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ABSTRACT	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  (chapters	  1	  –	  4)	   	   I	  argue	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  an	  
adequate	   conception	   of	   art	   until	  we	   have	   one	   that	   accommodates	   gardens.	   I	  
argue	   for	   this	  by	  demonstrating	   that	  gardens	  are	  sufficiently	   like	  paradigmatic	  
types	  of	  art	   to	  be	   included	   in	   the	  category	  of	  art.	  While	  doing	   this	   I	   show	  not	  
just	  how	  gardens	  are	   similar	   to	  other	   types	  of	  art	  but	  also	  how	  they	  combine	  
qualities	  shared	  with	  other	  types	  of	  arts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unique.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   second	   part	   (chapters	   5	   and	   6)	   I	   develop	   this	   claim.	   I	   consider	   the	  
dynamic	  nature	  of	  gardens	  and	  argue	  that	  gardens	  are	  most	   like	  performance	  
arts	   such	   as	   music	   and	   dance,	   and	   that	   their	   distinctiveness	   relies	   on	   the	  
particular	   dynamic	   character	   of	   the	   living	   organisms	   that	   constitute	   their	  
principal	  materials.	  
	  
I	  concludes	  this	  thesis	  (chapter	  7)	  by	  considering	  gardens	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
contemporary	  art	  genres	  of	  installation	  and	  environmental	  art.	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1	   Introduction	  
	  
In	  the	  18th	  century	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  gardens	  were	  works	  of	  
fine	  art	  and	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  that	  same	  assumption	  is	  still	  a	  commonplace	  of	  
popular	  media	  and	  popular	  opinion.	  Among	  philosophers	   in	   the	  18th	   century,	  
Immanuel	  Kant	  shared	  that	  assumption.	  Philosophy	  at	  that	  time	  had	  no	  need	  to	  
decide	  whether	  gardens	  were	  or	  were	  not	  art.	  Along	  with	  painting,	  music	  and	  
poetry,	  successful	  gardens,	   like	  tasteful	  dressing	  and	  beautiful	  (non-­‐functional)	  
furniture,	  were	  accepted	  as	  art.	  However,	  subsequently	  gardens	  were	  excluded	  
from	  the	   list	  of	  high	  arts	  and	   ignored	  by	  philosophers	  who	  wrote	  about	   those	  
arts.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  for	  this	  exclusion.	  
	  
In	  his	  Critique	  of	  Judgement	  Kant	  suggested	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  fine	  arts	  (beaux	  
arts)	  of	  his	  time,	  dividing	  them	  into	  three:	  	  the	  arts	  of	  speech,	  the	  formative	  arts	  
and,	   as	   he	  described	   it,	   “the	   art	   of	   the	  beautiful	   play	  of	   sensations”.	  He	   then	  
further	   divided	   the	   formative	   arts	   into	   plastic	   art	   (sculpture	   and	   architecture)	  
and	  painting,	  and	  painting	  into	  	  	  “painting	  proper”	  and	  	  “landscape	  gardening”.	  1	  
Painting	   proper	   involves	   “the	   beautiful	   portrayal	   of	   nature”	   and	   landscape	  
gardening	  involves	  “the	  beautiful	  arrangement	  of	  its	  products	  ”.2	  	  	  
	  
Kant	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  gardens,	  or	  at	  least	  landscape	  gardens,	  are	  “for	  the	  eye	  
only,	   just	   like	   painting”	   3	   and	   that	   a	   beautiful	   garden	   is	   one	   that	   meets	   an	  
aesthetic	  standard.	  It	  does	  this	  because,	  like	  any	  work	  of	  art,	  a	  beautiful	  garden	  
is,	  or	  should	  be,	  the	  object	  of	  a	  judgment	  of	  free	  beauty.	  A	  judgment	  of	  this	  kind	  
is	  one	  that	  everyone	  should	  make	  just	  because	  they	  should	  find	  it	  a	  pleasure	  to	  
look	   at.	   The	   first	   ‘should’	   expresses	   a	   normative	   claim.	   The	   second	   ‘should’	  
expresses	   a	   claim	   about	   what	   is	   to	   be	   expected.	   Kant	   thought	   that	   because	  
                                                
1	  Kant	  (2007)	  section	  51:	  187	   	   	    
2	  Ibid.	  section	  51:	  187 
3	  Ibid.	  section	  51:	  188 
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everyone	   has	   the	   same	   sensory	   equipment	   it	   is	   almost	   certain	   that	   everyone	  
will	  take	  pleasure	  in	  looking	  at	  a	  garden,	  if	  anyone	  does.	  This	  pleasure	  supplies	  a	  
good	  reason	  for	  making	  the	  judgment	  that	  a	  garden	  is	  beautiful.	  In	  this	  respect,	  
gardens	  are	  no	  different	  from	  paintings,	  sculptures	  or	  buildings	  that	  are	   lovely	  
to	  look	  at.	  They	  all	  supply	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  reason	  for	  making	  a	  judgment	  that	  
they	  are	  beautiful.	  	  
	  
Kant’s	   classification	   of	   landscape	   gardens	   as	  works	   of	   visual	   art	   reflected	   the	  
commonsense	  view	  of	  his	  time.	  They	  were	  works	  of	  art	  because	  their	  creation	  
required	  skill	  and	  planning	  and	  because	  they	  aspired	  to	  be	  beautiful	  to	  look	  at.	  	  
The	   view	   that	   gardens	   were	   primarily	   works	   of	   visual	   art	   persisted	   and	   was	  
strengthened	   by	   successive	   historical	   and	   aesthetic	   events	   such	   as	   the	   rise	   in	  
importance	  of	  the	  picturesque	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  quality,	  the	  continuing	  influence	  
of	   the	   Beaux	   Arts	   tradition	   and	   the	   influence	   of	  modernism	   as	   the	   dominant	  
theory	  of	  the	  arts	  during	  much	  of	  last	  century.	  In	  fact,	  the	  notion	  that	  gardens	  
are	  works	  of	  visual	  art	  like	  painting	  has	  remained	  unexplored	  until	  the	  last	  few	  
decades.	  
	  
I	   said	   that,	  since	  Kant’s	   time,	  mainstream	  Western	  philosophical	  attention	  has	  
moved	   away	   from	   gardens.	   Although	   philosophers	   have	   sometimes	   waxed	  
lyrical	   about	   gardens	   in	   their	   non-­‐professional	   writings	   they	   have	   largely	  
ignored	  them	  in	  their	  professional	  work.	  When	  Mara	  Miller’s	  The	  Garden	  as	  a	  
Work	   of	   Art1	   was	   published	   in	   1993	   it	   was	   the	   first	   serious,	   sustained	  
philosophical	   investigation	   in	   English	   of	   gardens	   as	  works	   of	   art	   for	   over	   150	  
years.	   Since	   Miller’s	   seminal	   book	   others	   by	   Ross2,	   Cooper3	   and	   Lee4	   have	  
followed	  and	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  volume	  of	  scholarly	  writing	  on	  the	  topic	  to	  be	  
found	  in	  journals	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                
1 Miller (1993) 
2 Ross (1998) 
3 Cooper (2006) 
4 Lee (2007) 
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As	  well	  as	  these	  philosophical	  books	  and	  articles	  there	  is	  now	  a	  steady	  flow	  of	  
scholarly	  articles,	  essays	  and	  books	  investigating	  many	  aspects	  of	  gardens	  from	  
the	  points	  of	  view	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  disciplines.	  Gardens	  are	  now	  being	  
examined	   and	   written	   about	   by	   sociologists,	   art	   and	   garden	   historians,	  
architects	   and	   landscape	   architects,	   archaeologists	   and	   philosophers	   of	   the	  
environment.	  	  
	  
This	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  explained	  at	   least	  partially	  by	  an	   increased	  popular,	  
scientific	  and	  philosophical	  interest	  in	  the	  aesthetics	  and	  ecology	  of	  the	  natural	  
environment.	   	   Accordingly,	   much	   of	   the	   recent	   writing	   considers	   gardens	   as	  
either	  part	  of,	  or	   in	  opposition	  to,	   the	  natural	  environment.	  Philosophers	  who	  
have	  written	   in	   this	   vein	   include	  Berleant1,	   Carlson2	   and	  Brady3.	   Similarly,	   the	  
practice	   of	   garden	   design	   has	   for	   many	   designers	   become	   inextricably	   linked	  
with	  the	  principles	  and	  practices	  of	  ecology.	  	  	  
	  
My	  thesis	   falls	   into	  two	  parts.	   In	   the	   first	  part	   I	  argue	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  an	  
adequate	   conception	   of	   art	   until	  we	   have	   one	   that	   accommodates	   gardens.	   I	  
argue	   for	   this	  by	  demonstrating	   that	  gardens	  are	  sufficiently	   like	  paradigmatic	  
types	  of	  art	   to	  be	   included	   in	   the	  category	  of	  art.	  While	  doing	   this	   I	   show	  not	  
just	  how	  gardens	  are	   similar	   to	  other	   types	  of	  art	  but	  also	  how	  they	  combine	  
qualities	  shared	  with	  other	  types	  of	  arts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unique.	  In	  the	  second	  
part	   I	  develop	   this	   claim.	   I	   consider	   the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  gardens	  and	  argue	  
that	  gardens	  are	  most	  like	  performance	  arts	  such	  as	  music	  and	  dance,	  and	  that	  
their	   distinctiveness	   relies	   on	   the	   particular	   dynamic	   character	   of	   the	   living	  
organisms	  that	  constitute	  their	  principal	  materials.	  	  
	  
Chapters	   two,	   three	  and	   four	   form	   the	   first	  part	  of	  my	   thesis.	   I	  begin	   chapter	  
two	  by	  listing	  traditional	  criteria	  for	  adequacy	  of	  conceptions	  and	  noting	  those	  
that	   I	   accept	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  my	   thesis.	   	   I	   then	   examine	   the	  mimetic	   and	  
                                                
1 Berleant (2004), (2007) 
2 Carlson ((2007), (2008) 
3 Brady (2003) 
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expression	  theories	   to	  assess	   their	  adequacy	   for	  accommodating	  paradigmatic	  
art	  works	  and	  gardens.	  I	  find	  that	  they	  are	  both	  inadequate.	  However,	  each	  of	  
these	   conceptions	   identifies	   a	   significant	   aspect	   or	   property	   that	   some	  
paradigmatic	   works	   of	   art	   possess.	   I	   show	   that	   some	   gardens	   also	   have	   that	  
aspect	  or	  property.	  	  
	  
In	   chapter	   three	   I	   examine	   the	   autonomous	   modernist	   conception	   and	   the	  
institutional	   theory	   to	  assess	   their	   adequacy	   for	   accommodating	  paradigmatic	  
art	  works	  and	  gardens.	   I	   find	   that	   they	   too	  are	   inadequate.	  However,	   like	   the	  
mimetic	   and	   expression	   conceptions,	   autonomous	   modernism	   identifies	   a	  
significant	  property	  of	   some	  paradigmatic	  works	  of	   art.	   	  All	   gardens	  have	   this	  
property.	   In	   autonomous	   modernism	   form	   is	   essential	   to	   art	   and,	   because	   I	  
identify	  gardens	  as	  “purposeful	  arrangements”,	  form	  is	  essential	  to	  them	  also.	  	  
	  
	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  institutional	  theory	  disregards	  gardens	  because	  gardeners	  and	  
garden	  designers	  are	  not	  officially	  artists	  and	   there	   is	  no	  garden	  subsystem	   in	  
The	  Artworld.	  For	  the	  same	  reasons	  the	  institutional	  theory	  excludes	  any	  object	  
which	   belongs	   to	   what	   ‘we’	   consider	   a	   paradigmatic	   art	   form,	   (sculpture,	   for	  
example),	   but	  which	   is	   produced	   in	   a	   society	   lacking	   an	   artworld,	   unless	   that	  
object	  has	  been	  appropriated	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art	  by	  a	  society	  in	  which	  there	  is	  an	  
artworld.	   I	   show	   that	   some	   contemporary	   and	   historical	   gardens	   possess	  
qualities	   and	   features	   which	   some	   artworld-­‐designated	   works	   of	   art	   possess,	  
and	  which	  are	  the	  reason	  for	  their	  being	  designated	  works	  of	  art	  and	  valued	  as	  
such.	  I	  claim	  that	  this	  unsatisfactory	  situation	  is	  due	  to	  problems	  inherent	  in	  the	  
structures	  and	  the	  membership	  criteria	  of	  The	  Artworld	  itself.	  
	  
In	   chapter	   four	   I	   introduce	   the	   cluster	   theory,	   and	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   the	   only	  
adequate	   conception	   of	   art.	   It	   satisfies	   my	   criteria	   for	   adequacy	   and	   it	   also	  
accommodates	  gardens.	  I	  conclude	  part	  one	  by	  claiming	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  
to	  exclude	  gardens	  from	  the	  category	  of	  art.	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The	   second	  part	   of	  my	   thesis	   consists	   of	   chapters	   five	   to	   seven.	   In	   this	   part	   I	  
explore	  the	  dynamic	  character	  of	  gardens.	  In	  chapter	  five	  I	  argue	  that	  dynamism	  
is	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   gardens,	   and	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   and	  
appreciation	  of	  them	  should	  take	  account	  of	  it.	  I	  describe	  how	  time	  and	  change	  
function	  in	  gardens	  and	  note	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  is	  both	  similar	  to,	  and	  different	  
from,	  what	  occurs	  in	  other	  arts.	  I	  argue	  that	  gardens	  are	  distinctive	  because	  of	  
the	   nature	   of	   their	   principal	  materials	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   those	  materials	  
change.	  I	  argue,	  further,	  that	  we	  experience	  gardens	  properly	  only	  when	  we	  pay	  
attention	   to	   their	   temporal	   aspect	   as	   much	   as	   to	   their	   ‘static’	   visual	  
configurations,	  and	  that	  when	  we	  do	  this	  our	  experience	  of	  them	  is	  analogous	  
to	  our	  experiences	  of	  musical	  performances	  and	  dance.	  
	  
	  In	  chapter	  six	  I	  examine	  analogies	  between	  gardens	  and	  the	  performance	  arts	  
of	   music	   and	   dance.	   Firstly,	   I	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   one	   way	   in	   which	   gardens	  
present	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  and	  claim	  that	   it	   is	  analogous	  to	  the	  way	   in	  which	  
music	   presents	   the	   passing	   of	   time.	   Secondly,	   I	   discuss	   analogies	   and	  
disanalogies	  between	  gardens	  and	  dance.	  
	  
In	  chapter	  seven	  I	  compare	  gardens	  with	  kinetic	  sculpture,	  installations	  and	  
environmental	  art	  and	  show	  that	  gardens	  share	  important	  aspects	  and	  
properties	  with	  these	  new	  paradigmatic	  arts	  forms	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
My	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  a	  brief	  chapter	  in	  which	  I	  summarize	  the	  conclusions	  I	  
draw	  from	  the	  principal	  arguments	  of	  both	  parts	  of	  my	  thesis.	  	  
	  
I	   end	   this	   introduction	  by	  considering	   the	  prior	  question	  of	  what	  gardens	  are.	  	  	  
In	   each	   of	   the	   three	   books	   about	   gardens	  written	   by	   philosophers	   during	   the	  
last	  fifteen	  years	  the	  authors	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  defining	  gardens.	  Only	  Miller1	  
offers	   a	   classical,	   or	   Socratic,	   definition	   in	   terms	   of	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	  
conditions.	   However,	   I	   reject	   parts	   of	   her	   definition	   for	   reasons	   I	   will	   give.	   	   I	  
                                                
1 Miller, op. cit. 
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believe	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	   have	   a	   clear	   idea	   of	  what	   I	  mean	   by	   the	   term	  
‘garden’	  so	  that	  when	  I	  use	  it	  you	  know	  what	  I	  am	  referring	  to,	  and	  so	  that	  my	  
claims	  can	  be	  evaluated	  appropriately.	  	  Although	  my	  interest	  is	  primarily	  in	  art	  
gardens,	  my	  definition	  needs	   to	   include	  all	   gardens	  and	  not	   just	  paradigmatic	  
art	   gardens.	   Any	   discussion	   of	   a	   garden-­‐as-­‐a-­‐work-­‐of-­‐art	   presupposes	   the	  
category	  ‘garden’,	  but	  need	  not	  imply	  that	  all	  gardens	  are	  works	  of	  art.	  	  
	  
Cooper	  is	  of	  little	  help	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  definition.	  Rather	  than	  starting	  out	  from	  
a	  classical	  definition	  of	  gardens	  he	  sees	  his	  whole	  book	  as	  “groping	  towards”1	  a	  
definition	  of	  the	  term.	  This	  would	  be	  acceptable	  if	  the	  book	  did	  finally	  grope	  its	  
way	   to	   an	   adequate	   definition,	   but	   that	   does	   not	   happen.	   Rather,	   Cooper	  
inclines	   towards	   a	   definition	   that	   he	   expresses	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   as	   follows:	  
“’Garden’	   is	  an	  entirely	   familiar	   term,	  and	  nearly	  every	  English	  speaker	  knows	  
what	  it	  means.	  Pressed	  to	  say	  what	  I	  mean,	  my	  response	  would	  be	  “The	  same	  as	  
you	  who	   are	   pressing	  me	  mean	  by	   it	   –	   so	   you	   already	   know	  what	   I	  mean.””2	  
Cooper	   is	   primarily	   interested	   in	   investigating	   the	   garden’s	   ability	   to	   enable	  
eudaimonia	  and	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  considering	  gardens	  as	  works	  of	  art.	  For	  this	  
reason,	   and	   more	   particularly	   because	   of	   its	   lack	   of	   usefulness,	   I	   ignore	   his	  
‘groping’.	  	  
	  
For	  Ross3,	  gardens	  are	  too	  various	  to	  be	  confined	  by	  a	  definition	  so,	  instead	  of	  
attempting	   one,	   she	   argues	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   term	   based	   on	   the	  
Wittgensteinian	  notion	  of	  family	  resemblance.	  An	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  
that	   it	  enables	  borderline	  cases,	  many	  of	  which	  would	  serve	  as	  good	  counter-­‐
examples	   to	   more	   rigorous	   definitions,	   to	   be	   brought	   under	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘garden’	  without	   elaborate	   cases	   having	   to	   be	  made	   for	   their	   inclusion.	  Using	  
Wittgenstein’s	   explanation	   of	   family	   resemblance,	   any	   two	   gardens	   can	   be	  
expected	  to	  share	  identifying	  traits,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  properties	  common	  to	  all	  
members	   of	   the	   class.	   	   However,	   I	   reject	   Ross’s	   invoking	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	  
                                                
1 Cooper, op. cit. p. 15 
2 Ibid. p. 13 
3 Ross, op. cit. p. 8 
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argument	  for	  the	  use	  of	  family	  resemblance	  as	  a	  defining	  tool	  and	  accordingly	  I	  
reject	  her	  definition	  based	  on	   it.	  Wittgenstein’s	   theory	   is	  useful	  because	  of	   its	  
wide	  embrace,	  but	  his	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘family	  resemblance’	  to	  describe	  how	  his	  
definition	   works	   is	   unacceptable.	   This	   is	   because	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	  
conditions	  do	  exist	  to	  describe	  a	  family	  and	  its	  members,	  and	  those	  conditions	  
do	  not	  include	  resemblance.	  An	  adequate	  classical	  definition	  already	  exists	  for	  a	  
biological	  family	  and,	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  small	  set	  of	  additional	  criteria,	  for	  a	  
family	  as	  a	  social	  unit.	   	  However,	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	   family	   resemblance	  
remains	  of	  some	  value	  for	  my	  purposes,	  because	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  precursor	  
to	   the	  cluster	   theory	  of	  art.	   In	  chapter	   four	   I	  argue	  that	   there	   is	  no	  adequate,	  
classical	   definition	   of	   art	   and,	   thus,	   a	   cluster	   definition,	   which	   offers	   a	   set	   of	  
criteria	   that	   might	   not	   be	   all	   met	   by	   any	   work	   of	   art,	   is	   the	   only	   acceptable	  
definition	  of	  art.	  
	  	  
Miller’s	   definition	   has	   two	   clauses.	   She	   states	   that	   a	   garden	   is	   “[i]	   any	  
purposeful	  arrangement	  of	  natural	  objects	   (such	  as	  sand,	  water,	  plants,	   rocks,	  
etc.)	   with	   exposure	   to	   the	   sky	   or	   open	   air,	   [ii]	   in	   which	   form	   is	   not	   fully	  
accounted	  for	  by	  purely	  practical	  considerations	  such	  as	  convenience.”1	   	   	   I	  will	  
accept	  that	  part	  of	  her	  first	  clause	  which	  states	  that	  a	  garden	  is	  “any	  purposeful	  
arrangement	  of	  natural	  objects	  (such	  as	  sand,	  water,	  plants,	  rocks,	  etc.)…”.	  It	  is	  
adequate	  for	  my	  purposes	  now	  because	  it	   is	  enough	  to	  pick	  out	  gardens,	  even	  
though	   it	   does	  not	   identify	   all	   their	   essential	   features.	   In	  particular,	   it	   ignores	  
the	  dynamism	  of	  gardens,	  which	  is	  going	  to	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  feature	  
of	  them.	   	  However,	   I	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  second	  part	  of	  her	   first	  clause.	  Not	  all	  
gardens	   need	   to	   have	   exposure	   to	   sky	   or	   open	   air.	   Interior	   gardens	   at	   scales	  
ranging	   from	  Victorian	   terrariums	   to	   large-­‐scale	  municipal	   conservatories	   and	  
‘winter	  gardens’	  are	  examples	  of	  types	  of	  gardens	  that	  an	  adequate	  definition	  
needs	  to	  include.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Miller op. cit. p. 15 
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I	  reject	  the	  second	  clause	  of	  her	  definition	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  there	   is	  no	  
good	  reason	  to	  deny	  that	  kitchen	  and	  herb	  gardens	  are	  gardens.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  
appropriate	  to	  take	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  in,	  and	  make	  aesthetic	  judgments	  about,	  
them.	  Secondly,	  gardens	  laid	  out	  according	  to	  practical	  considerations,	  such	  as	  
ease	  of	  maintenance	  or	  optimum	  productivity,	  may	  be	  beautiful	  because	   they	  
are	   well	   suited	   to	   a	   purpose,	   just	   as	   a	   well	   designed	   tennis	   racquet	   may	   be	  
beautiful	   because	   it	   is	   well	   suited	   to	   the	   purpose	   for	   which	   it	   was	   made.	  
Moreover,	  a	  well	  designed	  racquet	  may	  also	  be	   lovely	  to	   look	  at	   just	  as	  a	  well	  
designed	  vegetable	  garden	  may	  be	  lovely	  to	  look	  at.	  In	  Kantian	  terms	  gardens,	  
then,	   may	   be	   the	   objects	   not	   only	   of	   judgments	   of	   free	   beauty	   but	   also	   of	  
dependent	  beauty.	  	  
	  
Miller’s	   shortened	   definition	   comfortably	   includes	   the	   gardens	   that	   are	  
commonly	  considered	  to	  be	  works	  of	  art.	  Examples	  of	  such	  gardens	  are	  Monet’s	  
garden	   at	   Giverney,	   Charles	   Jencks	   and	   Maggie	   Keswick’s	   Garden	   of	   Cosmic	  
Speculation	  in	  Scotland,	  the	  gardens	  of	  the	  Palace	  of	  Versailles	  outside	  Paris	  and	  
the	   gardens	   at	   Stourhead	   and	   Stowe	   in	   England.	   These	   gardens	   are	   all	   well	  
known	   and	   highly	   regarded,	   and,	   like	   Miller,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   them,	   their	  
materials	   and	   the	   arrangement	   of	   their	   materials.	   However,	   other,	   more	  
‘ordinary’	  gardens	  may	  also	  potentially	  demonstrate	  qualities	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  
they	  may	  be	  considered	  works	  of	  art	  and,	  accordingly,	  I	  am	  equally	  interested	  in	  
such	  gardens.	  Examples	  of	  gardens	  of	   this	   sort	  are	  municipal	  bedding	  displays	  
and	   well	   designed	   vegetable	   plots,	   and	   Miller’s	   shortened	   definition	  
comfortably	  includes	  gardens	  like	  these	  too.	  
	  
I	   therefore	   adopt	   the	   shortened	   version	   of	   Miller’s	   definition	   as	   a	   working	  
definition:	  a	  garden	  is	  “any	  purposeful	  arrangement	  of	  natural	  objects	  (such	  as	  
sand,	  water,	  plants,	  rocks,	  etc.)…”.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  I	  acknowledge,	  along	  with	  
Miller,	  that	  many	  gardens	  also	  incorporate	  unnatural	  objects,	  such	  as	  fibreglass	  
sculptures,	  ceramic	  birdbaths,	  glass,	  mosaics,	  etc.	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2	   Conceptions	  of	  Art	  –	  Mimesis	  and	  the	  Expression	  
Theory	  
	  
What	  we	   now	   think	   of	   as	   art	   has	   been	   produced	   throughout	   human	   history.	  
There	   have	   been	   attempts	   from	   time	   to	   time	   to	   formulate	   an	   intellectual	  
framework	  by	  which	  to	  explain,	   identify	  and	   justify	   the	  practices	  whereby	   it	   is	  
produced	   and	   to	   classify	   and	   evaluate	   their	   products.	   These	   frameworks,	   or	  
conceptions,	  have	  varied	  in	  scope,	  emphasis	  and	  purpose.	  Some	  have	  proposed	  
a	  classificatory	  definition,	  others	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  essence	  and	  value	  
of	  the	  practices	  and	  their	  products,	  and	  others	  have	  functioned	  as	  apologies	  for	  
highly	  novel	  or	  subversive	  products	  and	  activities.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  examine	  two	  
important	   conceptions	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   their	   adequacy	   in	   terms	   of	  
accommodating	  gardens.	  These	  are	  mimesis	  and	  the	  expression	  theory.	  	  
	  
Traditionally,	   an	   adequate	   conception	   of	   art	   should	   satisfy	   metaphysical	   and	  
epistemological	  criteria.	  For	  example,	  some	  philosophers	  have	  assumed	  that	  an	  
adequate	  conception	  of	  art	  should	  (i)	   identify	  art’s	  essential	  nature	  and	  value,	  
(ii)	  provide	  the	  means	  to	  identify	  works	  of	  art	  and	  (iii)	  not	  exclude	  paradigmatic	  
works	   of	   art	   or	   include	   objects	   generally	   agreed	   not	   to	   be	  works	   of	   art.	   One	  
consequence	   of	   my	   examination	   of	   historical	   conceptions	   is	   that	   art	   has	   no	  
essential	   nature	   or	   value	   and	   therefore	   the	  metaphysical	   tasks	   outlined	   in	   (i)	  
above	   would	   not	   make	   sense.	   However,	   I	   will	   accept	   that	   an	   adequate	  
conception	  should	  enable	  those	  who	  accept	  it	  to	  identify,	  and	  perhaps	  evaluate	  	  
art	   objects	   both	   individually	   and	   comparatively,	   and	   it	   should	   not	   exclude	  
paradigmatic	  examples	  of	  art	  nor	  include	  objects	  generally	  agreed	  not	  to	  be	  art.	  	  
In	   other	  words,	   I	   accept	   that	   an	   adequate	   conception	   of	   art	   should	  meet	   the	  
second	  and	  third	  criteria	  cited	  above.	  I	  sometimes	  refer	  to	  these	  two	  criteria	  as	  
the	  identity	  and	  the	  inclusion	  criteria	  respectively.	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Mimesis	  
Conception	  of	  Art	  
In	  The	  Republic1,	  Plato	  identified	  image	  making,	  or	  mimesis,	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  
collection	  of	  practices	  that	   included	  music,	  drama,	  dance,	  poetry	  and	  painting.	  
Plato	  did	  not	   categorize	  only	   these	  activities	  as	  art.	   ‘Art’	  was	  a	  wider	   concept	  
that	  implied	  skill,	  and	  elsewhere	  Plato	  mentioned	  the	  arts	  of	  bed	  making,	  shoe	  
making,	   hunting,	  warfare	   and	   politics.	   The	   images	   that	  musicians,	   dramatists,	  
dancers,	   poets	   and	   painters	   made	   are	   images	   that	   represent	   actual	   things.	  
Images	   represent	   actual	   things	   because	   they	   look	   like,	   sound	   like	   or	   feel	   like	  
them.	  They	  are	  perceptually	  similar	  to	  them.	  Looking	  at	  a	  painting	  of	  a	  table	  is	  
like	  looking	  at	  a	  table	  because	  the	  image	  looks	  like	  a	  table	  looks	  from	  a	  certain	  
angle,	  in	  a	  certain	  light.	  Similarly,	  listening	  to	  a	  melody	  that	  has	  been	  composed	  
to	   imitate	  a	  cuckoo’s	   song	   is	   like	   listening	   to	  a	  cuckoo	  because	   the	  composed	  
melody	  sounds	  like	  the	  bird’s	  song	  on	  account	  of	  its	  sharing	  pitch	  and	  rhythmic	  
characteristics	  with	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  images	  depict	  the	  objects	  they	  represent.	  
This	   simple	   account	   of	   depiction,	   which	   ignores	   all	   the	   complications	   of	  
contemporary	   accounts,	   such	   as	   those	   of	   Wollheim2	   and	   Goodman3,	   is	  
adequate	  for	  my	  purposes.	  	  	  
	  	  
For	  Plato,	   the	  value	  of	   images	   lay	  not	   in	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   they	   resembled	  
what	   they	   depicted	   (their	   life-­‐likeness),	   or	   exhibited	   beauty,	   but	   in	   the	  
opportunity	   they	  offered	   for	   a	  better	  understanding	  of	   the	  world	   and	  how	   to	  
live	  in	  it.	  He	  did	  not	  think	  they	  offered	  very	  much	  of	  an	  opportunity.	  For	  Plato,	  
images	  were	  “third	  in	  succession	  from	  the	  throne	  of	  truth.”4	  They	  belonged	  on	  
the	   lowest	   tier	   of	   his	   metaphysical	   hierarchy,	   together	   with	   dreams	   and	  
hallucinations,	  and	  appealed	  to	  people	  because	  they	  aroused	  strong	  emotions	  
in	  them.	  For	  both	  these	  reasons	  they	  were	  unreliable	  guides	  for	  life.	  	  
                                                
1 Plato (2004) pp. 5-14 
2 Wollheim (1987) 
3 Goodman (1968) 
4 Plato op. cit. p. 9  
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For	  Aristotle,	  the	  essence	  of	  music,	  drama,	  dance,	  poetry	  and	  painting	  was	  still	  
mimesis	   and	   he	   understood	   mimesis	   to	   be	   representation	   by	   virtue	   of	  
perceptual	  resemblances.	  Like	  Plato,	  he	  believed	  that	  abstract	  arts	  like	  music	  or	  
dance	  were	  able	  to	  represent	  as	  well	  as	  the	  non-­‐abstract	  arts	  could.	  Thus	  dance	  
“…	   imitates	   character,	  emotion,	  and	  actions	  by	   rhythmical	  movement…”1,	   and	  
music	  uses	  rhythm	  and	  harmony	  (melody	  to	  us)	  to	  imitate	  “…	  	  the	  passions	  or	  
states	  of	  the	  soul.”2	  However,	  he	  offered	  a	  different	  account	  from	  Plato’s	  of	  the	  
value	  of	  images.	  He	  thought	  they	  could	  offer	  insights	  that	  would	  enable	  people	  
to	  live	  better.	  For	  example,	  tragedy	  enabled	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  world	  was	  
such	  that	  good	  people	  (like	  us)	  could	  do	  morally	  bad	  things	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  
their	  own.	  This	   insight	  was	  achieved	   through	   the	  catharsis	  of	  pity	  and	   fear.	   In	  
Poetics	  Aristotle	  wrote	  that	  tragedy	  culminates	  by	  means	  of	  pity	  and	  fear	  in	  the	  
cleansing	  of	   those	  same	  passions.3	   	   In	  other	  words,	  we	   feel	  pity	   for	   the	   tragic	  
hero	   and	   fear	   for	   ourselves	   and	   these	   emotions	   arise	   from	   seeing	   that	   the	  
events	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  happened	  to	  the	  tragic	  hero	  could	  happen	  to	  ourselves.	  
The	  fact	  that	  tragedy	  arouses	  strong	  emotions	  did	  not	  mean	  we	  could	  not	  learn	  
valuable	   lessons	   from	   it,	   and	   in	   thinking	   this	  way	   Aristotle	   contradicted	  what	  
Plato	  had	  believed	  about	  the	  value	  of	  strong	  emotions.	  	  
	  
The	   mimetic	   conception	   of	   Plato	   and	   Aristotle	   remained	   the	   most	   accepted	  
philosophical	   statement	   of	   an	   art	   conception	   right	   through	   until	   the	   19th	  
century.	  Although	  it	  lasted	  a	  long	  time	  it	  did	  not	  remain	  untested.	  Well	  before	  
the	   controversial	   art	   products	   of	   the	   late	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	   centuries	  
appeared	  and	  sounded	  its	  death	  knell	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  even	  the	  visual	  arts,	  more	  
conventional	   arts	   products	   had	   been	   testing	   mimesis	   almost	   since	   its	   first	  
formulation.	   Architecture	   was	   regarded	   in	   ancient	   Greece	   as	   a	   technical	  
accomplishment	   rather	   that	   image	  making	  and	   therefore	   it	  never	   fitted	  under	  
the	   conception.	   However,	   in	   retrospect,	   the	   important	   buildings	   of	   Ancient	  
                                                
1 Aristotle (1994-2009) 1:1 
2 Grout (1980) p. 87  
3 Aristotle (1941) pp. 1455-1475 
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Greece,	  and	  of	  all	  the	  major	  empires	  and	  cities	  that	  followed	  –	  consider	  Hagia	  
Sophia	   	   -­‐	   have	   long	   been	   considered	   to	   be	   art	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   not	   being	  
mimetic.	   Renaissance	   gardens	   such	   as	   that	   at	   the	   Villa	   Lante	   lack	   significant	  
mimetic	  elements	  yet	  have	  long	  been	  considered	  art.	  And	  music’s	  development	  
as	  an	  art	  prior	  to	  the	  19th	  century	  –	  consider	  Bach’s	  Art	  of	  Fugue	  –	  meant	  that	  it	  
had	  long	  outgrown	  any	  explanation	  of	  its	  essence	  and	  value	  based	  on	  mimesis.	  	  
	  
I	   noted	   above	   that	   the	   conception	  of	  mimesis	   became	   generally	   untenable	   in	  
the	   face	   of	   developments	   in	   many	   of	   the	   arts	   from	   the	   late	   19th	   century	  
onwards.	   Early	   20th	   century	  modernism’s	   inclination	   towards	   abstraction	   was	  
problematic	  as	  were	  later	  developments	  in	  Dadaism	  and	  aleatoric	  art,	  to	  name	  
just	   two	   styles.	   The	  objets	   trouvés	   of	   Duchamp	   and	   his	   fellow	  Dadaists	  made	  
statements	   about	   art	   but	   they	  made	   no	   attempt	   to	   represent	   anything,	   they	  
simply	  were	  something.	   	  The	  aleatoric	  artists	   like	  Cage	  and	  his	  followers	  made	  
art	  based	  on	  the	  throw	  of	  a	  dice	  or	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  I	  Ching	  and	  for	  them	  art	  
had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  representation,	  although,	  in	  retrospect,	  some	  may	  have	  
chosen	   to	   argue	   that	   it	   represented	   the	   chaotic	   nature	   of	   matter	   and	   the	  
universe.	  	  	  
	  
Architecture	  and	  music,	  de	  facto	  exclusions	  from	  the	  conception	  for	  centuries,	  
were	  now	  joined	  by	  the	  previously	  mimetic	  visual	  arts,	  and	  any	  other	  arts	  to	  the	  
degree	   that	   those	   arts	   could	   or	   wanted	   to	   become	   abstract.	   Painting	   and	  
sculpture	   were	   no	   longer	   essentially	   depictive	   and	   therefore	   the	   mimetic	  
conception	  was	   no	   longer	   adequate	   to	   describe	   them.	   Furthermore,	   as	   noted	  
earlier,	   some	  arts,	   including	  most	  music,	  had	  not	  been	  essentially	  mimetic	   for	  
many	  centuries.	  	  
	  
The	  conception	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  the	  inclusion	  criterion	  because	  neither	  the	  earlier	  
paradigmatic	  works	  mentioned	  above,	  nor	  20th	  century	  ones	  such	  as	  Schwartz’s	  
Bagel	  Garden	  (see	  Figure	  5,	  p.	  58)	  and	  Cage’s	  4’33,	  are	  mimetic,	  and	  therefore	  
the	   conception	   is	   unable	   to	   accommodate	   them.	   It	   also	   fails	   the	   identity	  
criterion.	  If	  mimesis	  were	  to	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  objects	  as	  works	  of	  art	  then	  you	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would	  identify	  many	  things	  that	  are	  not	  art.	  Children's	  toys,	  signs	  on	  toilet	  doors	  
and	  anybody’s	  whistling	   in	   imitation	  of	  a	   tui’s	   song	  would	  all	  be	  works	  of	  art.	  
Conversely,	  it	  would	  also	  exclude	  many	  objects,	  such	  as	  Bach’s	  Art	  of	  Fugue	  and	  
the	  other	  works	  mentioned	  above,	  that	  most	  people	  agree	  are	  works	  of	  art.	  	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   a	   mimetic	   theory	   in	   which	   the	   only	   form	   of	   representation	   was	  
depictive	   never	   worked	   for	   literature.	   It	   worked	   for	   dramatic	   performances	  
because	  looking	  at	  and	  listening	  to	  the	  actor	  speaking	  his	  lines	  was	  like	  looking	  
at	  and	  listening	  to	  the	  character	  praising	  his	  faithful	  friend	  or	  pleading	  with	  his	  
wife	   not	   to	   desert	   him.	   Dramatic	   performances	   do	   depict,	   but	   novels,	   and	  
poems	  read	  silently,	  do	  not.	  Novels	  might	  encourage	  readers	  to	  imagine	  seeing	  
or	   hearing	   characters	   praising	   friends	   or	   pleading	   with	   wives	   and	   to	   imagine	  
seeing	  a	  wife	  returning	  to	  her	  pleading	  husband,	  but	  words	  do	  not	  represent	  as	  
images	  do.	  	  
	  
Depictive	   representation	  of	  emotions	  has	  been	  understood	   to	  be	  a	   feature	  of	  
the	  abstract	  arts	  ever	  since	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  included	  music	  and	  dance	  in	  their	  
lists	  of	  image	  making	  activities.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  representations	  occur	  
are	  complex	  and	   I	   consider	   them	   in	  detail	   later.	   	   	  At	   this	   stage	   it	   is	  enough	  to	  
reiterate	   that	   abstract	   arts	   can	   depict	   emotions	   directly	   and	   that	   these	  
depictions	   are	   based	   on	   perceptual	   resemblances.	   	   For	   example,	   music	   may	  
represent	  sadness	  because	  it	  has	  a	  melody	  that	  is	  tortuous,	  slow	  and	  in	  a	  minor	  
key.1	   In	  this	  case	  the	  music	  represents	  sadness	  because	   it	  sounds	   like	  the	  way	  
sad	  people	  sound	  when	  they	  speak	  or	  otherwise	  express	  themselves	  vocally.	  	  
	  
The	  traditional	  mimetic	  theories	  of	  the	  arts	  employed	  a	  concept	  of	  mimesis	   in	  
which	  perceptual	  resemblances	  were	  the	  basis	  of	  depictive	  representation.	  I	  call	  
this	  direct	  depictive	  representation.	   In	  cases	  of	  direct	  depictive	  representation	  
images	   represent	   actual	   things	   because	   they	   look	   like,	   sound	   like	   of	   feel	   like	  
them	  and	  we	  are	  aware	  of	   these	   resemblances	   through	  our	   senses.	  However,	  
                                                
1 Cooke (1959) 
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an	  adequate	  account	  of	  depictive	  representation	  needs	  to	  account	  not	  only	  for	  
perceptual	   resemblances	   but	   also	   for	   perceived	   resemblances.	   Perceived	  
resemblances	  are	  not	  necessarily	  based	  on	  perceptual	  resemblances.	  Perceived	  
resemblances	  do	  not	  necessarily	  depend	  on	  whether	  an	  image	  looks,	  sounds	  or	  
feels	  like	  what	  it	  represents:	  when	  perceived	  resemblances	  are	  non-­‐perceptual	  
they	   depend	   for	   resemblance	   on	   socially	   agreed	   conventions	   that	   involve	   the	  
devices	   of	   metaphor	   and	   metonymy.	   When	   perceived	   resemblances	   are	  
involved	  I	  call	  the	  process	  symbolic,	  or	  indirect,	  representation.	  I	  now	  show	  how	  
both	  of	  these	  types	  of	  representation	  function.	  
	  
Depictive	   representation	   depends	   on	   perceptual	   likeness	   between	   an	   image	  
and	  what	   is	  being	   represented	  by	   it.	  Words,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  are	  not	  at	  all	  
perceptually	  like	  what	  they	  represent.	  Thus,	  the	  word	  ‘blossom’	  does	  not	  look,	  
sound,	  smell	  or	  feel	  like	  a	  blossom	  and	  nor	  is	  it	  structured	  like	  one.	  However	  it	  
still	   successfully	   represents	   blossoms	   to	   English	   speakers.	   Both	   images	   and	  
words	   can	   represent	   in	   a	  way	   I	   describe	   as	  direct.	   The	   two	   steps	  occurring	   in	  
direct	  representation	  by	  images	  and	  words	  are	  shown	  below.	  
	  
A	  painting	  of	  a	  blossom	  
ê	  
represents	  (depicts)	  a	  blossom	  
because	  it	  looks	  like	  one	  
Figure	  1	  Direct	  depictive	  representation.	  
 
The	  word	  ‘blossom’	  
ê	  
represents	  a	  blossom	  because	  of	  conventions	  
although	  it	  doesn’t	  look	  like	  one	  
Figure	  2	  Direct	  linguistic	  representation.	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The	  conventions	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  case	  of	  direct	  linguistic	  representation	  above	  
are	   the	   socially	   agreed	   conventions	   within	   a	   culture	   that	   enable	   particular	  









Symbolic,	  or	  indirect,	  representation	  is	  a	  more	  complex	  type	  of	  representation	  
that	   can	   also	   involve	   both	   images	   and	   words.	   It	   functions	   partially	   as	   in	   the	  
above	  modes	   but	   it	   involves	   an	   additional	   step.	   The	   three	   steps	   occurring	   in	  
symbolic	  representation	  by	  words	  and	  images	  are	  shown	  below.	  
	  
The	  word	  ‘blossom’	  
ê	  
represents	  a	  blossom	  because	  of	  conventions	  
although	  it	  does	  not	  look	  like	  one	  
ê	  
and	  this	  word	  may	  also	  represent,	  say,	  youth,	  spring	  or	  joy	  	  
because	  of	  conventions	  
although	  it	  does	  not	  look	  like	  any	  of	  those	  things	  
figure	  3	  Symbolic	  linguistic	  representation.	  
A	  painting	  of	  a	  blossom	  
ê	  
represents	  (depicts)	  a	  blossom	  
because	  it	  looks	  like	  one	  
ê	  
and	  this	  painting	  may	  also	  represent,	  say,	  youth,	  spring	  or	  joy	  	  
because	  of	  conventions	  
although	  it	  does	  not	  look	  like	  any	  of	  those	  things	  
Figure	  4	  Symbolic	  depictive	  representation.	  
 
The	   conventions	   referred	   to	   in	   step	   three	   of	   each	   types	   of	   symbolic	  
representation	   are	   different	   from	   the	   conventions	   already	   discussed	   above,	  
which	   allow	   words	   to	   function	   as	   arbitrary	   signs	   for	   other	   things.	   The	  
conventions	   here	   referred	   to	   involve	  metaphor,	  which	   is	   based	   on	   perceived,	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but	  not	  necessarily	  perceptual,	   similarities,	   and	  metonymy,	  which	   is	  based	  on	  
relationships	  such	  as	  cause	  and	  effect	  or	  part	  and	  whole.	  The	  conventions	  that	  
allow	  metaphor	   and	  metonymy	   to	  work	   are	   socially	   agreed,	   but	   need	   not	   be	  
arbitrary.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  example	  of	  symbolic	  linguistic	  representation	  above	  (Figure	  3.	  p.	  18)	  the	  
represented	  blossom	  may	   in	   turn	   represent	   youth	  or	   spring.	   It	  may	   represent	  
youth	   because	   of	   perceived	   (cf.	   perceptual)	   similarities	   between	  blossom	  and	  
youth:	   	  blossoms	  appear	  early	   in	  the	  annual	  seasonal	  cycle	  and	  that	  therefore	  
reminds	   us	   of	   youth,	   which	   is	   the	   early	   stage	   of	   life.	   This	   representation	   of	  
youth	  by	  blossoms	   involves	  metaphor.	  The	  blossom	  may	  also	  represent	  spring	  
because	   it	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	   whole	   season	   of	   which	   it	   is	   a	   part,	   and	   that	  
representation	  involves	  metonymy.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  example	  above	  of	  symbolic	  depictive	  representation	  (Figure	  4,	  p.	  18)	  the	  
painting	  of	  a	  blossom	  depicts	  a	  blossom	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  painting	  may	  represent	  
youth	  or	  spring.	  The	  first	  stage	  of	  this	  process	  is	  depictive	  and	  the	  second	  stage	  
is	  non-­‐depictive.	  Thus,	  the	  painted	  image	  represents	  the	  blossom	  by	  looking	  like	  
it	   and	   the	   blossom	  may	   in	   turn	   represent,	   say,	   youth	   or	   spring	   or	   joy	   to	   the	  
initiated	  because,	  although	  it	  looks	  nothing	  like	  it,	  it	  reminds	  us	  of	  those	  things	  
by	  virtue	  of	  perceived	  connections	  between	  blossoms	  and	  youth.	  This	  symbolic	  
depictive	   representation	   occurs	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   the	   word	   ‘blossom’	  
metaphorically	  represents,	  say,	  youth	  in	  symbolic	  linguistic	  representation.	  Both	  
direct	   and	   symbolic	   (indirect)	   depictive	   representation	   occur	   in	   gardens	   and	  
typical	  examples	  of	  them	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
	  
My	   discussion	   above	   has	   focused	   on	   symbolic	   (indirect)	   representation.	  
However,	   although	   this	   form	   of	   representation	   was	   not	   envisaged	   by	   Plato’s	  
and	  Aristotle’s	   conception,	   taking	   it	   into	   account	   does	  not	   turn	   a	   so-­‐modified	  
mimesis	  theory	  into	  an	  adequate	  conception	  of	  art.	  It	  remains	  a	  fact	  that	  all	  art	  
is	  not	  essentially	  mimetic,	  and	  therefore	  a	  mimetic	  conception	  modified	  in	  that	  
way	  still	  does	  not	  satisfy	  my	  identity	  and	  inclusion	  criteria.	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Gardens	  
Gardens	   may	   have	   individual	   mimetic	   features	   such	   as	   floral	   clocks,	   topiary	  
mythological	  figures	  or	  animals,	  parterre	  patterns,	  sculptures,	  statuary,	  ‘Greek’	  
temples	   and	   ‘Chinese’	   pagodas.	   Gardens	  may	   also	   have	   linked	   elements	   that	  
form	   larger-­‐scale	   mimetic	   features	   such	   as	   the	   much	   described,	   classical	  
passages	  devised	  at	  Stowe.	  All	   these	  features	  are	  examples	  of	  direct	  depictive	  
representation.	  
	  
Some	  constructed	  garden	  landscapes,	  such	  as	  the	  rock	  gardens	  of	  19th	  century	  
Europe,	  were	   small	   scale	   re-­‐creations	   parts	   of	   natural	   landscapes	   such	   as	   the	  
Swiss	  and	   Italian	  Alps.	  These	  rock	  gardens	  were	  able	   to	  bring	  an	   image	  of	   the	  
Alps	   into	   a	   garden	   and	  were	   coincidentally	   able	   to	   import	   that	   highly	   valued	  
19th	  century	  aesthetic	  quality,	  sublimity.	  Gardens	  today	  often	  aim	  to	  re-­‐create	  
natural	   landscapes,	   either	   pictorially,	   as	   in	   the	   desert	   recreations	   of	   the	  
Australian	   Garden	   in	   Victoria,	   Australia,	   or	   by	   employing	   ecologies	   or	   plants	  
found	   in	  a	  particular	  native	   landscape,	  as	   in	  Waitangi	  Park	   in	  Wellington,	  New	  
Zealand.	   The	   mimetic	   features	   of	   all	   these	   gardens	   are	   examples	   of	   direct	  
depictive	  representations	  of	  natural	  landscapes	  and	  ecological	  systems	  existing	  
elsewhere.	  These	  representations	  are	  based	  on	  perceived	  visual	   resemblances	  
between	  the	  gardens	  and	  the	   landscapes	  and	  ecological	  systems	  gardens	  they	  
represent.	  
	  
The	  19th	  century	   rock	  gardens	  described	  above	  were	  an	  attempt	   to	  depict	  an	  
exotic	  landscape	  within	  a	  garden.	  More	  commonly	  though,	  gardens	  have	  aimed	  
to	  re-­‐create	  a	  desirable	  geographical	  or	  historical	  ‘elsewhere’	  not	  by	  importing	  a	  
whole	  landscape	  but	  by	  simply	  importing	  plants,	   layouts	  and	  built	  form	  typical	  
of	   that	  other	  place.	   In	   this	  way,	   fashionable	   suburban	  and	   city	   gardeners	   and	  
designers	   sometimes	  attempt	   to	   represent	   Italian	  gardens.	  Cottage	  gardenists	  
often	   aim	   to	   represent	   small	   pieces	   of	   Victorian	   England,	   while	   sophisticated	  
contemporary	  gardeners	  may	  aim	  for	  a	  Bloomsbury	  look.	  The	  mimetic	  features	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of	  all	   these	  gardens	  are	  examples	  of	  direct	  depictive	   representation,	  either	  of	  
other	  gardens	  or	  spatial	  configurations	  existing	  or	  imagined	  to	  exist	  elsewhere.	  	  
These	   representations	   are	   based	   on	   perceptual	   resemblances	   between	   the	  
gardens	  and	  the	  other	  gardens	  and	  spatial	  configurations	  they	  represent.	  
	  
In	   some	   historical	   periods	   gardens	   have	   sought	   to	   represent	   paradise.	  	  
Sometimes	   this	   has	   occurred	   by	  way	   of	   depicting	   plants	   and	   layouts	   that	   the	  
initiated	   would	   have	   recognized	   as	   representing	   paradise	   because	   the	   plants	  
looked	  like	  those	  they	  believed	  grew	  in	  paradise	  and	  because	  the	  layouts	  looked	  
like	   what	   they	   believed	   paradise	   looked	   like.	   In	   these	   cases,	   representations	  
were	   based	   on	   perceived	   visual	   resemblances	   between	   real	   and	   imagined	  
objects	   and	  places.	   At	   other	   times,	   paradise	  was	   depicted	  more	   abstractly.	   In	  
such	  gardens,	  symmetrical	  layouts	  and	  qualities	  such	  as	  pleasantness,	  comfort,	  
fecundity	  and	  harmony	  would	  have	  been	  understood	  as	  representing	  paradise	  
because	   they	   felt,	   looked,	   sounded	   and	   perhaps	   even	   smelt	   like	   how	   the	  
initiated	   imagined	  paradise	   to	   feel,	   look,	   sound	   and	   smell.	   For	   example,	   early	  
Muslim	  gardens	  and	  mediaeval	  Christian	  gardens	  were	  often	  characterized	  by	  a	  
rectilinear	  enclosure	  and	  a	  rectilinear	  layout	  divided	  by	  water	  canals	  leading	  to	  
a	   central	   pond.	   The	   gardens	   often	   walled	   off	   the	   outside	   world,	   contained	  
plants	  that	  profited	  from	  the	  shelter	  and	  support	  the	  walls	  offered	  and	  supplied	  
shade	  and	  water	  for	  visitors.	  Although	  these	  individual	  objects	  and	  relationships	  
meant	   different	   things	   in	   different	   local	   cultures	   there	   was	   a	   general	  
understanding	   that	   such	   garden	   elements	   expressed	   harmony,	   plenty,	   shade	  
and	   coolness	   and	   so	   on,	   and	   that	   these	   qualities	   were	   in	   turn	   suggestive	   of	  
paradise.	   In	   cases	   like	   this,	   gardens	   depicted	   paradise	   not	   only	   because	   they	  
looked	  like	  it	  but	  also	  because	  they	  felt,	  sounded	  and	  perhaps	  even	  smelt	  like	  it.	  
Thus,	   the	   representations	   of	   paradise	   achieved	   in	   this	   way	   were	   based	   on	   a	  
variety	  of	  perceived	  perceptual	  resemblances.	  
	  
Victorian	  English	  public	  parks	  were,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  Plato	  may	  have	  approved	  of,	  
designed	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	   ‘good’	  (i.e.	  aristocratic)	   living.	  The	  parks	  depicted	  
elements	   of	   the	   contemporary	   aristocratic	   parklands	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   visual	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resemblances	  to	  them.	  They	  did	  this	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  all	  the	  citizenry	  might,	  by	  
being	   allowed	   to	   experience	   an	   aristocratic	   landscape,	   become	   aware	   of	   and	  
ideally	  adopt	  the	  ‘higher’	  values	  associated	  with	  that	  class.	  The	  depictions	  were	  
expressive	   of	   values	   and	   they	   represented	   a	   way	   of	   living	   that	   was	   deemed	  
desirable	  and	  therefore	  to	  be	  aspired	  to.	  	  
	  
I	  have	  provided	  examples	  of	  gardens	  that	  directly	  depict	  whole	  landscapes	  and	  
also	  other	  gardens	  and	  places.	  However,	  gardens	  can	  exhibit	  symbolic	  depictive	  
representation	   too	   and	   thereby	   represent	   a	   range	   of	   ideas	   and	   concepts.	   	   	   A	  
typical	   example	   of	   this	   type	   of	   representation	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   a	   formal	   17th	  
century	  European	  garden	  such	  as	  that	  at	  Versailles.	  At	  Versailles,	  the	  relentless,	  
extensive	  geometry	  of	  the	  layout	  cuts	  through	  the	  landscape,	  demolishing	  and	  
reshaping	   everything	   in	   its	   path	   in	   a	   way	   that	   has	   little	   respect	   for	   existing	  
vegetation	  and	  landform,	  or	  for	  the	  subtleties	  and	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  site.	  To	  
a	   visitor,	   this	   looks	   like	   ruthless	   treatment	   of	   the	   landscape	   and	   its	   resources	  
and	   it	  may	   in	   turn	   put	   her	   in	  mind	  of	   the	  way	   an	   absolute	  monarch	   behaves	  
towards	  his	  subjects.	  The	  power	  exerted	  over	  the	  landscape	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  
like	  the	  power	  of	  the	  absolute	  monarch	  over	  his	  people.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  garden	  
is	  a	  metaphor	  for	  absolute	  power.	  	  
	  
The	  gardens	  of	  classical	  Rome	  provide	  further	  examples	  of	  gardens	  that	  exhibit	  
symbolic	   depictive	   representation.	   Those	   gardens	  were	   replete	  with	   statuary,	  
buildings	   and	   other	   built	   form.	   This	   meant	   that	   they	   were	   able	   not	   only	   to	  
depict	  a	  range	  of	  people,	  object	  and	  scenes	  but	  also	  to	  represent	  symbolically	  
quite	  complex,	  abstract	  notions.	  For	  example,	  Kuttner1	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  
the	   gardens	   of	   Hadrian’s	   villa	   at	   Tivoli,	   quite	   apart	   from	   their	   splendid	   and	  
enduring	  aesthetic	  and	  depictive	  qualities,	  would	  have	  represented	  to	  initiated	  
guests	  Rome’s	  and	  the	  emperor’s	  naval	  prowess	  and	  history,	  although	  they	  did	  
not	   look	   like	   those	   things.	  According	   to	  Kuttner,	   they	  did	   this	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	  
way	   different	   depictive	   and	   non-­‐depictive	   elements	   were	   arranged	   and	  
                                                
1 Kuttner (2003) 
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organized	  three-­‐dimensionally	  with	  reference	  to	  each	  other	  and	  to	  the	  viewers.	  
For	  example	  she	  describes	  how,	  “…	  a	  flooded	  stadium	  garden	  and	  artificial	  river	  
source	  cavern	  convokes	  [sic]	  the	  world’s	  rivers	  feeding	  into	  the	  Mediterranean,	  
as	  if	  the	  peripatetic	  Hadrian	  had	  authored	  both	  the	  global	  environment	  for	  his	  
journeys	   of	   governance	   and	   its	   cultural	   geography.”1	   	   She	   further	   describes	  
how,	   “From	   the	   walkways	   and	   from	   within,	   the	   pool	   edges	   …	   become	   the	  
margins	  of	  a	  periplus	   [circumnavigation]	  around	  Hadrian’s	  empire:	  Asia,	  Egypt	  
and	  Europe.”2	  	  
	  
Writers3	   4	   agree	   that	   Japanese	  and	  Chinese	  gardens	   can	  be	  directly	  depictive,	  
like	   the	   Alpine	   rock	   gardens	   referred	   to	   above,	   or,	   for	   the	   initiated,	   they	   can	  
symbolically	  represent	  complex	  ideas	  concerning	  nature,	  the	  soul,	  permanence	  
and	   impermanence,	   and	   so	   on.	   Both	   direct	   and	   indirect	   depictive	  
representation	  are	  often	  found	  in	  combination	  in	  Asian	  monastery	  gardens.	  The	  
monastery	   gardens	   served	   as	   meditative	   tools	   to	   encourage	   monks	   in	   their	  
pursuit	  of	  higher	  things	  by	  depicting,	  more	  or	  less	  realistically,	  the	  world,	  and	  by	  
representing	  symbolically	   life’s	  meanings	  and	  challenges	  seen	  according	  to	  the	  
worldview	  of	  the	  monastery’s	  belief	  system.	  	  
	  
Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  did	  not	   consider	  gardens	   to	  be	   images	  and	   therefore	   their	  
mimetic	  conception	  had	  no	  need	  to	  include	  them.	  I	  have	  shown,	  however,	  that	  
many	  gardens	  do	  have	  features	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  they	  are	  mimetic,	  although	  
many	  do	  not.	   Plato’s	   conception	   fails	   to	   accommodate	   these	   because	   neither	  
direct	  nor	   symbolic	   representation	   is	  essential	   to	  gardens.	  Moreover,	  mimetic	  
theories	   fail	   because	   they	   do	   not	   capture	   what	   is	   distinctive	   about	   gardens.	  
Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  making	  mimetic	  gardens	  that	  provide	  
practical	   and	   moral	   knowledge	   about	   how	   to	   live	   well	   would	   in	   theory	   have	  
been	  justified	  and	  valuable	  in	  the	  views	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle.	  Examples	  of	  such	  
                                                
1 Ibid. p. 142  
2 Ibid. p. 142 
3 Du Cane (2003) 
4 Turner (2011) 
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gardens	   are	   the	   ecologically	   balanced	   gardens	   of	   today,	   which	   organize	   their	  
elements	   in	   imitation	   of	   natural	   places	   and	   systems	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
exhibiting	  models	   for	  desirable	  activities	   such	  as	  healthy	   communal	   living	  and	  
caring	  for	  the	  earth.	  	  
	  
Aristotle’s	   notion	   that	   mimesis	   involved	   not	   just	   imitation,	   but	   also	  
intensification,	  of	  the	  real	  world	  is	  perhaps	  more	  helpful	  than	  Plato’s	  view	  when	  
it	   comes	   to	   considering	   gardens	   and,	  by	   adopting	   it,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   see	   a	  
garden	   in	   loco	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   site	   and	   surrounding	  
rather	   than	   just	   as	   an	   imitation	   of	   another	   site.	   Useful	   and	   interesting	   too	   is	  
Cooper’s	   thinking	   when	   he	   writes	   of	   gardens	   in	   which	   in	   various	   ways,	   “the	  
earth	  itself	  has	  been	  pressed	  into	  service	  to	  express	  itself.”1	  
	  
In	   summary,	   gardens	   can	   represent	   either	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   (symbolically).	  
The	   demand	   for	   gardens	   to	   fulfill	   these	   functions	   has	   fluctuated	   throughout	  
history.	  Both	  were	  popular	  during	   the	  18th	  and	  early	  19th	  centuries	  and	  both	  
were	   unpopular	   during	   the	  modernist	   period.	   But	   gardens’	  meanings	   are	   not	  
limited	   to	   or	   dominated	   by	   what	   can	   be	   conveyed	   through	   representation.	  
Gardens	  can	  depict	  and	  symbolically	  represent,	  but	  these	  functions	  are	  neither	  
essential	  elements	  nor	  distinctive	  aspects	  of	  them,	  and	  neither	  do	  they	  provide	  
adequate	  reasons	  for	  valuing	  them.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  
these	   functions	  does	  not	  provide	  adequate	  grounds	   for	   identifying	  gardens	  as	  
works	  of	  art.	  
	  
Mimesis,	   understood	   as	   depictive	   representation,	   has	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   an	  
inadequate	   conception	   for	   even	   the	   visual	   arts	   because	   many	   contemporary	  
examples	   do	   not	   depict	   and	   so	   would	   be	   excluded.	   Mimesis,	   understood	   as	  
depictive	   representation,	   was	   not	   ever	   adequate	   for	   architecture,	   music	   and	  
literature	   because	   most	   paradigmatic	   examples	   were	   excluded.	   However,	  
mimesis	   of	   the	   kinds	   discussed	   is	   a	   significant	   feature	   of	   many	   paradigmatic	  
                                                
1 Cooper op. cit. p. 84 
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works	  of	   art	   and	   is	   a	   reason	  why	   they	   are	   valued.	   It	   has	   turned	  out	   to	  be	   an	  
important	  characteristic	  of	  many	  gardens	  and	  is	  at	  least	  one	  way	  in	  which	  they	  
convey	  meanings.	   Therefore,	   in	   this	   respect,	   some	   gardens	   are	   on	   a	   par	  with	  
some	  universally	  accepted	  works	  of	  art.	  
	  
The	  Expression	  Theory	  of	  Art	  	  
Conception	  of	  Art	  (A)	  –	  Art	  Expresses	  Emotion	  
The	  expression	   theory	  of	   art	   is	   the	   conception	   commonly	   associated	  with	   the	  
artists	  and	  art	  works	  of	  the	  romantic	  period	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  That	  period	  is,	  
in	   turn,	   associated	   with	   the	   19th	   century,	   but	   its	   origins	   lay	   in	   the	   late	   18th	  
century	  and	  its	  products	  continued	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  some	  artists	  well	  into	  the	  
20th	   century.	   During	   the	   period’s	   19th	   century	   heyday,	   art	   was	   increasingly	  
talked	  about,	   thought	  about	  and	   indulged	   in,	  and	  the	  term	   ‘art’	  was	  generally	  
understood	   by	   laypeople,	   artists	   and	   philosophers.	   There	   was	   little	   need	   to	  
(re)define	   the	   term	   because	   everyone	   knew	   what	   it	   meant.	   However,	   art’s	  
products	  and	  the	  roles	  of	  art	  and	  artists	  in	  society	  changed	  considerably	  during	  
that	   time	   and	   those	   changes	   lead	   eventually	   to	   art’s	   being	   redefined,	   albeit	  
retrospectively,	   just	   as	   the	   19th	   century	   was	   ending	   and	   romanticism	   was	  
already	  in	  decline.	  	  
	  
The	   expression	   theory	   replaced	   mimesis	   as	   the	   predominant	   de	   facto	  
conception	  of	  art	  as	  the	  19th	  century	  progressed,	  though	  representation	  did	  not	  
disappear	   as	   a	   significant	   feature	  of	  many	   art	   forms.	   Representation,	   and	   the	  
meanings	   associated	   with	   it,	   could	   not	   disappear	   completely	   without	   taking	  
with	  them	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  all	   literature	  functions.	  Although	  
the	   expression	   theory	   was	   the	   predominant	   theory	   of	   art,	   it	   coexisted	   with	  
mimesis	   and,	   later,	   with	   modernism,	   and	   this	   is	   typical	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
changes	   in	  practice	  and	  understanding	  of	  practice	  occur	   in	  the	  arts.	  Except	  for	  
the	  cases	  of	  revolutionary	  changes,	  such	  as	  have	  been	  decreed	  in	  Mao’s	  China	  
and	   in	   the	   early	   days	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   neither	   art	   practice	   nor	   the	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conceptions	   it	   implies	   change	   overnight.	   Conceptions	   and	   practices	   overlap,	  
sometimes	  comfortably	  and	  sometimes	  contradictorily.	  The	   fact	   that	  practices	  
and	   conception	   overlap	   and	   co-­‐exist	   may	   have	   contributed	   in	   part	   to	   the	  
formulation	   of	   the	   all-­‐embracing	   institutional	   theory	   in	   the	   1970’s	   and	   it	   is	  
certainly	   reflected	   in	   the	   criteria	   adopted	   in	   various	   versions	   of	   the	   cluster	  
theory.	  I	  examine	  the	  institutional	  and	  cluster	  theories	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
	  
The	  expression	  theory	  conceived	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  art	  as	  being	  concerned	  with	  
the	   expression	   of	   an	   artist’s	   emotion	   or	   imaginative	   vision	   suffused	   with	  
emotion.	   	   In	   its	   simplest	   and	   most	   restrictive	   form	   this	   concept	   entails	   that	  
artists	  are	  people	  who	  are	  inspired	  by	  emotional	  experiences	  and	  who	  use	  their	  
skill	   with	   words,	   paint,	   music,	   marble,	   movement	   and	   so	   on	   to	   intentionally	  
embody	   their	   emotions	   in	   a	  work	   of	   art	  with	   a	   view	   to	   stimulating	   the	   same	  
emotions	   in	   an	   audience.1	   According	   to	   this	   conception,	   an	   artist	   feels	   the	  
emotions	  that	  he	  intentionally	  expresses	  in	  his	  work	  and	  an	  audience	  feels	  the	  
same	   emotion	   when	   they	   experience	   that	   work,	   provided	   that	   the	   artist	   has	  
‘embodied’	  his	  emotion	  in	  his	  work.	  These	  conditions	  are	  individually	  necessary	  
and	  jointly	  sufficient.	  This	  means	  that	  if	  the	  artist	  has	  not	  successfully	  embodied	  
his	  emotions	  or	  vision	  in	  his	  work,	  or	  if	  he	  feels	  no	  particular	  emotion	  and	  does	  
not	  intend	  to	  express	  one	  but	  instead	  writes	  his	  poem	  or	  paints	  his	  picture	  for	  
some	   other	   motive,	   then	   what	   he	   produces	   is	   not	   art.	   	   Therefore,	   not	   all	  
paintings,	  compositions,	  poems	  and	  so	  on	  are	  works	  of	  art.	  	  
	  
Understood	   in	  this	  way,	  works	  of	  art	  were	  valuable	  because	  the	  expression	  of	  
emotion	  was	  valued,	  and	  because	  they	  led	  to	  greater	  knowledge	  of	  experience	  
and	   emotional	   responses	   and	   potentially	   to	   increased	   self	   awareness,	   which	  
were	  all	  deemed	  to	  be	  valuable.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  art	  was	  becoming	  
more	  highly	  valued	  because	  artists	  themselves,	  and	  their	  work,	  were	  becoming	  
more	   highly	   valued.	   These	   processes	   of	   revaluation	   had	   begun	   in	   the	  
Renaissance	  but	  progress	  had	  been	  slow.	  It	  is	  salutary	  to	  remember	  that	  in	  the	  
                                                
1 Graham (2005) pp. 133-145 
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18th	  century	  Bach	  was	  a	  servant-­‐composer	  who	  was	  employed	  by	  his	  patrons	  in	  
the	  way	  a	  wealthy	  person	  today	  might	  retain	  their	  own	  dressmaker	  or	  interior	  
decorator.	  Although	   in	   this	   instance	  Bach	  was	  valuable	   to	  his	  patron,	   the	   idea	  
that	  Bach	  could	  be	  independent,	  and	  furthermore	  creatively	  independent,	  was	  
not	  acceptable.	  However,	  progress	  was	  being	  made,	  and	  by	  the	  19th	  century	  it	  
had	   become	   commonplace	   to	   regard	   artists	   as	   valuable	   and	   independent	  
members	   of	   society.	   	   By	   that	   time,	   artists	  were	   seen	   increasingly	   as	   inspired,	  
creative	   individuals	  who	  were	   ‘different	   from	   the	   rest	  of	  us’,	   and	   their	   vision,	  
experiences	   and	   emotional	   insights	   were	   things	   non-­‐artists	   should	   value	   and	  
experience	   for	   themselves	   through	   the	   artists'	   works.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  
speculate	  whether	  this	  change	  in	  attitude	  towards	  works	  of	  art	  in	  the	  Romantic	  
period	  may	   have	   been	   a	   precursor	   to	   the	   special	   aesthetic	   attitude	   that	   one	  
branch	   of	  modernism	  was	   to	   encourage	   in	   viewers	   from	   the	   start	   of	   the	   20th	  
century,	  even	  though	  versions	  of	  the	  expression	  theory	  itself	  continued	  to	  have	  
adherents	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  that	  century,	  and	  indeed	  still	  do	  today.	  
	  
The	  expression	  conception	  was	  first	  explored	  philosophically	  at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  
was	   still	   generally	   understood	   to	   be	   true	   of	   artistic	   practice	   by	   contemporary	  
artists	   and	   their	   audiences.	   However,	   the	   theory	   found	   its	   most	   prominent	  
advocate	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	   in	  Croce,	  and	  later	  on	   in	  Croce’s	  translator	  
and	  disciple,	  Collingwood.	  Croce’s	  Aesthetics1	  appeared	  in	  1902,	  by	  which	  time,	  
although	   musical	   romanticism	   was	   to	   continue	   to	   survive	   in	   the	   work	   of	  
composers	   like	   Rachmaninoff	   and	   Sibelius	   for	   another	   50	   or	   so	   years,	  
revolutionary	   changes	   had	   already	   been	   evident	   across	   many	   of	   the	   arts,	  
including	  music,	  for	  a	  decade	  or	  so.	  	  	  Croce	  was	  writing	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  century	  
of	  romanticism	  and	  his	  retrospective	  glance	  seemed	  a	  fitting	  end	  to	  that	  period,	  
although	   it	   offered	   no	   way	   to	   understand	   the	   ‘new’	   that	   was	   beginning	   to	  
happen	   around	   him.	   His	   understanding	   of	   the	   primacy	   of	   emotion	   in	   the	  
creation	  and	  reception	  of	  art	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  inclination	  of	  the	  arts	  during	  
the	   romantic	   period	   away	   from	   form	   and	   towards	   content	   and	   especially	  
                                                
1 Croce (1929) 
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‘emotional’	   content.	   The	   rise	   of	   abstract	   music,	   which	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   being	  
abstract	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  an	  ideal	  vehicle	  for	  ‘pure’	  emotion,	  and	  lyric	  poetry,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  increased	  popularity	  of	  forms	  such	  as	  the	  novel	  and	  the	  song-­‐cycle,	  
both	   of	   which	   were	   seen	   as	   ideal	   conveyors	   of	   particularized	   emotions,	   all	  
contributed	   to	  an	  environment	  within	  which	   the	  expression	   theory	  could	   take	  
root	  and	  flourish.	  	  
	  
A	  further	  classical	  exposition	  of	  the	  expression	  theory	  was	  provided	  by	  Tolstoy,	  
who	  believed	  that	  art	  was	  an	  activity	  intimately	  connected	  with	  moral	  good.	  He	  
extended	  the	   theory	   to	  embrace	   the	  production	  of	  what	  he	  understood	  to	  be	  
‘good’	  art.	   In	  his	   influential	  essay	  What	   is	  Art?,1	  published	   in	  1897,	  he	  offered	  
two	  conditions	  for	  art:	  (1)	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  an	  artist	  communicates	  his	  previously	  
experienced	  emotions	   to	  a	   viewer	  and,	  equally,	   (2)	   those	  emotions	   should	  be	  
stimulated	   by	   appropriate	   events,	   by	   which	   he	   meant	   events	   expressive	   of	  
universal	  brotherhood.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  morality	  in	  his	  conception	  reminds	  us	  of	  a	  
similar	  focus	  in	  the	  mimetic	  conceptions	  of	  the	  Ancient	  Greeks	  and	  anticipates	  a	  
similar	  focus	  in	  the	  conceptions	  of	  the	  engaged	  modernists	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  
Conversely,	  the	  theories	  that	  Croce	  and	  Collingwood	  espoused	  can,	  by	  virtue	  of	  
their	  concentration	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  artist	  and	  his	  product,	  be	  seen	  as	  
being	  similar	  to	  the	  20th	  century	  art	  for	  art’s	  sake	  modernist	  conception.	  	  
	  
I	   now	   describe	   two	   objections	   to	   the	   strict	   formulations	   of	   the	   expression	  
theory	  described	  above.	  Firstly,	  the	  classical	  formulation,	  which	  entails	  that	  an	  
artist	  has	  an	  emotional	  response	  to	  some	  thing,	  event	  or	  person	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  that	  intentionally	  creates	  a	  work	  that	  embodies	  the	  emotion	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
stimulating	   the	   same	   emotions	   in	   her	   audience,	   is	   inadequate.	   This	   is	   so	  
because,	   in	  most	   historical	   and	  many	   contemporary	   instances,	   it	   is	   extremely	  
difficult	   if	   not	   impossible	   to	   identify	   adequately	   (a)	   the	   emotions	   an	   artist	  
experienced	  and	  embodied	   in	  her	  work	  and	   (b)	  her	   intention	   to	  communicate	  
them,	   and	   (c)	   to	   establish	   whether	   the	   audience	   experienced	   the	   same	  
                                                
1 Tolstoy (1899) 
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emotions	   when	   they	   experienced	   her	   work.	   Because	   we	   cannot	   identify	   or	  
confirm	  points	  (i)	  -­‐	  (iii)	  we	  cannot	  identify	  the	  artist’s	  work	  as	  art.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	   if	   the	   overall	   emotional	   tone	   of	   Beethoven’s	   Symphony	   No.	   9	   is	  
generally	   agreed	   to	   be,	   say,	   joyful,	   how	   did	   Beethoven,	   who	   was	   known	   to	  
compose	  only	   slowly	  and	  with	  much	  difficulty,	   and	  who	  at	   the	   time	  he	  wrote	  
the	  work	  was	   deaf,	   frustrated	   and	   given	   to	   bitterness,	  maintain	   joyful	  moods	  
throughout	   the	   periods	   of	   time	   it	   took	   him	   to	   write	   and	   revise	   this	   lengthy	  
work?	  
	  
As	   I	   have	   shown,	   there	   are	   logical	   objections	   to	   the	   expression	   theory,	   but	  
simply	   by	   rejecting	   the	   conception’s	   base	   claim	   that	   art	   is	   essentially	   about	  
communicating	   emotion	   the	   conception	   becomes	   unsustainable.	   While	   the	  
conception	  may	  have	  been	  adequate	  for	  some	  of	  the	  typical	  art	  of	  its	  time	  it	  is	  
inadequate	   for	   much	   of	   the	   art	   that	   followed	   and	   preceded	   it.	   All	   art	   is	   not	  
expressive	  of	  the	  emotion	  an	  artist	  felt	  in	  a	  particular	  situation	  and	  all	  art	  does	  
not	  stimulate	  in	  the	  listener	  feelings	  an	  artist	  has	  intentionally	  embodied	  in	  the	  
work.	  However,	  the	  expression	  theory	  has	  focused	  on	  an	  aesthetically	  valuable	  
property	  of	  some	  works	  of	  art.	  Accordingly,	  we	  value	  some	  work	  of	  art	  because	  
they	   express	   emotions,	   not	   necessarily	   the	   artist’s,	   in	   various	   ways.	  
Nevertheless	   the	   conception	   is	   inadequate	   because	   it	   does	   not	   allow	   us	   to	  
identify	  works	  of	  art.	  Not	  all	  art	   is	  expressive	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  expression	  
theory	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   expression	   conception	   does	   not	   allow	   us	   to	  
distinguish	  between	  art	  and	  non-­‐art.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  identity	  
criterion.	  Furthermore,	  under	  this	  conception,	  paradigmatic	  works	  of	  art	  such	  as	  
Malevich’s	  White	   on	   White	   painting	   or	   Stockhausen’s	   Klavierstücke	   XI	   	   	   are	  
neither	  works	  of	  art	  nor,	  as	  works	  of	  art,	  valuable.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  are	  not	  
expressions,	   as	   the	   expression	   theory	   understands	   that	   term.	   Therefore,	  
because	  the	  conception	  cannot	  accommodate	  these	  paradigmatic	  works	  of	  art,	  
it	  is	  inadequate	  on	  that	  basis	  too.	  	  The	  classical	  expression	  theory,	  then,	  satisfies	  
neither	  of	  my	  criteria	  for	  adequacy.	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Conception	  of	  Art	  (B)	  –	  Art	  is	  Expressive	  of	  Emotion	  
 
Although	  the	  expression	  theory	  has	  proved	  inadequate	  as	  a	  general	  theory	  that	  
does	   not	   mean	   that	   art	   does	   not	   express	   emotions,	   or	   that	   this	   is	   not	   a	  
significant	  feature	  or	  a	  valid	  reason	  for	  valuing	  some	  art.	  Art	  clearly	  can	  express	  
emotions,	   but	   does	   not	   necessarily	   do	   so,	   and	   does	   not	   necessarily	   do	   so	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  expression	  theory.	  	  
	  
I	   will	   now	   examine	   ways	   in	   which	   works	   such	   as	   Malevich’s	   painting	   and	  
Stockhausen’s	   piano	   piece	   mentioned	   above	   may	   ‘express’	   emotions.	   	   I	   will	  
follow	   writers	   such	   as	   Peter	   Kivy1	   and	   Stephen	   Davies2	   and	   use	   the	   term	  
‘expressive’.	  When	  I	  say	  a	  work	  is	  expressive	  of	  an	  emotion	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  
the	  expression	  theory.	  	  
	  
An	  expressive	   representational	  painting,	  but	  not	  a	  poem,	  has	   the	  potential	   to	  
depict	   events	   and	   people	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   emotions	   associated	   with	   such	  
events	  and	  people,	   such	  as	   love,	   jealousy,	   joy,	   sadness,	  may	  be	  depicted	  also.	  
This	  happens	  because	  the	  representations	  of	  the	  events	  or	  people	  look	  like	  the	  
way	  events	  are,	  or	  people	  behave,	  when	  a	  particular	  emotion	  is	  experienced.	  In	  
this	  way,	  according	  to	  this	  conception,	  emotions	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  a	  work	  and	  
may	  be	  felt	  by	  the	  viewer.	   	  However,	  not	  all	  arts	  are	  representational	  and	  this	  
has	   lead	  philosophers	  to	  consider	  other	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  arts,	  and	  especially	  
abstract	  arts,	  may	  be	  able	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotions.	  	  Central	  to	  their	  claims	  
is	   an	   understanding	   that	   although	   abstract	   arts	   do	   not	   represent	   directly	  
(depict)	   objects,	   people	   and	   events,	   they	   can	   still	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotions	  
because	   of	   qualities	   their	   constituent	   elements	   possess	   individually	   and	  
collectively.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Kivy (1980) 
2 Davies (2006) 
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Deryck	   Cooke’s1	   pioneering	   work	   in	   the	   1950’s	   concerned	   the	   expression	   of	  
emotion	   in	   abstract	   music	   and	   led	   him	   to	   develop	   an	   extensive	   ‘lexicon’	   of	  
musical	   units	   that	   were	   expressive	   of	   particular	   emotions.	   	   In	   recent	   years,	  
Stephen	   Davies2	   and	   Peter	   Kivy3	   have	   considerably	   expanded	   Cooke’s	   earlier	  
work.	  Davies	   claims	   that	  music	   can	   express	   emotions	  because	   (i)	   its	   structure	  
may	   mirror	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   physiology	   of	   emotion	   or	  
because	   (ii)	   it	   can	   resemble	   human	   vocal	   utterance	   or	   because	   (iii)	   music’s	  
movement	  may	  mirror	  human	  comportment	  and	  behaviour.4	  	  	  
 
A	   full	   understanding	  of	  Davies’	   claim	   (i)	   assumes	   a	  detailed	   knowledge	  of	   the	  
qualities	  of,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which,	  whole	  pieces	  of	  music	  and	  their	  constituent	  
elements	   are	   assembled.	   However,	   in	   brief,	   in	   a	   piece	   of	   music	   a	   composer	  
devises	   (composes)	   and	   arranges	   large	   and	   small	   scale	   musical	   elements	   to	  
create	  a	  composition.	  All	  the	  elements,	  ranging	  from	  individual	  notes,	  melodies	  
and	   chords	   through	   progressions	   of	   notes,	   melodies	   and	   chords,	   to	   whole	  
movements	  and	  series	  of	  movements,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  and	  the	  speed(s)	  
at	   which	   these	   elements	   occur	   and	   are	   combined,	   create	   audible	   dynamic	  
patterns	  of	  tension	  and	  release.	  All	  these	  patterns	  are	  available	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  a	  
listener.	  They	  are	  aural	  perceptual	  patterns	  that	  can	  potentially	  be	  perceived	  to	  
be	  analogous	   to	   the	   felt	  patterns	  of	   tension	  and	   release	   that	   characterize	   the	  
experience	   of	   an	   emotion	   in	   a	   listener.	   The	   music	   resembles	   the	   emotion	  
because	   it	   sounds	   like	   how	   having	   the	   emotion	   feels.	   Therefore	   I	   call	   this	   a	  
crossover	  perceptual	   resemblance,	  and	   this	   is	  one	  way	   in	  which	  music	   can	  be	  
said	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotion.	  
	  
Davies	  claim	  (ii)	  is	  more	  straightforward.	  It	  states	  that	  music	  can	  be	  expressive	  
of,	  say,	  sadness	  because	   it	  sounds	   like	  the	  way	  a	  person	  sounds	   like	  when	  we	  
believe	  them	  to	  be	  sad.	  Thus,	  a	  melody	  may	  have	  a	  slow,	  dragging	  rhythm	  and	  
                                                
1 Cooke (1959) 
2 Davies op. cit. 
3 Kivy (1980) 
4 Davies op. cit. pp. 135-162 
          32 
tempo	  and	  have	  a	  melodic	  shape	  that	  moves	  repeatedly	  over	  the	  interval	  of	  a	  
minor	   third.	   	   	   A	   listener	   hearing	   a	   melody	   like	   this	   may	   be	   aware	   of	   aural	  
perceptual	   resemblances	   between	   the	   melody	   and	   the	   way	   a	   sad	   person’s	  
speech	  or	  other	  vocal	  utterances	  sound	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  pitch	  and	  rhythm.	  The	  
music	  sounds	  like	  a	  sad	  person	  sounds.	  This	  is	  another	  way	  in	  which	  music	  can	  
be	   said	   to	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotion	   and	   is	   an	   example	   of	   straightforward	  
resemblance	  (depiction).	  
	  
Davies’	  claim	  (iii)	   is	  again	  based	  on	  a	  crossover	  perceptual	   resemblance	  and	   it	  
also	  assumes	   listeners’	  experiencing	  music	  metaphorically.	   	  Firstly,	  although	   in	  
reality	  music	  moves	  only	  in	  time,	  we	  hear	  it	  in	  this	  case	  as	  if	  it	  were	  moving	  in	  
space.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  translate	  the	  aural	  patterns	  of	  movement	  into	  visual	  
ones.	   Secondly,	  music	   is	   expressive	  of,	   say,	   joy	  because	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   its	  
sounds	   ‘move’	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   we	   observe	   happy	   people	  
moving.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  joyful	  piece	  the	  musical	  elements,	  including	  tempo,	  harmony,	  
rhythm	  and	  melody	  may	  move	  along	  in	  a	  sprightly	  dotted	  rhythm	  and	  at	  a	  lively	  
tempo,	   at	   the	   same	   time	  as	   the	  melody	   is	   jumping	  between	   the	  notes	  of	   the	  
tonic	  major	  chord	  and	  the	  harmonies	  are	  progressing	  in	  a	  straightforward,	  non-­‐
chromatic	   way.	   Listeners	   hearing	   a	   piece	   of	   music	   like	   this	   perceive	   the	  
perceptual	   resemblances	   between	   aural	   patterns	   of	   ‘movement’	   they	   hear	   in	  
the	  music	  and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   they	  see	   a	   joyful	  person	  moving,	  and	   in	   this	  
way	  the	  music	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotion.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  example	  above	  a	  listener	  hears	  the	  music	  ‘moving’	  in	  ways	  that	  look	  like	  
how	  a	  joyful	  person	  moves.	  Thus,	  aural	  patterns	  resemble	  visual	  patterns.	  There	  
is	   a	   parallel	   account	   of	   how	   Davies’	   claim	   (iii)	   functions	   that	   is	   based	   on	  
proprioception.	   It	   also	   involves	   a	   crossover	   resemblance.	   	   	   In	   this	   account	   a	  
listener	  hears	  the	  music	  ‘moving’	  in	  ways	  that	  feel	  like	  how	  the	  listener	  himself	  
feels	   like	   moving	   when	   he	   is	   joyful.	   In	   this	   instance	   aural	   patterns	   resemble	  
proprioceptive	  patterns	  and	  in	  this	  way	  too	  music	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  expressive	  
of	  emotions.	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Davies’	   claims	   enable	   us	   to	   understand	   how	   an	   abstract	   work	   of	   art	   may	   be	  
expressive	  of	  emotion,	  and	  I	  employ	  his	  and	  similar	  claims	  below	  to	  show	  how	  
gardens	  may	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotions.	  However,	  I,	  along	  with	  Davies,	  do	  not	  
mean	   to	   claim	   that	   his	   theories	   amount	   to	   a	   conception	   of	   art,	   and	   they	  
therefore	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  I	  have	  adopted	  
for	  adequacy	  of	  conceptions	  of	  art.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   in	   closing	   this	   section	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	   all	   three	  of	  Davies’	  
claims	  concerning	  the	  expressiveness	  of	  art	  depend	   in	  their	  turn	  on	  a	  mimetic	  
account	  of	  art.	  Either	  direct	  or	  crossover	  resemblance	   is	  necessary	  for	  each	  of	  
his	  accounts	  of	  expressiveness	  to	  work.	  	  
Gardens	  
 
From	   the	   early	   19th	   century	   onwards	   the	   expression	   theory	   started	   to	   gain	  
acceptance	  as	  the	  de	  facto	  philosophy	  of	  art,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  promulgated
definitively	   as	   a	   philosophical	   conception	   until	   about	   100	   years	   later.	  
The	  great	  artistic	  achievements	  of	   the	  18th	  century	   landscape	  school	   typically	  
did	  not	  fit	  within	  the	  expression	  theory	  at	  all	  but,	  nonetheless,	  they	  continued	  
to	  be	  implemented	  and	  imitated	  well	  into	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  This	  reluctance	  on	  
the	   part	   of	   garden	   design	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	   changes	   in	   the	   other	   arts	   was	  
surprising	   because	   it	   was	   only	   50	   years	   earlier	   that	   gardening	   had	   been	  
heralded	  as	  an	  equal	  and	  true	  sister	  art	  of	  poetry	  and	  painting,	  and	  had	  been	  
considered	  to	  be	  an	  art	  that	  was	  important,	  relevant	  and	  contemporary.	  At	  that	  
time	   Horace	   Walpole	   had	   written,	   “Poetry,	   Painting,	   and	   Gardening,	   or	   the	  
Science	  of	  Landscape,	  will	  forever	  by	  men	  of	  Taste	  be	  deemed	  Three	  Sisters,	  or	  
The	   Three	  New	  Graces	  who	  dress	   and	   adorn	  Nature.”1	   Clearly,	   the	   sister	   arts	  
were	  now	  moving	  on	  and	   leaving	  gardens	  behind.	  There	  are	   some	  who	  argue	  
that	  they	  have	  never	  caught	  up	  and	  that	  gardens	  are	  in	  fact	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  be	  
‘fully	  contemporary’	  arts.	  However	  this	  point	  of	  view	  is	  not	  universally	  held.2	   I	  
                                                
1 Ross op. cit. p. 49 
2 Conan (2005) pp. 3-15 
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examine	   this	   issue	   further	   in	   chapter	   three,	   during	   my	   discussion	   of	   the	  
institutional	   theory.	   However,	   I	   can	   propose	   now	   two	   contemporary	   reasons	  
why	  gardens	  did	  not	  pursue	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  expression	  theory.	  
	  
Firstly,	   gardens	   failed	   to	   become	   fashionable	   as	   vehicles	   for	   19th	   century,	  
romantic	  artists	  because	  it	  was	  generally	  not	  possible	  for	  an	  artist	  to	  create	  her	  
own	   landscape	   garden,	   and	   those	  were	   the	   only	   gardens	   regarded	   as	   art.	   To	  
create	   a	   landscape	   garden	   you	   needed	   a	  wealthy	   patron	   or	   to	   be	   a	   seriously	  
committed	  and	  wealthy	  gardener,	  neither	  of	  which	  possibility	  appealed	  to	  the	  
typical	   romantic	   artist.	   By	   comparison,	   being	   a	   romantic	   painter,	   poet	   or	  
composer	  was	  straightforward:	  all	  you	  needed	  was	  ideas	  and	  a	  garret!	  
	  
The	  second	  reason	  why	  gardens	  were	   left	  behind	  by	  their	  sister	  arts	   in	  Britain	  
was	   the	   extraordinary	   increase	   in	   different	   plant	   materials	   that	   became	  
available	  there	  as	  the	  century	  progressed.	  The	  increasing	  ease	  of	  travel,	  and	  an	  
increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   educated,	   curious	   and	   wealthy	   members	   of	   the	  
middle	  and	  upper	  classes	  who	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  botany,	  resulted	  in	  many	  major	  
plant-­‐hunting	   expeditions	   being	   undertaken	   to	   Asia	   and	   the	   Americas.	   The	  
plants	   these	  expeditions	   introduced	   to	  Britain,	   coupled	  with	   the	   technological	  
advances	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Crystal	  Palace,	  lead	  understandably	  to	  a	  preference	  
for,	   and	   interest	   in,	   individual	   plants,	   and	   especially	   novel,	   exotic	   flowering	  
plants.	   This	   preference	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   overall	   effectiveness	   and	  
meanings	   of	   the	   arrangements	   of	   plants	   and	   other	   garden	   elements.	   What	  
plants	  were	   and	   looked	   like	  per	   se	   became	  more	   important	   than	   how	  and	   to	  
what	  ends	  they	  were	  deployed	  in	  a	  garden.	  	  
	  
The	   two	   reasons	   given	  above	   suggest	   contemporary	   reasons	  why	  gardens	  did	  
not	   become	   expressive	   arts	   during	   the	   romantic	   period.	   However,	   it	   is	  
reasonable	  to	  claim	  also	  that	  the	  expression	  theory	  as	  an	  art	  concept	  does	  not	  
comfortably	  accommodate	  gardens	  at	  all.	  The	  misfit	  between	  gardens	  as	  works	  
of	   art	   and	   the	   expression	   theory	  will	   be	   examined	   in	   detail	   below	   because	   it	  
provides	  useful	  additional	   information	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  gardens	  and	  about	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the	  fit	  between	  gardens	  and	  art	  conceptions	  generally.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	   note	   that	   none	   of	   the	   difficulties	   I	   consider	   below	   implies	   that	   gardens	  
cannot	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotion	   in	   the	   manner	   described	   in	   the	   previous	  
section	  with	   respect	   to	  music	   and	  other	   abstract	   arts.	   I	   examine	   the	   garden’s	  
potential	  for	  this	  type	  of	  expressiveness	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
	  
In	   its	   typical	   formulation	   the	   expression	   theory	   requires	   a	   progression	   and	  
direct	  links	  that	  can	  be	  shown	  this	  way:	  
	  
an	  artist	  feels	  emotion(s)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  experiencing	  some	  thing,	  person	  or	  
event	  
ê	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  feeling	  those	  emotions	  the	  artist	  intentionally	  creates	  an	  artwork	  	  
that	  embodies	  the	  emotional	  experience	  
ê	  
a	  person	  experiences	  the	  artwork	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  feels	  the	  same	  
emotion(s)	  as	  the	  artist	  did	  when	  he	  had	  the	  initial	  emotional	  experience	  
	  
	  The	  process	  outlined	  above	  is	  narrowly	  defined	  and	  offers	  little	  flexibility	  at	  any	  
stage.	   Because	   of	   this	   it	   presents	   particular	   difficulties	   for	   some	   arts,	   for	  
example	  architecture,	  but	  for	  none	  more	  so	  than	  gardens.	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   first	   place,	  when	   compared	   to	   other	   arts,	  making	   gardens	   is	   an	   unruly	  
artistic	  endeavour.	  Consider	  some	  of	  the	  following	  complexities	  related	  to	  their	  
creation,	  any	  one	  of	  which	  may	  sabotage	  the	  process	  described	  above:	  gardens	  
often	  take	  years	   to	   install	  and	  usually	   the	  design	  process	  continues	   in	  tandem	  
with	   the	   installation;	   a	   garden	   designer	   often	   lacks	   control	   over	   the	   living	  
elements	   of	   her	   design	   and	   the	   layout	   of	   those	   elements	   and	   she	   lacks	   any	  
control	   over	   the	   ultimate	   performance	   of	   those	   elements;	   garden	   design	   is	  
often	  a	  collaborative	  effort,	  not	  only	  between	  a	  team	  of	  designers,	  but	  between	  
designers,	   gardeners,	   owners,	   stonemasons,	   etc.;	   gardens	   change	   and	   evolve	  
constantly	   so,	   if	   they	   are	   expressive	   of	   a	   creator’s	   emotions,	   how	   can	   they	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express	  different	  things	  at	  different	  times?	  These	  complexities	  are	  not	  confined	  
to	  gardens.	  They	  are	  shared	  by	  other,	  paradigmatic	  arts.	  For	  example,	  operatic	  
performances	  and	  movie	  making	  require	  a	  multidisciplinary	  design	  team,	  many	  
exterior	   installations	  and	  kinetic	  sculptures	  are	  subject	  to	  change	  by	  wind,	  sun	  
and	   so	   on,	   and	   musical	   and	   dramatic	   performances	   with	   an	   improvisatory	  
component	   are	   ‘designed’	   as	   they	   go	   along	   and	   are,	   furthermore,	   designed	  
jointly	  by	  the	  performers	  and	  the	  original	  writer,	  if	  there	  is	  one.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  gardens	  appeal	  to	  all	  the	  senses.	  This	  does	  not	  disqualify	  them	  from	  
being	   art	   because	   many	   paradigmatic	   arts,	   including	   opera,	   sculpture	   and	  
installation	   art	   appeal	   in	   significant	   ways	   to	   more	   than	   one	   sense.	   However,	  
gardens,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  installations,	  are	  unusual	  in	  that	  they	  appeal	  to	  
the	  five	  senses	  and	  the	  vestibular	  sense	  too.	  The	  vestibular	  sense	  is	  particularly	  
important	   to	   the	   way	   we	   experience	   gardens	   and	   it	   pays	   a	   role	   in	   our	  
experience	   of	   architecture	   also.	   It	   is	   through	   this	   sense	   that	   we	   have	   an	  
understanding	   of	   how	   and	   where	   we	   are	   located	   in	   space	   relative	   to	   other	  
objects	   and	   ourselves	   at	   other	   times.	   	   Standing	   on	   edges	   of	   cliffs	   or	   high	  
terraces	   or	   striding	   down	   sloping	   lawns	   or	   moving	   ever	   closer	   to	   a	   tree	   are	  
experiences	  that	  we	  have	  by	  way	  of	  this	  sense.	  
	  
Although	  gardens	  are	  primarily	  a	  visual	  art,	  a	  garden	  visitor	  may	  choose,	  albeit	  
unconsciously,	  how	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  garden.	  For	  example,	  a	  visitor	  may	  be	  
hot	  from	  the	  sun	  and	  the	  reflected	  heat	  of	  a	  stone	  wall,	  may	  be	  a	  little	  anxious	  
because	  he	  is	  standing	  on	  the	  abrupt	  edge	  of	  a	  belvedere,	  may	  be	  delighted	  by	  
the	  sunset	  he	  is	  witnessing	  (outside	  the	  garden)	  and	  the	  sounds	  of	  birds	  (inside	  
and	   outside	   the	   garden),	   may	   be	   smelling	   lilac	   and	   eating	   an	   apple	   from	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  garden.	   In	  such	  circumstances	  how	  should	  an	  initiated	  visitor	  
behave	   so	   as	   to	   have	   the	   ‘proper’	   garden	   experience	   and	   thereby	   feel	   the	  
emotion	  embodied	  by	   the	  garden’s	   creator?	   	  Which	   sensory	  organ	   is	   the	   true	  
receptor	   for	   the	   emotion	   that	   the	   creator	   intended	   to	   communicate	   and	  
intended	  the	  visitor	  to	  feel?	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The	   issues	  gardens	  raise	  concerning	   ‘proper’	  experience	  of	  art	  are	  common	  to	  
many	   arts	   but	   are	   particularly	   pertinent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   gardens.	   Similarly,	   the	  
issues	  gardens	  raise	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  multi-­‐sensory	  nature	  are	  shared	  by	  all	  the	  
multi-­‐sensory	  arts,	  but	  are	  highlighted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  gardens.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   most	   gardens	   considered	   to	   be	   works	   of	   art	   are	   big	   and	   spatially	  
complex	  and	  all	  gardens	  have	  indistinct	  experiential,	  if	  not	  physical	  boundaries.	  
This	  does	  not	  disqualify	  them	  from	  being	  works	  of	  art	  because	  similar	  qualities	  
are	   shared	   to	   varying	   degrees	   by	   other	   arts,	   including	   architecture	   and	  
installation	  and	  environmental	  art.	   In	  gardens	  we	  are	   free	   to	  select	  how,	  how	  
much,	  when	  and	  in	  what	  order	  we	  experience	  gardens’	  elements	  and	  are	  free	  to	  
decide	   whether,	   say,	   a	   view	   of	   the	   sea	   or	   trees	   beyond	   a	   garden’s	   fence	  
comprises	   part	   of	   that	   garden.	   Gardens	   also	   often	   contain	   gardens-­‐within-­‐
gardens	  (‘garden	  rooms’)	  and	  gardens	  are	  open	  to	  being	  experienced	  fully	  or	  in	  
part,	  either	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  as	  a	  series	  of	  unrelated,	  separate	  episodes.	  Taking	  all	  
the	  above	  into	  account,	  then,	  perhaps	  the	  best	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  a	  garden	  may	  
express	  a	  whole	  lot	  of	  different,	  perhaps	  even	  conflicting	  emotions.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  
problem	   for	   the	   classical	   expression	   theory.	   That	   theory	   evolved	   partially	   in	  
response	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  production	  of	  small	  scale	  works	  of	  art	  such	  as	  the	  
lied,	   the	   lyric	   poem,	   domestically	   scaled	   paintings	   and	   short,	   intimate	   piano	  
pieces,	   all	   of	   which	   could	   easily	   be	   pervaded	   by	   one	   emotional	   mood	   and,	  
moreover,	   could	   clearly	   be	   the	   unassisted	   expressive	   work	   of	   a	   single,	  
identifiable	   agent,	   who	   sometimes	   was	   also	   the	   performer	   of	   the	   work.	  
Contemporary	  gardens	  were	  not	  like	  this	  and	  visitors,	  intuitively,	  did	  not	  expect	  
them	  to	  be	  so.	  
	  
I	   have	   provided	   several	   reasons	   above	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   the	   classical	  
expression	  theory	  does	  not	  accommodate	  gardens.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  already	  
noted	  with	  regard	  to	  Davies’	  theories	  on	  music,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  
that	   arts,	   and	   especially	   abstract	   arts,	   cannot	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotions.	  
Gardens,	   while	   they	   often	   contain	   depictive	   elements	   such	   as	   statues	   and	  
inscriptions,	   are	   essentially	   abstract	  works	   of	   art.	   I	   will	   now	   examine	  ways	   in	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which	  the	  theories	  of	  expressiveness	  that	  Davies	  and	  others	  have	  proposed	  may	  
be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  gardens.	  	  
	  
I	  begin	  by	  restating	  Davies’	  claims.	  He	  states	   that	  music	  can	  express	  emotions	  
because	   (i)	   its	   structure	   may	   mirror	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
physiology	  of	  emotions	  or	  because	  (ii)	  it	  can	  resemble	  human	  vocal	  utterance	  or	  
because	   (iii)	   music’s	   movement	   may	   mirror	   human	   comportment	   and	  
behaviour.1	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  (ii),	  Davies’	  claims	  may	  be	  valid	  for	  gardens.	  
For	   example,	   a	   garden	   composed	   entirely	   of	   flowing	   lines	   of	   yellow	   flowers	  
separated	  by	   flowing	   lines	   of	   green	   grass	  may	  be	   experienced	  by	   a	   viewer	   as	  
being	   expressive	   of	   different	   emotions	   from	   those	   a	   garden	   of	   the	   same	  
materials	   organized	   entirely	   in	   squares	   may	   be	   expressive	   of,	   and	   that	  
difference	   in	  experience	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  matters	  Davies	  raises	   in	  (i)	  and	  
(iii)	   above.	   Similar	   claims	   might	   be	   mounted	   not	   only	   for	   the	   way	   different	  
coloured	  plants	  are	  organized	   in	  a	  garden	  but	  also	  for	  colours	  themselves	  and	  
for	   any	   other	   garden	   elements	   and	   the	   way(s)	   in	   which	   they	   are	   organized.	  
Thus,	  rectangular	  beds	  of	  black	  tulips	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  sadness	  or	  
grief	  and	  to	  do	  so	  differently	  from	  the	  way	  a	  single	  weeping	  willow	  in	  an	  empty	  
field	  may	   be	   expressive	   of	   sadness	   or	   grief.	   Associations	   between	   plants	   and	  
emotions	   are	   not	   new	  and	  have	   been	  made	   and	   codified	   since	  Roman	   times.	  
However,	   the	   traditional	   associations	   between,	   say,	   rosemary	   and	  
remembrance	  and	  between	  red	  roses	  and	  love	  are	  not	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
claims	  of	  philosophers	  like	  Davies.	  They	  are	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  pictorial	  and	  
literary	   associations	   drawn	   from	   history,	   mythology	   and	   the	   arts	   and	   are	  
examples	  of	  indirect	  (symbolic)	  representation.	  	  
	  
The	  art	  critic	  and	  historian	  Ernst	  Gombrich	  and	  the	  composer	  Alexander	  Scriabin	  
preceded	  Davies	  et	  al.,	  but	  their	  claims	  outstripped	  the	  more	  modest	  claims	  of	  
their	  successors.	  Scriabin	  believed	  each	  major	  and	  minor	  key	  was	  of	  a	  particular	  
colour	  and	  Gombrich	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that,	  “Every	  colour,	  sound	  or	  shape	  
                                                
1 Davies op. cit. 
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has	  a	  natural	  feeling	  tone	  just	  as	  every	  feeling	  has	  an	  equivalence	  in	  the	  world	  
of	   sight	   and	   sound.”1	   As	   examples	   of	   colours	   Gombrich	   offered:	   “Among	  
colours,	   red,	   being	   brighter	   than	   blue,	   will	   easily	   be	   experienced	   as	   the	  
equivalent	  of	  warmth	  and	  cheerfulness,	  blue	  of	  cold	  and	  sadness.”2	  	  
	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  Davies	  and	  Gombrich	  are	  correct,	  gardens	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
expressive	  of	  particular	  emotions	  even	   though	   they	  are	  abstract	  works	  of	   art.	  
According	  to	  their	  theories,	  gardens	  can	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotions	  not	  because	  
they	   are	   able	   to	   represent	   object	   or	   events	   that	   might	   commonly	   cause	  
particular	   emotions	   to	   arise	  but	  because	   they	   are	  expressive	  of	   the	  particular	  
emotions	   themselves.	   And	   they	   do	   this	   because	   gardens’	   elements	   may	   be	  
organized	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   structurally	   similar	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   humans	  
experience	   emotions	   physiologically	   or	   because	   the	   elements	   themselves	   and	  
the	  way	  they	  are	  organized	  reflect	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  humans	  behave	  when	  they	  
experience	  particular	  emotions.	  	  
	  
I	  will	  now	  introduce	  two	  further	  issues	  relating	  to	  gardens	  as	  expressive	  works	  
of	   art.	   The	   first	   issue	   relates	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   gardens,	   the	   second	   to	   the	  
capabilities	  of	  gardens	  and	  other	  works	  of	  art,	  and	  to	  Davies’	   theories.	  Firstly,	  
even	   though	   gardens	   may	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotions,	   they	   remain	   abstract	  
works	  of	  art.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  they	  are	  abstract	  they	  are	  tangible	  
and	  real.	  They	  are	  our	  actual	  environment	  and	  we	  move	   in	  and	  through	  them	  
physically	  in	  the	  same	  way	  we	  move	  through,	  say,	  a	  farm	  or	  a	  shopping	  mall.	  In	  
this	  sense	  the	  degree	  of	  separation	  that	  usually	  exists	  between	  the	  real	  and	  the	  
abstract	   is	   blurred	   and	   hence	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   garden,	   which	   is	   our	   actual	  
physical	   surroundings,	   to	   be	   an	   expressive	   work	   of	   art	   is	   potentially	  
compromised.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Gombrich (1962) p. 219 
2 Ibid. p. 219 
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Secondly,	  if	  it	  is	  accepted	  that	  gardens	  can	  be	  expressive	  of	  emotions	  then,	  like	  
other	   abstract	   works	   of	   art,	   they	   cannot	   be	   expressive	   of	   a	   large	   number	   of	  
emotions	   that	   the	   representational,	   and	   especially	   the	   literary	   arts,	   have	   no	  
trouble	   in	  expressing.	  Although	   irony	   is	  possible	   in	  a	  garden	   it	  does	  not	   seem	  
possible	  or	  likely	  that	  a	  garden	  could	  or	  would	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  
disgust	  or	  hate.	  And	  Miller	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  gardens	  have	  “an	  inability	  
to	   express	   [any]	   negation”,1	   which,	   in	   her	   terms,	   presumably	   includes	   any	  
negative	  emotion	  at	  all.	  Davies	  claims	  that	  music	  can	  express	  only	  the	  so-­‐called	  
Platonic	  emotions.	   	  Although	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  exactly	  where	  Davies	  draws	  a	   line,	  
Stecker	  claims	  Davies	  means	  by	  this	  “emotions…	  [that]	  are all states capable of 
occurring without objects and are all variations of happiness or sadness.”2	   It	   is	  
reasonable	  then	  to	  think	  that	  Davies	  would	  argue	  that	  because	  gardens	  do	  not	  
usually	  represent	  objects,	  events	  or	  people	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  be	  expressive	  of	  
emotions,	   and	   especially	   particular	   emotions,	   relating	   to	   objects,	   persons	   or	  
events	   and	   that	   they	   are	   therefore	   limited	   to	   expressing	   the	   emotions	   he	  
classifies	   as	   Platonic.	   However,	   perhaps	   a	   case	   could	   be	  made	   asserting	   that	  
gardens	   can,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   be	   expressive	   of	   non-­‐Platonic	   emotions	  
too.	   I	   have	   described	   earlier	   how	   the	   gardens	   at	   Versailles	   metaphorically	  
represent	   absolute	   power.	   Perhaps	   they	   could	   be	   equally	   well	   described	   as	  
celebrating	  the	  triumph	  of	  absolute	  power?	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  classical	  expression	  theory	  of	  art	  has	  been	  shown	  above	  to	  be	  
inadequate	   as	   a	   conception	   of	   art.	   It	   has	   struggled	   to	   accommodate	   abstract	  
art,	   including	   some	   music,	   and	   many	   large-­‐scale	   and	   multi-­‐media	   works,	  
whether	   abstract	   or	   representational.	   This	   has	   lead	   philosophers,	   including	  
Davies	  and	  Kivy,	  to	  develop	  arguments	  to	  expand	  the	  conception	  to	  explain	  how	  
abstract	   arts	   may	   be	   expressive	   of	   emotions.	   This	   development	   of	   the	  
expression	   theory	   has	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   particularly	   useful	   for	   understanding	  
paradigmatic	  abstract	  arts	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  convey	  meanings.	  Some	  
                                                
1 Miller op. cit.  p. 178 
2 Stecker (1999) p. 275 
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gardens	   are	   also	   abstract	   works	   of	   art	   that	   are	   expressive	   of	   emotions.	  
However,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  essential	  element	  or	  a	  distinctive	  aspect	  of	  gardens,	  nor	  
does	  it	  provide	  adequate	  reason	  for	  valuing	  them.	  Moreover,	  being	  expressive	  
of	   emotions	   does	   not	   provide	   adequate	   grounds	   for	   identifying	   gardens	   as	  
works	   of	   art.	   Nonetheless,	   we	   value	   gardens	   for	   this	   property	   just	   as	   we	   do	  
paradigmatic	  works	  of	  art.	  Therefore,	  on	  these	  grounds,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  
why	  some	  gardens	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  works	  of	  art.	  
	   	  
There	  remains	  one	  suggestion	  to	  consider	  about	  how	  gardens	  might	  stimulate	  
particular	  emotions	  in	  a	  viewer.	  The	  philosopher	  Arnold	  Berleant	  suggests	  that	  
in	   gardens,	   cultures	   and	   individuals	   (artists)	  may	   create	   their	   ideal	   nature,	   or	  
present	  nature	  and	   the	  cultural	   values	  attending	   it	   in	  a	   concentrated	   format.1	  
This	  is	  an	  idea	  worth	  pursuing	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  expression	  theory	  because	  
perhaps	  what	  is	  unique	  about	  gardens	  is	  that	  they	  can	  afford	  opportunities	  for	  a	  
structured	   experience	   of,	   and	   encounter	   with,	   nature,	   and	   within	   those	  
opportunities	   lies	   the	   further	   opportunity	   for	   experiencing	   the	   culturally	  
appropriate	   emotional	   reactions	   to	   natural	   elements	   and	  processes	   exhibiting	  
beauty,	  the	  sublime	  and	  the	  agreeable.	  This	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  gardens	  may	  
be	   expressive	   of	   their	   creators’	   emotions	   but	   it	   does	   offer	   a	   framework	   for	  
considering	   that	   gardens	   might	   be	   able,	   by	   being	   expressive	   of	   a	   culture’s	  
values,	  to	  encourage	  the	  experience	  of	  certain	  common	  emotions.	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  Berleant’s	  idea	  can	  be	  extended	  further	  than	  he	  takes	  it.	  For	  example,	  
the	   Muslim	   paradise	   gardens	   offer	   a	   depiction	   of	   paradise	   rather	   than	   a	  
structured	  view	  of	  nature,	  but,	   like	  Berleant’s	   ‘nature’	  gardens,	  these	  paradise	  
gardens	   may	   also	   stimulate	   in	   the	   initiated	   visitor	   the	   culturally	   appropriate	  
emotions	  attached	  by	  the	  culture	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  paradise.	  	  
                                                
1 Berleant (2002a) (2002b) (2007)   
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3	   Conceptions	  of	  Art	  –	  Modernism	  and	  the	  Institutional	  
Theory	  
Modernism	  
Conception	  of	  Art	  
Modernism	   eventually	   succeeded	   the	   expression	   theory	   as	   the	   dominant	  
conception	  of	  art	  for	  its	  time	  although	  both	  conceptions	  co-­‐existed	  well	  into	  the	  
20th	  century.	  Art	  of	  the	  type	  that	  modernism	  set	  out	  to	  explain	  and	  justify	  began	  
appearing	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  arts	  that	  most	  needed	  justifying	  
were	  the	  visual	  arts	  and	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  theorizing	  began	  with	  reference	  
to	   that	   body	   of	   work.	  Music,	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent	   dance,	   had	   always	   been	  
abstract,	   and	   although	   they	   provoked	  dismay	   and	  outrage	   to	   the	   degree	   that	  
they	   abandoned	   traditional	   melody,	   rhythm,	   and	   harmony	   in	   the	   early	   20th	  
century,	   that	  abandonment	  may	  be	   said	   to	  have	   changed	  only	   the	  way	  music	  
sounded	  and	  dance	   looked.	  Music	  was	   still	   recognizably	  music	   and	  dance	   still	  
dance,	   just.	  However,	  when	  the	  visual	  arts	  became	  non-­‐representational,	  new	  
theories	   became	   essential	   to	   explain	   and	   justify	   the	   practice.	   The	   expression	  
theory	  had	  been	  the	  preceding	  conception	  but	   it	  was	  underpinned,	  at	   least	   in	  
the	  visual	  arts,	  by	  a	  continuing	  reliance	  on	  mimesis	  in	  even	  the	  most	  expressive	  
works	   of	   art.	   	   In	   the	   visual	   arts	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   emotion	   had	   been	  
understood	   to	   be	   expressed	   through	   the	   depiction	   of	   recognizable	   people,	  
objects	   and	   events.	   	   Once	   the	   visual	   arts	   gave	   away	   representation	   a	   new	  
rationale	   for	   their	  existence	  needed	  to	  be	  sought.	  That	  rationale	  was	  supplied	  
by	  the	  modernist	  conception,	  or	  at	  least	  by	  one	  strand	  of	  it.	  	  
	  
Like	   its	   predecessor,	  modernism	  was	  not	   a	   single,	   homogenous	   conception	  of	  
art.	  	  It	  had	  two	  main	  strands:	  art	  for	  art’s	  sake	  (autonomous	  modernism)	  and	  art	  
for	  society’s	  sake	  (engaged	  modernism).	  Autonomous	  modernism	  claimed	  that	  
art	  was	  self	  referential	  and	  that	  its	  value	  was	  independent	  of,	  and	  as	  important	  
as,	  other	   values,	   such	  as	   truth	  or	   justice.	   	  Art	  of	   this	   type	  often	   set	  out	   to	  be	  
subversive	  of	  earlier	  art	   traditions,	  styles	  and	  techniques	  while	  still	  aspiring	  to	  
be	   expressive	   of	   beauty	   or	   the	   sublime,	   and	   innovation	   and	   originality	   were	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important	   artistic	   values.	   Very	   often	   the	   art	   was	   abstract,	   i.e.	   non-­‐
representational.	   	   Any	   representational	   or	   narrative	   content	   such	   works	   did	  
exhibit	   was	   deemed	   to	   be	   irrelevant	   and	   disinterested	   contemplation	   was	  
required.	   A	   work’s	   formal	   features	   and	   qualities	   were	   held	   to	   be	   the	  
appropriate	   object	   of	   aesthetic	   attention	   and	   they	   were	   a	   source	   of	   the	  
aesthetic	  experience,	  which	  was	  in	  its	  turn	  deemed	  to	  be	  valuable.	  According	  to	  
Bell’s	  version	  of	  this	  conception,	  which	  I	  discuss	  below,	  form	  was	  essential	  to	  art	  
and	   therefore,	   because	   I	   have	   already	   defined	   gardens	   as	   purposeful	  
arrangements	   of	   natural	   objects,	   this	   conception	   might	   be	   assumed	   to	  
accommodate	   gardens	   comfortably.	   I	   investigate	   this	   assumption	   later	   in	   this	  
section.	  	  
	  
The	   second	   strand	  of	  modernism	  was	   engaged	  modernism.	   In	   the	   conception	  
offered	   by	   this	   strand	   of	  modernism	   autonomy	  was	   also	   important.	   Engaged	  
autonomous	   art	  was	   art	   that	  was	   independent	   of	   existing	   social	   and	   political	  
power	  structures	  and	   it	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  valuable	   in	  part	  because	   it	  was	  
able	  to	  criticize	  and	  subvert	  those	  same	  social	  and	  political	  structures.	  Such	  art	  
was	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  representational	  or	  narrative	  content	  rather	  than	  to	  be	  
abstract	  and	  it	  did	  not	  recommend	  that	  those	  who	  looked	  at,	  read	  or	  listened	  to	  
it	   be	  disinterested.	  Autonomous	  art	  of	   this	   sort	   aimed	   to	  engage	   its	   audience	  
both	   imaginatively	   and	   emotionally.	   Modernist	   gardens	   were	   typically	   not	  
modernist	   in	   the	   engaged	   sense,	   although	   arguments	   could	   possibly	   be	  
mounted	   for	   gardens	  of	  other	  periods,	   such	  as	  Victorian	  public	   parks	   and	   the	  
ecologically	   pure	   gardens	   of	   today	   being	   so.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   discussion	   of	  
modernism	   that	   follows	   will	   concentrate	   on	   modernism	   as	   autonomous	   and	  
disengaged.	  	  
	  
Unless	  I	  specify	  otherwise,	  when	  I	  refer	  below	  to	  autonomous	  modernism	  I	  am	  
referring	   to	   the	  modernist	   conception	  of	  Clive	  Bell.	   I	  discuss	  his	   conception	   in	  
detail	   later	   in	   this	   section,	   when	   I	   also	   briefly	   discuss	   the	   conceptions	   of	  
Clement	   Greenberg	   and	   Munroe	   Beardsley	   and	   introduce	   the	   philosophy	   of	  
Susanne	  Langer.	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Autonomous	  modernism	  conceived	  of	   the	  essence	  of	  art	  as	  being	  related	  to	  a	  
work’s	   formal	   composition.	   According	   to	   this	   conception	   an	   artist	   created	   a	  
work	  not	   to	   represent	  anything	  or	   to	  express	  her	  or	   someone	  else’s	  emotion:	  
she	   created	   a	   work	   in	   order	   to	   produce	   something	   that	   exhibited	   form	   and,	  
according	  to	  Bell	  and	  his	  followers,	  significant	   form.	  Exhibiting	  significant	  form	  
was	  both	  a	  necessary	  and	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  something’s	  being	  a	  work	  of	  
art.	  Any	  emotional	  or	  representational	  content	  a	  work	  may	  have	  was	  not	  only	  
irrelevant	   but	   was	   strictly	   to	   be	   ignored	   when	   assessing	   a	   work’s	   significant	  
form	  and,	  therefore,	   its	  value	  as	  art.	  A	  work	  of	  art	  was	  held	  to	  be	  valuable	  on	  
this	   account	   because	   it	   offered	   the	   opportunity	   for	   a	   viewer	   to	   undergo	   an	  
aesthetic	   experience,	   which	   experience	   was	   in	   turn	   held	   to	   be	   intrinsically	  
valuable.	  
	  
A	   pioneering	   precursor	   to	   these	   particular	   modernist	   views	   was	   Eduard	  
Hanslick,	  whose	  Concerning	  the	  Beautiful	  in	  Music1	  had	  appeared	  in	  1854,	  at	  the	  
height	  of	  the	  romantic	  period.	  He	  was	  conservative	  in	  his	  musical	  tastes	  and	  in	  
that	   book	   he	   defended	   music	   as	   an	   abstract	   art,	   an	   art	   whose	   content	   was	  
unable	  to	  be	  anything	  other	  than	  self-­‐referential.	  Since	  music	  was	  abstract,	  he	  
argued,	   it	  was	  unable	   to	  express	  anything	  except	   itself.	  However,	   as	  no	  other	  
contemporary	   fine	   art	   was,	   or	   was	   regarded	   as,	   abstract	   his	   views	   remained	  
confined	  to	  music	  and	  hence	  Hanslick’s	  influence	  on	  the	  non-­‐musical	  art	  world	  
was	  not	  great.	  
	  
What	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  formalism	  found	  a	  much	  more	  influential	  apologist	  
over	   half	   a	   century	   later	   in	   Clive	   Bell.2	   Bell	   developed	   his	   prescriptive	   views	  
primarily	  in	  relation	  to	  contemporary	  painting	  but	  his	  philosophy	  of	  art	  came	  to	  
be	   applied	   across	   all	   the	   arts.	   It	   was	   a	   conception	   for	   its	   time.	   Building	   on	  
Hanslick’s	  earlier	  work,	  and	  supported	  by	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	  he	  went	  some	  way	  
                                                
1 Hanslick (1957) 
2 Bell (1986) 
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towards	   explaining	   the	   power	   of	   the	   large	   body	   of	   abstract	   music	   produced	  
during	   the	   classical	   and	   romantic	   periods,	   but,	   much	   more	   importantly,	   he	  
offered	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  and	  was	  an	  apologist	  for	  the	  increasingly	  non-­‐
representational	   contemporary	   visual	   arts.	   For	   a	   public	   and	   for	   aestheticians	  
moving	   step	   by	   step	   away	   from	   representation	   and	   towards	   abstraction,	   the	  
formalist	  conception	  was	  a	  plausible	  alternative	  to	  earlier	  conceptions	  on	  which	  
to	   explain,	   criticize	   and	   experience	   the	   new	   works.	   It	   was	   soon	   extrapolated	  
from	  music	   and	   painting	   to	   cover	   all	   the	   arts,	  with	   functionalism	   becoming	   a	  
central	  tenet	  of	  20th	  century	  architecture.	  	  
	  
This	   conception	   set	   out	   to	   champion	   the	   art	   it	   fostered	   in	   a	   way	   that	   the	  
expression	   theory	   had	   not.	   	   Philosophical	   presentations	   of	   the	   expression	  
theory	  did	  not	  occur	  until	   that	   conception’s	   heyday	  was	   all	   but	   over	  whereas	  
modernism	  was	  espoused	  as	  a	  conception	  only	  ten	  or	  so	  years	  after	  Croce	  and	  
Tolstoy	  were	  writing	   their	   important	   theoretical	   contributions.	   The	  expression	  
theory	   was	   explaining	   what	   had	   been	   going	   on	   for	   over	   a	   century.	   The	  
modernist	  conception	  was	  explaining	  what	  had	  been	  happening	  in	  the	  previous	  
ten	  years	  only.	  And	   this	   close	   temporal	   relationship	  between	   the	  vanguard	  of	  
arts	  and	  philosophical	  aesthetics	  continues	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  
	  
Bell’s	  conception	  did	  offer	  a	   framework	  for	  understanding	  and	   justifying	  some	  
of	   the	   abstract	   arts	   of	   its	   time.	   However,	   its	   usefulness	   in	   these	   roles	   was	  
undermined	   by	   the	   circularity	   of	   its	   underlying	   claims.	   Bell	   claimed	   (a)	   that	  
significant	  form	  is	  what	  art	  possesses,	  	  (b)	  that	  significant	  form	  is	  what	  triggers	  
the	  aesthetic	  emotion	   in	   the	  viewer	  and	   (c)	   that	   the	  aesthetic	  emotion	   is	   that	  
which	   is	   triggered	   by	   significant	   form.	   Based	   on	   this	   we	   can’t	   pin	   down	   art,	  
significant	  form	  or	  the	  aesthetic	  emotion.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  even	  leaving	  aside	  its	  circular	  logic,	  Bell’s	  conception	  is	  not	  adequate.	  
Formal	  features	  may	  be	  an	  aesthetically	  valuable	  property	  of	  some	  works	  of	  art	  
but	   they	  may	  also	  be	  valuable	  properties	  of	  objects	   that	  are	  not	  works	  of	  art.	  
Moreover,	  although	  some	  works	  of	  art	  may	  exhibit	  aesthetically	  pleasing	  formal	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features	   this	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   exhibiting	   form,	   and	   in	   particular	   significant	  
form,	  is	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  art,	  nor	  one	  that	  necessarily	  results	  in	  a	  valuable	  
aesthetic	  experience.	  All	  art	  does	  not	  exhibit	  significant	  form	  and	  therefore	  the	  
conception	   fails	   to	   satisfy	   the	   identity	   criterion.	   Furthermore,	   a	   paradigmatic	  
work	   of	   art	   such	   as	   Boulez’	   Second	   Piano	   Sonata,	   which	   is	   constructed	   in	  
accordance	   with	   probability	   theory,	   cannot	   exhibit	   significant	   form	   and	  
therefore	  it	  cannot	  be	  art	  or,	  as	  art,	  valuable.	  	  On	  these	  grounds	  the	  conception	  
fails	  to	  meet	  the	  inclusion	  criterion	  also.	  Finally,	  the	  conception’s	  narrow	  view,	  
which	   requires	   that	   significant	   form	   be	   appreciated	   in	   a	   work	   while	  
representational,	   narrative	   and	   emotional	   content	   are	   ignored,	   is	   also	  
unacceptable.	   An	   understanding	   of,	   say,	   Mantegna’s	   St.	   Sebastian,	   Britten’s	  
War	  Requiem,	  Melville’s	  Moby	  Dick	  or	  Hotere’s	  Sangro	  paintings	  as	  significant	  
form	  only	  appears	  unjustifiably	  narrow	  and	  as	  missing	  the	  point	  of	  the	  works.	  
	  
There	   were	   others	   following	   on	   from	   Bell	   who	   agreed	   that	   formal	  
considerations	  were	  paramount	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  but	  allowed	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
that	  form,	  while	   it	  was	  a	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  art,	  was	  not	  an	  end	  in	   itself	  
and	  that	  it	  represented	  symbolically	  something	  else.	  One	  such	  philosopher	  was	  
Susanne	   Langer,	   who	   was	   active	   from	   the	   1950’s	   onwards.	   She	   developed	   a	  
comprehensive	   general	   theory	   of	   art	   that	   she	   elaborated	   extensively	   with	  
regard	  to	  many	  of	  the	  individual	  fine	  arts.	  Her	  philosophy	  of	  art	  was	  presented	  
initially	  in	  Feeling	  and	  Form1	  and	  Philosophy	  in	  a	  New	  Key	  2.	  For	  Langer,	  the	  arts	  
were	  a	  fundamentally	  important	  and	  valuable	  human	  activity.	  The	  ideas	  that	  art	  
might	   refer	   only	   to	   itself	   or	   that	   art	  might	   be	  merely	   beautiful	   were,	   to	   her,	  
counter-­‐intuitive.	   Her	   theories	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   some	   detail	   later	   and	   her	  
idea	   of	   how	   music	   functions	   will	   underpin	   a	   theory	   to	   be	   introduced	   in	  
connection	  with	  gardens.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Langer (1953) 
2 Langer (1957) 
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Others	  prominent	  in	  the	  field	  also	  produced	  their	  own	  modernist	  conceptions.	  
Art	   critic	   Clement	   Greenberg	   and	   philosopher	   Monroe	   Beardsley	   both	  
developed	  conceptions	  of	  autonomous	  modernism	  in	  which	  aesthetic	  qualities	  
and	  value	  were	  dependent	  on	   the	   formal	  qualities	  of	  works.	   	  Greenberg1,	   like	  
Bell	  before	  him,	  developed	  his	  theory	  mainly	  in	  response	  to	  the	  abstract	  visual	  
arts.	   He	   agreed	   with	   Bell	   that	   art	   was	   self-­‐referential,	   non-­‐contextual	   and	  
independent	   and	   that	   the	   art	   object	   itself	   was	   of	   primary	   importance.	   He	  
claimed	   that	   any	   art	   had	   an	   essential	   nature	   and	   that	   painting’s	  was	   painted	  
two	  dimensional	  surfaces.	  He	  believed	  that	  art	  was	  to	  be	  valued	  to	  the	  degree	  
that	  it	  showed	  originality	  and	  evolved	  and	  actualized	  new	  versions	  and	  forms	  of	  
its	   essential	   nature.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   paintings	   these	   advances	   in	   technique	   and	  
form	  were	  to	  be	  evident	  through	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  paint	  was	  applied	  to	  a	  two	  
dimensional	  canvas	  or	  similar	  flat	  surface.	  In	  arguing	  for	  originality,	  however,	  he	  
exposed	   a	   flaw	   in	   his	   theory.	   If	   a	   valuable	   work	   of	   art	   is	   one	   that	   exhibits	  
originality	   then	   art	   cannot	   be	   independent	   because	   originality	   can	   only	   be	  
assessed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   art	   that	   has	   preceded	   it.	   In	   this	   way,	   for	  
Greenberg,	  art	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  dependent	  after	  all.	  
	  
Beardsley2	  also	  believed	  in	  the	  primacy	  and	  independence	  of	  the	  art	  object.	  He	  
believed	   that	   aesthetic	   experience	   is	   valuable	   and	   that	   a	   work	   of	   art	   is	   a	  
functional	  object	  whose	  task	  is	  to	  stimulate	  an	  aesthetic	  experience	  in	  a	  viewer.	  
He	   defined	   a	   work	   of	   art	   as	   “…an	   arrangement	   of	   conditions	   intended	   to	   be	  
capable	   of	   affording	   an	   experience	   with	   marked	   aesthetic	   character…”.	   3	  
Beardsley	   allowed	   that	   an	   aesthetic	   object	   can	   have	  many	   presentations	   and	  
this	  was	  particularly	  important	  for	  his	  discussion	  of	  performances	  and	  other	  arts	  
that	  exhibit	  change.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Greenberg (1978a) 
2 Beardsley (1981) 
3 Ibid. p. 299.	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Greenberg’s	   and	   Beardsley’s	   conceptions	   highlight	   important	   aspects	   and	  
features	   of,	   as	   well	   as	   reasons	   for	   valuing,	   art.	   Greenberg	   claims	   that	   art	   is	  
autonomous,	   independent	  and	   self	   referential,	   and	   that,	  by	  exhibiting	  novelty	  
and	   originality,	   it	   provides	   an	   aesthetic	   experience	  which,	   in	   turn,	   provides	   a	  
reason	   for	   our	   valuing	   it.	   Beardsley	   claims	   that	   art	   exists	   to	   provide	   aesthetic	  
experience	  and	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  valuable.	  However,	  both	  these	  conceptions	  are	  
inadequate.	  They	  do	  not	  provide	  the	  means	  to	  distinguish	  between	  art	  and	  non-­‐
art	   and	   nor	   do	   they	   include	   all	   paradigmatic	   works	   of	   art.	   All	   art	   is	   not	  
autonomous,	   or	   novel	   and	   original.	   Consider	   the	   stained	   glass	   windows	   at	  
Chartres	  Cathedral.	  Similarly,	  all	  art	   is	  not	  created	  to	  be,	  or	  to	  be	  experienced	  
as,	   an	   aesthetic	   object.	   For	   example,	   Bach	   composed	   his	  Goldberg	   Variations	  
because	  it	  was	  his	  job	  to	  provide	  what	  his	  patron	  wanted,	  and	  in	  that	  instance	  
his	   patron	   wanted	   something	   to	   cure	   his	   insomnia.	   Consequently,	   these	  
conceptions	   fail	   to	   meet	   both	   the	   identity	   and	   the	   inclusion	   criteria	   for	  
adequacy.	  
Gardens	  
I	  have	  already	  referred	  to	  the	  circularity	  of	  Bell’s	  formulation	  of	  modernism	  and	  
it	   causes	   problems	   for	   discussing	   any	  work	   of	   art	   in	   terms	   of	   his	   conception.	  
However,	   for	  now,	   let	  us	  assume	  that	  we	  know,	   to	  a	  degree	  that	  allows	  us	   to	  
consider	  whether	  it	  might	  or	  might	  not	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  gardens,	  what	  significant	  
form	  might	  be.	  
	  
A	   clarification	   is	   needed	   at	   this	   point	   regarding	   two	   terms	   frequently	   used	   to	  
describe	  different	  styles	  of	  gardens.	  Gardens	  are	  commonly	  described	  as	  being	  
formal	  or	  informal.	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  garden’s	  being	  formal	  or	  informal	  tends	  to	  be	  
shorthand	  for	  describing	  a	  garden’s	  layout,	  plant	  range	  and	  planting	  style.	  	  Thus,	  
when	   a	   garden	   is	   described	   as	   being	   formal	  what	   is	   often	  meant	   is	   that	   that	  
garden’s	  elements,	  as	  seen	  in	  plan	  form,	  are	  geometric	  rather	  than	  curvilinear	  in	  
layout,	   that	   there	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   spatial	   repetition,	   (bilateral)	   symmetry	   and	  
linear	  axes	  in	  the	  layout	  of	  the	  garden’s	  elements,	  and	  that	  the	  garden’s	  internal	  
and	  external	  edges	  may	  be	  clearly	  defined.	  A	  garden	  described	  as	   formal	  may	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also	  be	   likely	  to	  employ	  a	   limited	  palette	  of	  plants,	  to	  dispose	  them	  en	  bloc	   in	  
the	   patterns	   just	   described	   and	   perhaps	   also	   to	   treat	   its	   plants	   in	   unnatural	  
ways	   by	  means	   of	   pruning,	   shaping	   and	   otherwise	   directing	   their	   growth.	   By	  
contrast,	   if	   gardens	   are	   described	   as	   informal	   they	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	  
curvilinear	   than	   geometric	   in	   plan	   form	   and	   there	   is	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   less	   bi-­‐
lateral	  symmetry.	  An	  informal	  garden	  is	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  merge	  into	  its	  setting	  
and	  it	  may	  well	  appear	  to	  dispose	  its	  plants	  more	  artlessly.	  	  
	  
Significant	  form	  for	  Bell	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  formality	  as	  just	  described.	  Any	  
work,	  no	  matter	  how	  ‘formal’	  of	  ‘informal’	  was	  capable	  of	  exhibiting	  significant	  
form.	   For	  him	   form	  was	   an	  outcome	  of	   the	  way	   colours,	   shapes	   and	   textures	  
and	   other	   elements	   were	   combined	   in	   a	   work.	   Such	   form	   was	   not	   to	   be	  
prejudged	   by	   a	   work’s	   being	   so-­‐called	   ‘formal’	   or	   ‘informal’.	   For	   Bell,	   a	   work	  
could	   theoretically	  by	  highly	   ‘formal’	   and	  yet	  not	  possess	   significant	   form	  and	  
equally	   a	   work	   could	   appear	   ‘informal’	   yet	   still	   possess	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  
significant	  form.	  
	  
Three	   issues	   need	   to	   be	   raised	   concerning	   gardens	   and	   significant	   form.	   The	  
first	   issue	  has	  already	  been	  noted	  above	   in	   connection	  with	  all	   the	  arts	  but	   it	  
bears	   repeating:	   if	   significant	   form	   is	   to	   be	   the	   sole	   criterion	   for	   artistic	  
appreciation	  of	  a	  garden	  then	  so	  much	  of	  gardens’	  repertoires	  of	  meanings	  and	  
value	  must	  in	  that	  way	  be	  ignored.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  although	  Bell	  is	  of	  no	  help	  on	  the	  matter,	  the	  perception	  of	  significant	  
form	   in	   a	   garden	   would	   seem	   to	   assume	   that	   there	   is	   a	   way	   in	   which	   the	  
garden’s	   individual	   elements	   cohere	   to	   produce	   the	   significant	   form(s)	   that	   a	  
viewer	   recognizes.	   Because	   a	   garden’s	   elements	   are	   perpetually	   changing	  
chronologically,	   diurnally	   and	   seasonally,	   as	   well	   as	   aging,	   dying	   and	  
regenerating,	   does	   this	   mean	   that	   there	   is	   an	   infinite	   number	   of	   significant	  
forms	  that	  a	  garden	  may	  have,	  or	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  just	  one,	  infinitely	  
accommodating	   significant	   form?	   Seen	   in	   this	   light	   the	   conception	   appears	  
inadequate	  to	  the	  case	  of	  gardens.	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  possible to claim that a 
          
          
50 
garden like the famous rock and sand garden in Ryōan-ji Temple has	  a	  constant,	  
singular	   significant	   form,	   gardens	   are	   not	   typically	   like	   that.	   Accordingly,	   the	  
assumption	   I	   referred	   to	   earlier,	   that	   autonomous	   modernism	   would	  
accommodate	  gardens	  because	  they	  are	  purposeful	  arrangements	  of	  objects,	  is	  
shown	  to	  be	  wrong.	  	  	  
	  
Bell	   does	   not	   seriously	   attempt	   to	   apply	   his	   aesthetic	   theory	   to	   the	   temporal	  
arts.	  Indeed	  he	  writes	  of	  music:	  “I	  do	  not	  understand	  music	  well….	  I	  find	  musical	  
form	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  apprehend,	  …	  My	  opinion	  about	  music	  is	  not	  worth	  
having.”1	  And	  perhaps	  it	  is	  this	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  music	  that	  allowed	  him	  not	  to	  
take	   a	   logical	   next	   step	   and	   develop	   a	   dynamic	   version	   of	   his	   theory	   of	  
significant	  form	  such	  that	  might,	  in	  his	  terms,	  adequately	  encompass	  music,	  the	  
other	  temporal	  arts,	  and	  gardens.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   an	   important	   objection	   to	   significant	   form	   as	   a	   framework	   for	  
appreciating	   gardens	   is	   that	   Bell	   does	   not	   allow	   that	   anything	   of	   a	   work’s	  
representational	   content	   is	   admissible	   when	   a	   work	   of	   art	   is	   being	   assessed.	  
Hence,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   clump	   of	   trees	   in	   a	   Capability	   Brown	   landscape	   is	   just	  
that,	  a	  clump	  of	   trees,	  and	  not	  say	  something	   that	   looks	   like	  a	  clump	  of	   trees	  
but	  is	  in	  fact	  made	  out	  of	  wrecked	  car	  bodies,	  is	  irrelevant.	  Similarly,	  a	  pear	  tree	  
in	   an	   enclosed	   monastery	   garden	   is	   not	   to	   be	   recognized	   for	   its	   beauty,	  
fecundity	  or	  any	  symbolic	  meaning	  it	  might	  have	  but	  simply	  for	  its	  contribution	  
to	  significant	   form.	   	  Kant	  might	  be	  seen	  to	  agree	  when	  he	  says,	  “A	  product	  of	  
fine	  art	  must	  be	  recognized	  to	  be	  art	  and	  not	  nature.”2	  However,	  herein	  lies	  an	  
issue	  that	  is	  distinctive	  about	  gardens	  as	  an	  art	  form:	  gardens	  use	  real	  objects,	  
even	  growing	  objects,	  as	  their	  materials	  and	  in	  this	  they	  are	  unique.	  	  	  
	  
In	  summary,	  autonomous,	  disengaged	  modernism	  as	  conceived	  of	  by	  Bell	  was	  a	  
useful,	  though	  inadequate,	  conception	  for	  the	  abstract	  visual	  arts	  it	  was	  seeking	  
                                                
1 Dutton (undated)  
2 Kant (2007) section 45: 135 
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to	   justify.	   Gardens	   are	   abstract	   visual	   arts	   and	   you	  would	   expect	   them	   to	   be	  
accommodated	   by	   the	   conception.	   Similarly,	   gardens	   are,	   by	   the	   definition	   I	  
have	  adopted,	  purposeful	  arrangements	  of	  natural	  objects	  and,	  therefore,	  form	  
is	   central	   to	   them.	   For	   this	   reason	   too	   you	   would	   expect	   autonomous	  
modernism	   to	   be	   adequate	   to	   accommodating	   gardens.	   	   However,	   Bell’s	  
conception	  of	  significant	  form	  was	  non-­‐dynamic	  and	  was	  therefore	  inadequate	  
to	  the	  task	  of	  accommodating	  gardens,	  which	  by	  the	  nature	  of	   their	  materials	  
must	  change	  constantly.	  	  The	  particular	  way	  in	  which	  gardens	  change	  over	  time	  
is	  essential	  to,	  and	  distinctive,	  of	  them.	  	  I	  discuss	  this	  feature	  of	  gardens	  in	  detail	  
later,	  in	  chapter	  five.	  
	  
I	   referred	   above	   to	   the	   conceptions	   of	   Greenberg	   and	   Beardsley.	   Their	  
conceptions	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  significant	  form	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
exclude	  gardens.	  Greenberg’s	  modernist	  theory	  allows	  in	  part	  that	  gardens	  may	  
be	   works	   of	   art,	   and	   valuable,	   to	   the	   degree	   that	   they	   are	   technically	   and	  
formally	  original	  and	  innovative	  in	  their	  essential	  nature.	  I	  have	  already	  claimed	  
that	  gardens	  have	  an	  essential	  nature.	   	   I	  agree	  with	  Greenberg	  that	  paintings’	  
essential	   nature	   is	   two-­‐dimensional	   and	   sculpture’s	   three	   dimensional.	   My	  
further	   claim	   is	   that	   gardens’	   essential	   nature	   is	   four-­‐dimensional,	   and	   that	  
gardens	   share	   this	   with	   dance.	   Gardens,	   therefore,	   because	   they	   have	   an	  
essential	   nature,	   have	   an	   appropriate	   means	   whereby	   they	   can	   demonstrate	  
their	  originality	  and	   innovativeness.	  A	  paradigmatic	  art	  garden	  such	  as	   Jencks’	  
and	   Keswick’s	   Garden	   of	   Cosmic	   Speculation	   in	   Scotland	   amply	   displays	  
technical	  and	  formal	  originality	  and	  innovation	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  its	  organic	  
and	   inorganic	   elements	   and	   the	   whole	   garden	   exist	   in	   four	   dimensions	   and	  
change	  constantly	  over	  time.	  Greenberg	  would	  therefore	  agree	  that	  it	  could	  be	  
valuable.	  However,	  he	  would	  have	  trouble	  accepting	  it	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art	  because	  
it	  is	  clearly	  not	  non-­‐referential,	  nor	  independent	  of	  the	  scientific,	  mathematical	  
and	  architectural	  milieu	  in	  which	  it	  was	  formed.	  Furthermore,	  gardens,	  whether	  
they	  are	  considered	  art	  gardens	  or	  not,	  cannot	  be	  independent	  of	  their	  physical	  
and	  social	  milieux	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Greenberg	  says	  works	  of	  art	  should	  be.	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Beardsley1	  also	  believes	  in	  the	  primacy	  and	  independence	  of	  the	  art	  object,	  and	  
that	  art	  exists	   to	   function	   to	  provide	  aesthetic	  experience.	  Gardens	  have	   long	  
been	   considered	   objects	   that	   offer	   aesthetic	   experience.	   A	   paradigmatic	   art	  
garden,	   such	   as	   Monet’s	   garden	   at	   Giverney,	   is	   clearly	   an	   arrangement	   of	  
‘conditions’	   capable	  of	  affording	  an	  aesthetic	  experience	  and	  Beardsley	  would	  
therefore	   agree	   that	   it	   could	   be	   valuable.	   However,	   the	   changeability	   of	   the	  
garden	  at	  Giverney	  and	  the	  infinite	  numbers	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  may	  be	  fully	  or	  
partially	  explored	  present	  challenges	  for	  Beardsley’s	  theory	  of	  an	  independent,	  
functional	  aesthetic	  object.	  Although	  Beardsley	  allowed	  that	  aesthetic	  objects,	  
including	  performances,	  can	  exist	   in	  multiple	  ‘presentations’,	   I	  believe	  that	  the	  
constant	  mutability	  that	   is	  an	  everyday	  feature	  of	  most	  gardens,	  and	  to	  which	  
we	  direct	  aesthetic	  attention,	  and	  from	  which	  we	  derive	  aesthetic	  pleasure,	   is	  
not	   something	   his	   conception	   is	   designed	   to,	   or	   able	   to	   accommodate	  
adequately.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  ‘significant	  form’	  can	  be	  tied	  down,	  Bell’s	  conception,	  
and	  those	  of	  Greenberg	  and	  Beardsley,	  all	  draw	  our	  attention	  to	  important	  and	  
valuable	  features	  and	  aspects	  of	  some	  works	  of	  art.	  Works	  of	  art	  can	  be	  
formally	  interesting	  and	  pleasing,	  novel	  and	  original,	  and	  they	  can	  stimulate	  
aesthetic	  experiences	  for	  a	  viewer.	  However	  none	  of	  these	  features	  and	  
qualities	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  or	  distinctive	  aspect	  of	  gardens.	  Furthermore	  
they	  do	  not	  provide	  adequate	  reasons	  for	  valuing	  gardens	  and	  nor	  does	  
exhibiting	  them	  provide	  adequate	  ground	  for	  identifying	  gardens	  as	  works	  of	  
art.	  However,	  all	  these	  features	  and	  qualities	  are	  to	  found	  in	  some	  paradigmatic	  
works	  of	  art	  and	  we	  value	  those	  works	  because	  they	  possess	  them.	  	  These	  same	  
features	  and	  qualities	  are	  also	  to	  be	  found	  in	  some	  gardens	  and	  this	  supplies	  an	  
additional	  reason	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  gardens	  from	  the	  category	  of	  art	  
is	  unjustified.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Beardsley (1981) 
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The	  Institutional	  Theory	  
Conception	  of	  Art	  	  
All	   the	   art	   conceptions	   already	   discussed	   continue	   to	   play	   some	   role	   in	   our	  
understanding	  of	  art	  today.	  However,	  they	  all	  started	  to	  come	  under	  increasing	  
pressure	   from	  about	   1920	  onwards	   as	   they	  were	   faced	  with	   a	   steady	   flow	  of	  
objects	   and	   performances	   that	   they	   were	   unable	   to	   accommodate.	   A	   new	  
conception	  was	  needed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  	  range	  of	  new	  and	  difficult	  objects	  and	  
performances,	  some	  of	  which	  appeared	  to	  be	  not	  only	  not	  art	  but	  to	  be	  anti-­‐art.	  	  
Objets	  trouvés	  and	  other	  products	  of	  Dadaism	  and	  aleatoric	  art,	  for	  example,	  all	  
proved	  difficult	  not	  only	  for	  the	  person	  in	  the	  street	  but	  also	  for	  the	  art	  public,	  
art	  institutions,	  funding	  agencies	  and	  philosophers.	  	  More	  controversial	  still	  was	  
the	   practice	   of	   conceptual	   art,	   which	   typically	   featured	   no	   art	   object	   at	   all.	  	  
Locally,	  works	   such	  as	  composer	   John	  Cousins’	  1984	  Membrane,	  during	  which	  
he	  manipulates	  the	  flow	  of	  his	  own	  urine,	  or	  installations	  like	  those	  of	  the	  et	  al.	  
collective,	   stretched	   the	   modernist	   aesthetic	   and	   its	   definitions	   to	   breaking	  
point.	  Although	  the	  autonomous	  modernist	  conception	  encouraged	  subversive	  
innovation,	   it	   still	   valued	   significant	   form	   and	   supported	   the	   notion	   that	   art	  
stood	  apart	  from	  ‘real’	  life	  and	  was	  self-­‐referential	  in	  terms	  of	  meaning.1	  While	  
it	  is	  true	  that	  objects	  and	  performances	  in	  the	  genres	  just	  cited	  were	  often	  self-­‐
referential	   and	   could	   be	   sometimes	   seen	   to	   have	   significant	   form,	   clearly	   art	  
was	  changing	   fast	  and	   traditional	  notions	  of	   form,	  beauty	  and	  other	  aesthetic	  
qualities	   were	   being	   seriously	   challenged.	   In	   response	   to	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	  
new	   theories	   of	   art	   were	   proposed,	   prominent	   among	   which	   was	   the	  
institutional	  conception,	  usually	  known	  as	  the	  institutional	  theory.	  
	  
This	  theory	  was	  promulgated	  primarily	  by	  Arthur	  Danto	  and	  George	  Dickie.	  My	  
discussion	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  Dickie’s	  version	  of	  the	  theory	  but	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  
brief	  account	  of	  Danto’s	  version.	  Danto	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘artworld’,	  by	  which	  he	  
                                                
1 Greenberg (1978a), (1978b) 
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meant	   “an	   atmosphere	   of	   art	   theory”.1	   	   He	   saw	   art	   history	   as	   analogous	   to	  
scientific	  enquiry	  and	  works	  of	  art	  as	  theoretical	  entities.	  He	  believed	  that,	  just	  
as	   in	   science,	   new	   products	   and	   new	   ways	   of	   thinking	   put	   pressure	   on	   old	  
conceptions	  and	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  art	  and	  ultimately	   forced	  a	  revolution	  
like,	   say,	   the	  Copernican	  Revolution	   in	   science.	  The	   result	  was	   revised	  or	  new	  
theories	   of	   art	   that	   accommodated	   the	   previously	   problematic	   products	   and	  
ways	  of	  thinking.	  Art	  objects	  and	  theories	  were	  mutually	  dependent,	  and	  were	  
individually	  and	  collectively	  open	  to	  change	  and	  continual	  revision	  by	  members	  
of	   The	   Artworld.	   The	   important	   distinguishing	   clause	   in	   his	   definition	   of	   art	  
states	   that	   something	   is	   art	   if	   and	   only	   if	   “…	   the	   work	   in	   question	   and	   the	  
interpretations	   thereof	   require	   an	   art	   historical	   context.”2	   	   This	   means	   that	  
something	  is	  art	  only	  if	  members	  of	  The	  Artworld	  think	  it	  is.	  The	  Artworld	  thinks	  
an	   object	   is	   art	   because	   some	   of	   its	   members	   understand	   that	   the	   object	   in	  
question	   belongs	   to,	   interacts	   with,	   or	   can	   be	   under	   understood	   and	  
appreciated	  in	  the	  light	  of	  preceding	  art	  practices	  and	  the	  theories	  and	  writings	  
those	  practices	  have	  elicited.	  New	  ‘art’	  that	  does	  not	  fit	  may	  become	  a	  member	  
of	   the	   category	   when	   there	   is	   sufficient	   pressure,	   weight	   of	   evidence	   or	  
momentum	  for	  it	  to	  be	  noticed	  and	  considered	  as	  such.	  Then	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  
an	  enlarged	  theoretical	  category	  called	  ‘art’.	  
	  
There	   have	   been	   objections	   to	  Danto’s	   theory.	   For	   example,	   some	   say	   that	   it	  
allows	  that	  art	  criticism	  written	  with	  some	  literary	  style	  could	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  
art.	  Others	   claim	   it	   is	   inadequate	  because	   it	  allows	  an	  object	   to	  be	  art	  at	  one	  
time,	  then	  not	  to	  be	  art	  at	  another	  time,	  and	  then	  for	   it	  to	  be	  art	  again	  at	  yet	  
another	  time,	  and	  so	  on,	  depending	  on	  how	  the	  object	  can	  be	  accommodated	  
by	   current	   theoretical	   art	   discourses.	   However,	   in	   theory,	   Danto’s	   conception	  
has	  no	  problem	  accommodating	  gardens	  and	  in	  this	  way	  the	  conception	  could	  
be	   adequate	   to	   the	   case	   of	   gardens.	   	   But,	   for	   reasons	   I	   will	   discuss	   below	   in	  
connection	  with	  Dickie,	  Danto’s	  art	  world	  has	  generally	  not	  been	   interested	   in	  
                                                
1 Adajian (2008) 
2 Ibid. 
          
          
55 
gardens	   and	   therefore,	   by	  his	   criteria,	   they	   are	  not	   art,	   or	   at	   least	  not	   at	   this	  
time.	  	  
	   	  
Dickie’s	  1985	  version	  of	  the	   institutional	  theory	   is	  summarized	  by	  Hepburn	   	  as	  
claiming	   “the	   unifying	   factor	   [of	   art	   is]	   …	   not	   the	   possession	   of	   common	  
perceptual…	   features	   by	   artworks,	   but	   the	   conferral	   on	   certain	   objects,	   by	  
representatives	  of	  the	  ‘artworld’,	  of	  the	  status	  of	  ‘candidate	  for	  appreciation’	  as	  
works	  of	  art”.1	  Dickie’s	  definition	  is	  procedural:	  just	  as	  a	  rule	  becomes	  law	  when	  
it	   has	   gone	   through	   the	   appropriate	   procedures	   so	   too	   an	   object,	   person	   or	  
event	   becomes	   art	  when	   it	   has	   gone	   through	   appropriate	   procedures.	   In	   this	  
way	   art	   is	   not	   expected	   to	   possess	   or	   exhibit	   any	   characteristic	   perceptual	  
features	  or	  qualities	  and	  therefore	  any	  object,	  process	  or	  person	  is	  a	  potential	  
artwork.	   	   	   An	   actual	   artwork	   exists	   not	   because	   of	   features	   it	   possesses	   but	  
because	  it	  is	  treated	  in	  a	  particular	  by	  a	  member	  or	  members	  of	  the	  particular	  
social	  systems	  known	  as	  The	  Artworld,	  and	  that	  treatment	  alone	  is	  a	  necessary	  
and	   sufficient	   condition	   for	   something’s	   being	   a	   work	   of	   art.	   This	   theory	   is	  
radically	   different	   from	   the	   mimetic,	   expression	   and	   modernist	   conceptions	  
discussed	   above,	   all	   of	   which	   required	   the	   art	   object	   to	   have	   particular	  
perceptual	   features,	   in	  respect	  of	   the	  possession	  of	  which	  the	  object	  could	  be	  
identified	   and	   valued	   as	   art.	   	   It	   is	   also	   different	   from	   Danto’s	   theory.	   Danto	  
required	  that	  members	  of	  The	  Artworld	  think	  about	  art	  in	  agreed	  ways	  and	  this	  
enabled	   them	   to	   classify	   something	   as	   art.	   	   Dickie	   offers	   procedures.	   He	  
requires	   that	   members	   of	   The	   Artworld	   do	   something	   about	   art,	   that	   they	  
follow	  certain	  procedures	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  an	  object	  becomes	  art.	  However,	  
the	  procedures	  that	  need	  to	  be	  followed	  to	  designate	  something	  a	  work	  of	  art	  
and	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  designating	  groups	  are	  ill	  defined.	  
	  
Dickie’s	   institutional	   theory	   supplied	   a	   straightforward	   classificatory	   definition	  
of	  art.	  By	  this	  definition	  anything	  can	  be	  art	  if	  it	  is	  presented	  for	  appreciation	  by	  
The	  Artworld.	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  definition	  lay	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  cover	  all	  the	  	  
                                                
1 Hepburn (1992) p. 425 
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“anxious	  objects”1	  whose	  status	  as	  art	  objects	  was	  in	  doubt.	  Dickie	  considered	  
that	   the	   theory’s	   inabilities	   to	   describe	   what	   qualities	   and	   characteristics	   we	  
might	   expect	   art	   objects	   to	  possess,	   to	   clarify	  what	   art’s	   essence	  might	  be	  or	  
what	   functions	   it	  might	  have	  and	  to	  explain	  why	  art	  might	  be	  valuable	   for	  us,	  
were	  all	  strengths	  of	  his	  theory.	  	  
	  
The	  institutional	  theory	  is	  so	  inclusive	  that	  theoretically	  any	  thing	  can	  be	  art	  and	  
therefore,	  unlike	  mimesis,	  the	  expression	  theory	  and	  autonomous	  modernism,	  
the	  institutional	  theory	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  art	  has	  an	  essential	  intrinsic	  and/or	  
perceptual	  nature,	  other	  than	  its	  being	  the	  product	  of	  procedures.	  	  Neither	  does	  
it	  propose	  reasons	  why	  art	  may	  be	  valuable.	  According	  to	  the	  two	  criteria	  I	  have	  
adopted,	  the	  institutional	  theory	  is	  inadequate	  as	  a	  conception	  and	  definition	  of	  
art.	  Within	  limits	  the	  theory	  does	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  art:	  art	  is	  an	  object,	  person	  
or	  event	  that	  has	  gone	  through	  certain	  procedures.	  However,	  the	  details	  of	  the	  
procedures	   are	   ill	   defined,	   especially	  when	   compared	   to,	   say,	   the	   procedures	  
required	  to	  change	  a	  rule	  into	  law.	  Moreover,	  the	  requirements	  for	  membership	  
of	   the	   procedural	   body,	   i.e.	   The	   Artworld,	   are	   equally	   vague.	   Therefore,	   the	  
usefulness	  of	  the	  definition	  for	  identifying	  works	  of	  art	  is	  limited.	  Its	  imprecision	  
in	   setting	   out	   procedures	   and	   identifying	   personnel	   also	   results	   in	   some	  
paradigmatic	  works	  of	  art	  being	  excluded	  by	  the	  definition.	  For	  example,	  works	  
that	  belong	  to	  paradigmatic	  art	  forms	  but	  are	  produced	  in	  societies	   lacking	  an	  
artworld	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  category	  of	  art	  unless	  they	  are	  appropriated	  by	  
The	  Artworld.	  Similarly,	  in	  societies	  with	  an	  artworld,	  some	  paradigmatic	  works	  
of	  art,	  including	  some	  gardens,	  are	  excluded	  because	  they	  have	  not	  undergone	  
the	   appropriate	   procedures.	   This	   weakness	   of	   the	   conception	   has	   particular	  
significance	  for	  gardens	  because	  they	  have	  not	  generally	  enjoyed	  the	  attention	  
of	  The	  Artworld.	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  
	  
I	  have	  given	   reasons	  above	   to	   show	  that	   the	   institutional	   theory	   fails	   to	  meet	  
the	   identification	   and	   the	   inclusion	   criteria.	   I	   have	   also	   noted	   that	   the	  
                                                
1 Rosenburg (1964) 
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conception	   lacks	   a	   normative	   component	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   explain	   any	  
value	  that	  art	  may	  have.	   	  For	   that	   reason	  the	  conception	  will	   remain	  counter-­‐
intuitive	  as	  long	  as	  human	  ears	  can	  distinguish	  between	  Snoopy’s	  Christmas	  and	  
Bach’s	  St	  Matthew’s	  Passion.	  	  	  
 
The	   following	   literary	   anecdote	  may	  make	   a	   point	   and	   bring	   this	   section	   to	   a	  
close	   on	   a	   lighter	   note.	   In	   his	   imaginative	   novel	   Homesickness1,	   which,	  
incidentally,	   appeared	   several	   years	   before	   any	   promulgations	   of	   the	  
institutional	   theory	   of	   which	   I	   am	   aware,	   Murray	   Bail	   locates	   a	   group	   of	  
unsophisticated	   Australian	   tourists	   in	   a	   dusty,	   hot,	   primitive	   village.	   They	   are	  
directed	  to	  visit	  the	  much	  vaunted,	  new	  museum	  and	  set	  off	  eagerly,	  expecting	  
to	  see	  handicrafts	  and	  other	  ‘ethnic’	  pieces.	  Instead,	  they	  are	  perplexed	  to	  find	  
in	  the	  display	  cases	  a	  soda	  syphon,	  a	  pram	  and	  a	  flushing	  toilet	  cistern.	  	  
Gardens	  	  
The	  all-­‐inclusiveness	  of	  the	  institutional	  theory	  is	  very	  useful	  because	  it	  enables	  
all	   manner	   of	   ‘difficult’	   objects	   to	   be	   subsumed	   under	   the	   category	   of	   art.	  
However,	   this	   particular	   strength	   of	   the	   conception	   is	   of	   little	   use	   where	  
gardens	   are	   concerned	   because	   for	   the	   most	   part	   gardens	   have	   not	   been	  
‘difficult’.	  Generally	  they	  have	  eschewed	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  practices	  of	  the	  other	  
arts	  and,	  consequently,	  they	  have	  often	  dropped	  below	  The	  Artworld’s	  radar.	  	  
	  
Miller	   claims	   that	   the	   garden	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   object	   of	   interest	   to	   the	  
institutional	   theory’s	  Artworld	   and	   therefore,	   in	   the	   terms	  of	   that	   theory,	   the	  
garden	   is	  no	   longer	  art.	  She	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  the	  theory	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  
such	  demotion	  from	  art	  to	  non-­‐art	  and	  therefore	  it	  “…	  suggests	  that	  the	  theory	  
is	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  differentiating	  works	  of	  art	  from	  non-­‐works	  of	  art,	  
[and}	  that	  the	  ‘institutional’	  theory	  does	  not	  get	  at	  some	  crucial	  features	  which	  
we	   seem	   to	   be	   employing	   …	   in	   deciding	   what	   art	   is.”	   2	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
                                                
1 Bail (1980) 
2 Miller op. cit. p. 70 
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conclusion	  that	  gardens	  have	  never	  been	  art	  is	  intuitively	  and	  empirically	  untrue	  
and	  therefore	  the	  conception	  is	  inadequate.	  
	  
Miller’s	  original	   statement,	   that	   the	  garden	   is	  no	   longer	  of	   interest	   to	   the	  The	  
Artworld,	   is	   true	   only	   in	   a	   limited	   way.	   While	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	   with	   a	   few	  
celebrated	  exceptions,	  such	  as	  Schwartz’s	  Bagel	  Garden	  (see	  Figure	  Five	  below),	  
gardens	   have	   not	   been	   ‘difficult’,	   that	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   they	   have	   not	   been	  
genuine	   artistic	   enterprises	   undertaken	   by	   genuine	   artists.	   A	   roll	   call	   that	  
includes	  architects	  Le	  Corbusier,	  Christopher	  Tunnard,	  Richard	  Neutra,	  Charles	  
Jencks,	   Thomas	   Church	   and	   Gunnar	   Asplund,	   filmmaker	   Derek	   Jarman,	   and	  
garden	  designers	  Geoffrey	  Jellicoe,	  Roberto	  Burle	  Marx,	  Brenda	  Colvin,	  Russell	  
Page,	  Martha	   Schwartz,	   and	  Richard	   Findlay	  Harrison	   clearly	   speaks	  of	   and	   to	  




Figure	  5	  Photograph	  of	  Martha	  Schwartz's	  notorious	  Bagel	  Garden.1	  
	  
Ross2,	  too,	  agrees	  with	  Miller	  that	  the	  garden	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  object	  of	  interest	  
to	   the	   art	   world,	   but	   her	   conclusion	   is	   different.	   She	   argues	   that	   as	   the	   20th	  
                                                
1 [Online] Available from: http://www.marthaschwartz.com/projects/bagelgarden.html [Accessed 
1 October 2011] 
2 Ross op.cit. 
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century	   progressed,	   gardens	   became	   irrelevant	   and	   obsolete	   and	   they	   were	  
transmuted	  as	  an	  art	  form	  into	  environmental	  and	  land	  art	  in	  a	  way	  analogous	  
to	   the	   replacement	   of	   stained	   glass	   and	   tapestry	   by	   oil	   painting	   in	   the	   late	  
Middle	  Ages.	  Ross	  invokes	  Danto’s	  theoretical	  historicism	  to	  support	  this	  claim:	  
gardens	   are	   no	   longer	   relevant	   as	   would-­‐be-­‐art	   because	   they	   have	   been	  
superseded	   by	   a	   superior	   medium	   that	   is	   more	   appropriate	   for	   the	   artistic	  
statements	  and	  projects	  that	  artists	  want	  to	  make	  in	  our	  times.	   
	  
This	  claim	   is	  neat	  and	   tidy	  but,	  as	  discussed	  above	   in	  connection	  with	  Miller’s	  
claim,	  it	  is	  invalid	  because	  garden	  art	  did	  not	  cease	  being	  made,	  experienced	  or	  
interpreted	  during	   the	  20th	   century.	   Furthermore,	   land	   and	  environmental	   art	  
may	  equally	  well	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  types	  of	  installation	  art	  rather	  than	  being	  
transmutations	  of	  gardens,	  and	  this	  point	  will	  be	  explored	  later	  on.	  
	  
It	   is	   true,	   however,	   that	   gardens	   have	   been	   slow	   to	   take	   up	   the	   causes	   of	  
contemporary	  art.	  But	  it	  may	  be	  nearer	  the	  truth	  to	  say	  that	  gardens	  should	  not	  
take	   up	   the	   fashionable	   intellectual	   currents	   of	   contemporary	   art.	   In	   his	  
Introduction:	  In	  Defiance	  of	  the	  Institutional	  Art	  World,	  Michel	  Conan	  writes,	  “…	  
garden	  art	  deserves	  scholarly	  scrutiny	  in	  its	  own	  right	  and	  should	  be	  studied	  in	  
its	   own	   terms	   without	   any	   pretense	   at	   imitating	   critical	   discussions	   of	   the	  
contemporary	  art	  world	  since	  it	  has	  remained	  alien	  to	  its	  critical	  discourse.”1	  
	  
Conan’s	  quotation	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  parallel	  artworld	  that	  is	  
interested	  in	  gardens	  as	  art.	  Such	  a	  ‘garden-­‐artworld’	  was	  not	  envisaged	  by	  the	  
institutional	   theory,	   but	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   gardens	   noted	   above,	   together	  
with	   the	   critical	   attention	   paid	   to	   them	   in	   academic	   books,	   journals	   and	  
teaching	  programmes,	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  a	  system	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  Dickie	  
claimed	   for	   art	   does	   exist	   for	   gardens.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   fact	   that	   some	  
gardens,	   for	  example	  The	  National	   September	  11	  Memorial	   garden	  at	  Ground	  
Zero	   in	  New	   York	   (see	   Figure	   6,	  p.	   60),	   are	   publically	   funded	   in	   the	  way	   that	  
                                                
1 Conan (2005) p. 3 
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sculpture	  and	  other	  public	  arts	  are	  funded	  is	  further	  evidence	  of	  gardens’	  being	  
considered	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  other	  arts.	  Perhaps	  there	   is	  a	  case	  to	  be	  made	  
that	  a	   ‘garden-­‐artworld’	  exists	  and	  that	   it	   is	  a	  sub-­‐group	  of	  The	  Artworld,	  with	  
membership	  and	  procedures	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  Dickie’s	  artworld.	  	  
	  
I	   discuss	   below	   some	   likely	   reasons	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   interest	   of	   contemporary	  
philosophers	  and	  aestheticians	  in	  gardens.	  These	  reasons,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  
already	  been	  referred	  to	   in	  connection	  with	  other	  conceptions,	  again	  highlight	  
aspects	   of	   gardens’	   differences	   from	   the	   other	   arts	   -­‐	   differences	   that	   explain	  
why	  even	  the	  all-­‐embracing	  institutional	  theory	  may	  not	  embrace	  gardens.	  This	  
is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  institutional	  theory	  could	  not	  accommodate	  gardens:	  the	  
fact	   is	   simply	   that	   The	   Artworld’s	   recent	   inhabitants	   and	   institutions	   have	  
generally	  not	  seen	  gardens	  in	  this	  way.	   	   I	  have	  argued	  above	  that	  20th	  century	  
gardens	   have	   indeed	   been	   part	   of	   the	   world	   of	   art,	   but	   that	   phrase	   is	   not	  
synonymous	  with	  ‘artworld’	  and	  this	  is,	  perhaps,	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  restrictive	  




Figure	  6	  Aerial	  photograph	  of	  The	  National	  September	  11	  Memorial	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  1	  
 
There	  are	  six	  reasons	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  of	  contemporary	  philosophers	  and	  
aestheticians	  in	  gardens.	  Firstly,	  gardens	  possess	  a	  high	  sensuous	  content	  and,	  
                                                
1 [Online] Available from: http//www.911memorial.org/design-overview [Accessed 3 October 
2011] 
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supposedly,	   a	   low	   intellectual	   content.	   This	   is	   a	   reversal	   of	   what	   the	  
contemporary	  art	   theorist	  expected	  of	  works	  of	  art	  and	  consequently	  gardens	  
were	   neglected.	   Secondly,	   contemporary	   gardens	   continued	   to	   exhibit	   and	  
represent	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  traditional	  aesthetic	  values	  which,	  given	  this	  was	  the	  
time	   of	   “The	   End	   of	   Aesthetic	   Experience”1,	   were	   unfashionable.	   Thirdly,	  
gardens	  were	  not	  amenable	  to	  being	  exhibited	  easily,	  or	  to	  being	  transported,	  
reproduced	   as	   facsimiles	   or	   studied,	   and	   for	   these	   reasons	   too	   gardens	  were	  
easily	   ignored	  by	   late	  20th	  and	  early	  21st	   century	  aesthetics.	   Fourthly,	   gardens	  
have	   always	   been	   comparatively	   expensive	   to	   make	   and	   maintain	   at	   a	   level	  
commensurate	  with	  their	  being	  works	  of	  art.	  In	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  20th	  century,	  as	  
in	  earlier	  times,	  new	  serious	  gardens	  were	  the	  preserve	  of	  wealthy	   individuals	  
only.	   This	   perceived	   elitism	   surrounding	   art	   gardens	  did	   not	   help	   to	   foster	   an	  
interest	   among	   aestheticians	   and	   critics	   of	   the	   engaged	  modernist	   school,	   for	  
some	   of	   whom	   the	   arts	   were	   seen	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   pursue	   egalitarian	  
ideals,	   as	   existing	   to	   right	   social	   wrongs	   and	   to	   empower	   minority	   groups.	  
Fifthly,	   gardens	   are	   not	   easily	   ironic	   or	   self-­‐critical,	   and	  nor	   do	   they	   generally	  
shock	  or	   confront	   viewers.	   This	  made	   them	  unlikely	   candidates	   for	   art	   status,	  
part	   of	   the	   mandate	   for	   which	   was,	   according	   to	   the	   avant-­‐garde,	   to	   shock,	  
disturb	  and	  offend.	  Sixthly,	  a	  vicious	  circle	  operated.	  Because	  The	  Artworld	  did	  
not	  take	  an	  interest	  in	  gardens,	  gardens	  continued	  not	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  The	  
Artworld.	   The	   Artworld’s	   procedures	   for	   conferring	   the	   status	   of	   art	   ignored	  
gardens	   and	   Danto’s	   theory	   ignored	   them	   too.	   One	   reason	   for	   this	   lack	   of	  
interest	   was	   that	   gardens	   are,	   by	   their	   very	   nature,	   difficult	   to	   delineate	   in	  
space	  and	  time.	  They	  have	  an	  extremely	  high	  degree	  of	  mutability	  generally	  so	  
that	  the	  whole	  project	  of	  pinning	  down	  a	  garden	  in	  order	  for	  a	  member	  of	  The	  
Artworld	   to	   present	   it	   for	   consideration	   as	   an	   art	   work	   was	   fraught	   with	  
complexity	   and	   difficulty.	   Hence	   it	   almost	   never	   happened,	   either	   for	  
contemporary	   gardens	   or	   for	   historical	   gardens	   being	   presented	   in	   retrospect	  
for	  consideration.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Shusterman (1997) 
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In	   summary,	   Dickie’s	   institutional	   theory	  might	   be	   expected	   to	   accommodate	  
gardens	  easily.	  However,	  gardens’	  profile	  has	  been	  low	  in	  The	  Artworld	  and	  that	  
highlights	  an	  important	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  conception	  related	  to	  its	  procedures	  
and	  membership.	   	   I	  have	  shown	  that	  some	  contemporary	  gardens	  share	  many	  
of	  their	  qualities	  and	  features	  with	  works	  appropriated	  as	  art	  by	  The	  Artworld,	  
and	   this	   is	   true	  of	   some	  historical	   gardens	   also.	  However,	   gardens	   have	  been	  
ignored	   by	   Dickie’s	   artworld,	   if	   not,	   perhaps,	   by	   a	   ‘garden-­‐artworld	   sub-­‐
committee’.	  	  Similarly,	  Danto’s	  artworld	  has	  not	  been	  interested	  in	  gardens.	  The	  
theories	   in	  which	  members	  of	  his	  artworld	  have	  been	   interested	  have,	  by	  and	  
large,	   reflected	   the	   same	   sorts	   of	   concerns	   and	   priorities	   as	   those	   held	   by	  
members	   of	   Dickie’s	   artworld.	   Therefore,	   according	   to	   Danto’s	   artworld	   too,	  
gardens	   are	   not	   art,	   despite	   their	   sharing	   significant	   aesthetic	   and	   other	  
features	  and	  qualities	  with	  contemporary	  and	  historical	  objects	  and	  events	  that	  
The	  Artworld	  has	  appropriated	  as	  art.	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4	   Conceptions	  of	  Art	  –	  The	  Cluster	  Concept	  	  
 
Summary	  of	  Adequacy	  of	  Conceptions	  
I	   have	   now	   examined	   four	   important	   conceptions	   of	   art	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  
adequacy	   as	   conceptions.	   I	   have	   also	   examined	   how	   gardens	   might	   be	  
accommodated	  under	  each	  of	  those	  conceptions.	  
	  
Each	  art	  conception	  has	  proved	  inadequate	  for	  reasons	  already	  given,	  but	  each	  
of	  the	  conceptions	  has	  also	  contributed	  an	  important	  insight	  about	  some	  works	  
of	  art.	  With	   the	  possible	  exception	  of	   the	   institutional	   theory,	   the	  property	  or	  
relation	   that	   has	   been	   ‘difficult’	   for	   each	   conception	   to	   accommodate	   is	   a	  
property	  or	  relation	  that	  many	  gardens	  have.	  	  
	  
Plato’s	   and	   Aristotle’s	   mimetic	   conception	   excludes	   gardens	   because	   they	  
generally	   do	   not	   represent	   directly.	   However,	   many	   gardens	   do	   represent	  
symbolically.	   It	   is	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   them	   and,	   just	   as	   is	   the	   case	   with	  
paradigmatic	   arts	   such	   as	   poetry	   and	   painting,	   it	   can	   be	   a	   reason	   for	   valuing	  
them,	  especially	  if	  it	  is	  done	  well.	  	  	  
	  
The	  expression	  theory	  excludes	  gardens	  but	  gardens	  are	  expressive	  of	  emotions	  
in	   an	   important	  way	   that	   is	   not	   accommodated	   by	   its	   classical	   version.	   Along	  
with	  paradigmatic	  arts	  such	  as	  music	  and	  paintings,	  gardens	  can	  be	  expressive	  
of	  emotion	  and	  this	  is	  often	  a	  reason	  for	  valuing	  them.	  	  
	  
	  Bell’s	  version	  of	  autonomous	  modernism	  excludes	  gardens	  insofar	  as	  the	  forms	  
in	   which	   he	   was	   interested	   were	   non-­‐dynamic.	   Form	   is	   essential	   to	   gardens	  
because	  they	  are	  purposeful	  arrangements	  of	  natural	  objects.	  However,	  form	  in	  
gardens	   is	   necessarily	   dynamic	   because	   gardens	   exist	   in	   four	   dimensions.	  
Constant	   change,	   or	   at	   least	   the	  management	   of	   such	   change,	   is	   an	   essential	  
and	   distinctive	   feature	   of	   gardens.	   This	   is	   so	   even	   in	   the	   case	   of	   apparently	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static	  Japanese	  rock	  and	  gravel	  gardens,	  where	  constant	  grooming	  of	  the	  sand	  is	  
required	   to	   resist	   change	   and	   therefore	   give	   an	   illusion	   of	   timelessness.	  With	  
this	   counterexample,	   gardens	   are	   valued	   for	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   change	  
over	  time,	  just	  as	  music	  and	  the	  other	  temporal	  arts	  are.	  	  
	  	  
Greenberg’s	   modernist	   conception	   excludes	   gardens	   because,	   although	   they	  
may	  be	  novel	  and	  original,	  they	  are	  generally	  not	  autonomous,	  self-­‐referential,	  
non-­‐contextual	   and	   independent.	   By	   contrast,	   gardens	   are,	   ‘real’,	   inhabitable,	  
physically	  dependent	  on	  the	  surrounding	  landscape	  and	  soil,	  dependent	  for	  part	  
of	  their	  meaning	  on	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  social	  and	  physical	  environs,	  and,	  
moreover,	  they	  can	  be	  useful	  and	  productive.	  All	  these	  are	  important	  features	  
of	  gardens	  and	  offer	  potential	  reasons	  for	  our	  valuing	  them.	  They	  are	  features	  
which	   also,	   in	   varying	   degrees,	   are	   found	   in	   paradigmatic	   arts	   such	   as	  
architecture	  and	  installations,	  where	  they	  provide	  reasons	  for	  our	  valuing	  those	  
arts.	   Finally,	   gardens,	   and	   all	   other	   works	   of	   art,	   are	   excluded	   from	   being	  
valuable	  works	  of	  art	  under	  Greenberg’s	  conception	  because	  they	  cannot	  satisfy	  
his	  paradoxical	  requirement	  that	  they	  be	  at	  once	  original	  and	  non-­‐contextual.	  	  
	  
Beardsley’s	  modernist	  conception	  appears	  to	  include	  gardens	  because	  gardens	  
can	  be	  “…an	  arrangement	  of	  conditions	  intended	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  affording	  an	  
experience	   with	   marked	   aesthetic	   character…”.1	   However,	   gardens	   and	   their	  
materials	   change	   constantly,	   and	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   unique	   among	   the	   arts.	  
Beardsley	   did	   not	   discuss	   gardens	   and,	   in	  my	   opinion,	   his	   notion	   of	   differing	  
‘presentations’	   of	   a	   single	   work	   of	   art,	   does	   not,	   and	   was	   not	   designed	   to,	  
accommodate	   gardens.	   I	   discuss	   the	   mutability	   of	   gardens	   in	   detail	   in	   the	  
following	  chapter.	  At	  this	  point	  I	  simply	  restate	  that	  gardens	  are	  valued	  for	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  they	  change	  over	  time,	  just	  as	  music	  and	  the	  other	  temporal	  arts	  
are.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Beardsley op. cit. p. 299.	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Dickie’s	  institutional	  theory	  excludes	  gardens	  because	  they	  are	  not	  aesthetically	  
fashionable.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   gardens	   tend	   to	   be	   concerned	  with	   values	   such	   as	  
sensuous	  pleasure,	  naturalness,	  beauty	  and	  peacefulness,	  but	  the	  corollary	  that	  
features	   like	  these	  are	   likely	   to	  contribute	  to	  something’s	  not	  being	  art	  seems	  
counter-­‐intuitive,	   to	   say	   the	   least.	   The	   loosely	   described	   procedures	   and	  
membership	   criteria	  of	  Dickie’s	   artworld,	   and	   the	  unstated	  biases	   that	   inform	  
those	  procedures	  and	  membership	  criteria,	  are	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  institutional	  
theory,	   and	   they	   deny	   gardens	   the	   status	   of	   a	   paradigmatic	   art	   that	   they	  
enjoyed	  formerly.	  
	  
Danto’s	   institutional	   theory	  excludes	  gardens	  because	  art	   theory	  and	  theorists	  
ignored	   them,	  probably,	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Dickie’s	   conception,	  on	   the	  grounds	  
that	   they	   are	   not	   aesthetically	   fashionable.	   However,	   I	   have	   provided	   several	  
examples	  that	  show	  that	  gardens	  ought	  not	  to	  have	  been	   ignored	   in	  this	  way.	  
‘Art’	   gardens	   never	   stopped	   being	   produced,	   and	   it	   is	   a	  weakness	   of	   Danto’s	  
conception	   that,	   because	   gardens	   were	   unfashionable	   in	   his	   artworld,	   they	  
were	  denied	  the	  status	  of	  a	  paradigmatic	  art	  that	  they	  had	  long	  enjoyed.	  	  	  
	  
In	  summary,	  all	  four	  conceptions	  tell	  us	  important	  things	  about	  what	  art	  is	  and	  
about	   how	   and	   why	   art	   has	   been	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   valuable	   human	  
endeavour	   and	   they	   all,	   albeit	   in	   modified	   forms,	   continue	   to	   have	   their	  
champions	   	  However,	   they	   all	   remain	   inadequate	   as	   conceptions	   and	   this	   has	  
lead	   Berys	   Gaut	   to	   develop	   what	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   only	   possible	   adequate	  
conception	  of	  art.	  
	  
Art	  as	  a	  Cluster	  Concept	  
Conception	  of	  Art	  
In	   	  2000	  Gaut	  suggested	  that	  art	   is	  a	  cluster	  concept	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  
defined	  in	  the	  traditional,	  Socratic	  way.	  This	  proposal	  is	  similar	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  
suggestion	   that	   some	   concepts	   need	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   family	  
resemblances	  but	  does	  not	  have	  the	  problems	  following	  from	  the	  dependence	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on	  ‘family’.	  	  Gaut	  claimed	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  criteria	  for	  the	  application	  of	  
the	   cluster	   concept	  but	   that	  none	  of	   them	   is	  necessary.1	   Thus,	   there	  are	  only	  
sufficient	  conditions.	  The	  presence	  of	  some	  of	  them	  is	  enough	  for	  an	  object	  or	  
performance	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  many	  are	  needed	  but	  
some	  must	   be	   present.	   The	   cluster	   conception	   continues	   to	   have	   currency.	   It	  
has	   been	   criticized,	   reviewed	  and	  modified	  by	  Gaut	   and	  others	   as	   recently	   as	  
2010.2	   It	   remains	   the	  most	   acceptable	   solution	   to	   the	  millennia	   old	   quest	   to	  
define	  art.	  
	  
Gaut	   proposed	   a	   list	   of	   ten	   criteria.	   (Others	   working	   along	   similar	   lines	   have	  
proposed	   their	   own	   lists:	   Dutton3	   proposed	   twelve	   of	   his	   own	   criteria	   and	  
Barwell4	  eleven.)	  Gaut’s	  criteria	  are:	  	  	   	  
(i)	  possessing	  positive	  aesthetic	  qualities…;	  (ii)	  being	  expressive	  
of	   emotion;	   (iii)	   being	   intellectually	   challenging;	   (iv)	   being	  
formally	   complex	  and	   coherent;	   (v)	   having	  a	   capacity	   to	   convey	  
complex	  meanings;	  (vi)	  exhibiting	  an	  individual	  point	  of	  view;	  (vii)	  
being	  an	  exercise	  of	  creative	  imagination;	  (viii)	  being	  an	  artefact	  
or	  performance	   that	   is	   the	  product	  of	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   skill;	   (ix)	  
belonging	   to	   an	   established	   artistic	   form;	   and	   (x)	   being	   the	  
product	  of	  an	  intention	  to	  make	  a	  work	  of	  art.5	  
	  
The	  conceptions	  of	  art	  discussed	  earlier	  have	  each	  highlighted	  aspects	  of	  art’s	  
attributes,	  qualities	  and	  values	  but	  have	  done	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  of	  art’s	  
attributes,	   qualities	   and	   values.	   The	   breadth	   and	   flexibility	   of	   this	   present	  
conception	   allow	   it	   to	   include	   objects	   and	   performances	   of	   all	   genres,	   styles,	  
times	  and	  places	  while	  still,	  unlike	  the	  institutional	  conception,	  allowing	  for	  any	  
and	   all	   of	   art’s	   specialness	   and	   value	   as	   an	   aesthetically-­‐oriented	   human	  
activity.	   It	   also	   provides	   adequate	   means	   to	   identify	   works	   of	   art	   and	   it	  
                                                
1 Gaut (2000) 
2 Longworth and Scarantino (2010)  
3 Torres (2010)  
4 I. Barwell (2011) pers. comm.   
5 Davies (2004) p. 297 
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accommodates	  all	  paradigmatic	  works	  of	  art.	  Perhaps	  the	  end	  of	  art	  has	  been	  
avoided,	  again.	  	  
Gardens	  
Gardens	  fit	  comfortably	  into	  this	  concept	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  think	  of	  paradigmatic	  
art	  gardens	  that	  satisfy	  some,	  if	  not	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  criteria.	  	  Thus,	  Monet’s	  
garden	   at	   Giverney	   satisfies	   (i)	   –	   (ii),	   	   (iv),	   (vi)	   –	   (ix),	   and	   possibly	   (x),	   and	  
Schwartz’s	   Bagel	   Garden	   (see	   Figure	   5,	   p.	   58)	   satisfies	   all	   the	   criteria	   except,	  
perhaps,	  (ii).	  	  
	  
The	  problems	  that	  the	  conceptions	  examined	  earlier	  have	  posed	  for	  gardens	  are	  
all	   resolved	   by	   Gaut’s	   cluster	   concept.	   Hence:	   criteria	   (iii)	   and	   (v)	   allow	   for	  
gardens	   to	   represent	   indirectly	   a	   range	   of	   complex	   ideas	   and	   meanings;	  
criterion	  (ii)	  allows	  for	  gardens	  to	  be	  directly	  expressive	  of	  emotions	  by	  way	  of	  
the	   expressive	   nature	   of	   their	   individual	   elements,	   and	   the	  manner	   in	   which	  
they	   are	   combined;	   criterion	   (iv)	   allows	   for	   gardens	   to	   have	   unique,	   dynamic	  
formal	  qualities;	  criterion	  (i)	  allows	  for	  gardens	  to	  be	  dynamic	  aesthetic	  objects;	  
criteria	  (iii),	  (v)	  and	  (vi)	  allow	  for	  gardens	  to	  be	  challenging	  and	  innovative;	  and	  
criteria	  (i)	  –	  (x)	  all	  allow	  for	  gardens	  to	  be	  works	  of	  art	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  perceived	  
exclusion	   by	   the	   institutional	   theory’s	   artworld.	   Therefore,	   there	   is	   no	   good	  
reason	  to	  exclude	  gardens	  from	  the	  category	  of	  art.	  
 
Gardens	   share	   properties	   with	   paradigmatic	   art	   forms	  which	   are	   the	   reasons	  
why	  we	  value	  them	  as	  art.	  However,	  in	  this	  discussion,	  I	  have	  only	  mentioned	  in	  
passing	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   gardens,	   namely	   dynamism.	   Gardens	   are	  
dynamic	   arrangements	   of	   organic	   and	   inorganic	   elements.	   Their	   form	   and	  
materials	  are	  dynamic	  and	  change	  over	  time,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  way	  in	  which	  gardens	  
are	  distinctive.	  	  
	  
In	  part	  two	  of	  my	  thesis	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  gardens.	  In	  chapter	  five	  
I	  describe	  the	  distinctive	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  gardens	  and	  discuss	  similarities	  and	  
differences	   between	   gardens	   and	   other	   categories	   of	   art.	   In	   chapter	   six	   I	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consider	   analogies	   between	   gardens	   and	   the	   performance	   arts	   of	   music	   and	  
dance,	  and	  in	  chapter	  seven	  I	  compare	  gardens	  to	  the	  new	  paradigmatic	  arts	  of	  
kinetic	  sculpture,	  installations	  and	  environmental	  art.	  Finally,	  in	  chapter	  eight,	  I	  
provide	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  conclusions	  from	  both	  parts	  of	  my	  thesis.	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5	   Gardens	  	  
Poems,	  Paintings	  or	  Something	  Else?	  
 
Philosopher	   John	   Ferrari1	   believes	   that	   gardens	   are	   meaningless	   when	  
considered	   as	  whole	   artistic	   entities.	   He	   claims	   that	   gardeners	   organize	   plant	  
lives	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  which	  political	  systems	  organize	  human	  lives.	  	  For	  him,	  
human	  societies	  carry	  no	  meaning	  when	  considered	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  therefore,	  
by	  analogy,	  gardens	  do	  not	  do	  so	  either.	  Furthermore,	  this	  is	  a	  good	  thing.	  	  This	  
controversial	   view	   is,	   I	   believe,	   unique	   to	   its	  writer.	   I	   have	   argued	  above	   that	  
gardens	  can	  be	  meaningful	  artistic	  entities	  and	  I	  am	  supported	  in	  this	  belief	  by	  
the	   writings	   of	   Ross	   and	  Miller.	   I	   now	   examine	   their	   writings	   with	   a	   view	   to	  
clarifying	  what	  sort	  of	  artistic	  entities	  gardens	  might	  be	  and,	  therefore,	  how	  and	  
what	  they	  may	  mean.	  	  
 
Ross	  devotes	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  What	  Gardens	  Mean2	  to	  a	  study	  of	  some	  well-­‐
known	  examples	  of	  18th	  century	  landscape	  gardens.	  She	  states	  that	  they	  were	  
regarded	   as	   works	   of	   art	   and	   that	   gardening	   was	   considered	   a	   sister	   art	   to	  
poetry	  and	  painting.	  	  Her	  examination	  of	  them	  as	  works	  of	  art	  follows	  two	  lines,	  
neither	  of	  which	  pursues	  what	  I	  believe	  is	  unique	  and	  distinctive	  about	  gardens.	  
Her	  examination	  of	  Pope’s	   garden	  at	   Twickenham,	  and	   the	  gardens	  at	   Stowe,	  
Stourhead	   and	   West	   Wycombe,	   involves	   comparisons	   with	   the	   sister	   art	   of	  
poetry.	   Consequently,	   they	   are	   discussed	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   direct	   and	   indirect	  	  
representational	  and	  even	  their	  narrative	  capabilities.	   Individual	  built	  features,	  
statuary,	   inscriptions,	   earth	   modeling	   and	   passages	   through	   the	   garden	   are	  
analyzed	   but	   plants	   and	   plantings	   are	   almost	   completely	   ignored.	   Ross	   then	  
examines	  the	  gardens	  of	  Painshill	  Park	  and	  Riveaulx	  Terrace	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  
sister	   art	   of	   painting.	   Their	   picturesque	   qualities	   are	   described	   and	   their	  
relationships	   to	   the	  paintings	  and	   theories	  of	  Claude,	  Poussin,	  Rosa,	  et	  al.	   are	  
noted.	   In	   these	  picturesque	  gardens,	  plants	  are	  more	   important	   for	  Ross	   than	  
                                                
1 Ferrari (2010)  
2 Ross op. cit. 
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they	   are	   in	   the	   poetic	   gardens,	   but	   their	   value	   resides	   in	   their	   being	   static	  
contributors	   to	   a	   picture	   rather	   than	   in	   their	   being	   living,	   changing	   objects.	  
Viewing	   gardens	   as	   poetry	   or	   painting	   is	   interesting	   and	   from	   Ross	   we	   learn	  
much	  about	  why	  18th	  century	  gardens	  look	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  	  
	  
I	   agree	   with	  Miller1	   that	   gardens	  may	   function	   in	   the	  manner	   of	   poems	   and	  
paintings	   but	   that	   that	   ignores	   their	   temporal	   dimension.	   	   She	   describes	   the	  
changes	  that	  may	  happen	  in	  gardens	  and	  groups	  them	  as	  seasonal,	  diurnal	  and	  
geological.	   She	   claims	   that	   because	   these	   changes	   occur	   at	   different	   speeds	  
they	  may	   cause	   us	   to	   experience	   different	   types	   of	   time,	   including	   what	   she	  
terms	  cosmic,	  biological,	  geological	  and	  historical	   time,	  although	  she	  does	  not	  
propose	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   this	   might	   happen.	   Miller	   also	   notes	   that	  
another	  sort	  of	  change	  occurs	  in	  gardens	  which,	  unlike	  the	  changes	  mentioned	  
above,	   is	   not	   part	   of	   an	   ongoing	   or	   cyclical	   process.	   For	   example,	   external	  
agents	   like	   the	   wind	   can	   cause	   changes	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   leaves	   and	  
branches	  of	   trees	  move,	  and	  Miller	   say	   this	   this	   sort	  of	  change	  creates	   tempo	  
and	  rhythm.	  
	  
I	   do	  not	   disagree	  with	   the	  basic	   claims	  Miller	  makes	  with	   regard	   to	  what	   she	  
terms	   ‘temporality’.	   She	   is	   correct	   to	   claim	   that	   change	   is	   omnipresent	   in	   the	  
garden	  and	  correct	  to	  claim	  that	  change	  is	   inevitably	  connected	  to	  the	  passing	  
of	  time.	  However,	  I	  disagree	  with	  her	  in	  two	  important	  ways.	  Firstly,	  tempo	  and	  
rhythm	  may	  be	  present	  in	  the	  limited	  way	  Miller	  understands	  those	  terms	  when	  
leaves	  and	  branches	  of	  a	  tree	  are	  moving,	  but	  that	  is	  true	  of	  trees	  and	  the	  wind	  
anywhere	  and	  not	  specific	  to	  gardens.	  In	  her	  example	  of	  the	  moving	  leaves	  and	  
branches,	  any	  so-­‐called	  tempo	  and	  rhythm	  created	  are	  accidental	  creations	  of	  
nature	   and	   humans	   can	   have	   no	   input	   into	   creating	   them.	   Moreover,	  
movements	  (changes)	  of	  this	  type	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  plants	  rather	  than	  
in	   other	   garden	   elements	   and	   this	   restricts	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   essential	  
contributor	  to	  meaning	  in	  a	  garden,	  namely	  rhythm,	  to	  the	  aleatoric	  changes	  in	  
                                                
1 Miller op. cit. 
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one	   category	   only	   of	   gardens’	   elements.	   Secondly,	   the	   types	   of	   changes	   she	  
classifies	   as	   geological,	   seasonal,	   and	   geological	   are,	   when	   joined	   with	   the	  
biological	  patterns	  that	  plants	  obey,	  precisely	  the	  types	  of	  changes	  that	  can	  be	  
organized	   to	  create	   rhythm	  and	   tempo,	  and	   therefore	  meaning,	   in	  a	  garden.	   I	  
examine	  this	  second	  claim	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  and	  I	  propose	  a	  
mechanism	  by	  which	  changes	   in	  gardens	  can	  be	  organized	  into,	  and	  perceived	  
as,	  rhythmic	  units	  that	  function	  analogously	  to	  rhythm	  in	  music.	  
	  
I	  have	   said	   that	  gardens’	  elements	   can	  be	   like	  poems	   to	  a	   limited	  degree	  and	  
that	  gardens	  and	  their	  elements	  can	  function	   in	  a	  way	  analogous	  to	  paintings.	  
However,	  neither	  analogy	  addresses	  their	  essential	  changeability	  and	  existence	  
in	   time	   as	   well	   as	   space.	   Understanding	   gardens’	   temporal	   dimension	   is	  
essential	  to	  an	  adequate	  	  	  appreciation	  of	  them.	  Their	  changeability	  means	  that	  
an	  understanding	  of	  them	  as	  being	  analogous	  to	  performances	  is	  the	  best	  way	  
to	  appreciate	  them	  as	  they	  deserve.	  
	  
Plants	   are	   the	   most	   obvious	   and	   significant	   components	   of	   gardens.	   They	  
change	   constantly	   and	   the	   fact,	   effects	   and	   significance	   of	   their	   changeability	  
have	  been	  largely	   ignored	  by	  Kant	  and	  those	  who	  have	  followed	  him.	   I	  do	  not	  
intend	  to	  challenge	  the	  claim	  that	  gardens	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  appreciated	  
as	  things	  that	  are	  ‘for	  the	  eye’	  and	  that	  aspire	  to	  be	  lovely	  to	  look	  at.	  	  Gardens	  
can	   be	   understood	   as	   pictures	   and	   it	   is	   an	   acceptable	   way	   of	   understanding	  
them,	  as	  far	  as	  it	  goes.	  However,	  appreciating	  gardens	  in	  this	  way	  affords	  only	  
an	   incomplete	   experience	   of	   them	   and	   also	   ignores	  what	   is	   distinctive	   about	  
them.	   Gardens	   have	   visual	   dimensions	   that	   the	   other	   visual	   arts,	   including	  
painting,	  sculpture	  and	  architecture	  lack.	  	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  use	  time	  and	  
exhibit	   its	   passing	   make	   gardens	   unique	   among	   the	   visual	   arts.	   In	   particular,	  
gardens	  present	   the	  passing	  of	   time	  visually	   in	  a	  way	   that	   is	  analogous	   to	   the	  
way	   in	  which	  music	   presents	   the	   passing	   of	   time	   audibly,	   but	  with	   significant	  
differences.	   	   Appreciating	   this	   aspect	   of	   gardens	   supplies	   a	   reason	   for	  
conceptualizing	  them	  as	  a	  distinctive	  category	  of	  art	  that	  offers	  a	  unique	  kind	  of	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experience.	   In	  the	  following	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  present	  an	  argument	  for	  
all	  these	  claims.	  
Change	  and	  the	  Arts	  
 
As	   I	   said	   in	   my	   introduction,	   Kant	   placed	   gardens	   in	   the	   same	   category	   as	  
painting,	   sculpture	   and	   architecture.	   However,	   this	   was	   to	   ignore	   the	   way	   in	  
which	   change	   is	   essential	   to	   gardens	   but	   not	   to	   these	   other	   arts,	   with	   the	  
exception	   of	   kinetic	   sculpture,	  with	  which	   Kant,	   of	   course,	  was	   not	   familiar.	   I	  
examine	  how	  the	  ‘new’	  art	  of	  kinetic	  sculpture	  involves	  change	  in	  chapter	  five.	  
Change	  is	  essential	  to	  gardens	  because	  their	  materials	  are	  natural	  objects,	  and	  
in	  particular	  living	  organisms,	  and	  these	  materials	  are	  arranged	  to	  be	  objects	  of	  
aesthetic	  experience.	  When	  gardeners	  place	  plants	  and	  other	  natural	  objects	  in	  
a	  garden	   they	  expect	   those	  plants	  and	  objects	   to	  change	  and	   they	  expect	   the	  
changes	  to	  be	  noticed	  and	  enjoyed.	  	  The	  sequence	  of	  changes	  that	  constitutes	  
the	   life	   of	   a	   plant	   is	   singularly	   important	   in	   a	   garden.	   Important	   also	   are	   the	  
relationships	  in	  and	  between	  the	  sequence	  of	  changes	  constituting	  the	  life	  of	  an	  
individual	   plant,	   those	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   other	   plants	   and	   in	   the	   inorganic	  
objects	  in	  the	  garden.	  
	  
These	   changes	   supply	   reasons	   for	   the	   aesthetic	   pleasure	   taken	   in,	   and	   the	  
aesthetic	   judgments	   made	   about	   gardens.	   Gardeners	   install	   and	   organize	  
organic	   and	   inorganic	   objects	   in	   gardens	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   those	   objects	  
will	   undergo	   characteristic	   changes	   and	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   people	   will	   pay	  
attention	  to	  those	  changes	  and	  derive	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  from	  them.	  Not	  only	  
flowers,	   but	   flowering,	   not	   only	   fruit,	   but	   fruiting,	   not	   only	   leaves,	   but	   furling	  
and	   unfurling,	   swelling	   and	   dwindling,	   and	   the	   relations	   between	   these	   and	  
other	  events,	  are	  arranged	  by	  the	  gardener	  for	  our	  interest	  and	  pleasure.	  	  	  
	  
Painters,	   architects	   and	   sculptors	   expect	   their	   paintings,	   buildings	   and	  
sculptures	  to	  change,	  but	  from	  an	  aesthetic	  point	  of	  view	  they	  do	  not	  generally	  
expect	   viewers	   to	   pay	   attention	   to,	   or	   derive	   pleasure	   from,	   such	   changes.	  
Examples	   of	   such	   changes	   are	   the	   peeling	   paint	   on	   a	   wooden	   building,	   the	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darkening	   of	   varnish	   on	   a	   painting	   and	   the	   chipping	   or	   cracking	   of	  marble	   or	  
stone	   in	   a	   sculpture.	   Objects	   such	   as	   these	   ideally	   should	   not	   change	   unless	  
ageing	   has	   beneficial	   aesthetic	   effects,	   for	   example	   the	   patina	   on	   a	   bronze	  
sculpture	   or	   the	   rose	   colour	   of	   old	   bricks.	   If	   age	   does	   not	   enhance	   their	  
appearance	  these	  objects	  should	   ideally	   remain	  as	   they	  were	  when	  they	  were	  
originally	  painted,	  built	  or	  sculpted	  and	  the	  point	  of	  any	  restoration,	  therefore,	  
is	  to	  return	  the	  object	  to	  its	  original	  condition,	  or	  to	  a	  condition	  perceived	  to	  be	  
most	   beautiful.	   In	   either	   case,	   it	   is	   desirable	   that	   the	   object	   remains	   in	   its	  
restored	   state	   and	   does	   not	   undergo	   further	   change.	  So,	   although	   paintings,	  
sculptures	  and	  architecture	  do	  change,	  our	  attention	  to	  them	  is	  to	  objects	  in	  a	  
static	  configuration.	  	  
	  
Gardens,	   however,	   are	   not	   ideally	   static.	   Although	   gardeners	   devote	  
considerable	   time	   and	   energy	   to	   resisting	   change,	   by	   way	   of	   mowing	   lawns,	  
cutting	   hedges,	   pruning	   roses	   and	  weeding	   beds,	   they	   also	   invariably	   expect,	  
plan	   for	   and	   design	  with	   change(s)	   in	  mind.	   Unlike	   the	   arts	   discussed	   above,	  
gardens	  need	  to	  change	  and	  develop	  and,	  with	   the	  exception	  of	   the	   Japanese	  
sand	  and	  rock	  gardens	  already	  referred	  to,	  they	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  remain	  the	  
same	  as	  when	  they	  were	  first	  created.	  Aesthetic	  appreciation	  of	  a	  garden	  as	  a	  
static	  picture	  or	  series	  of	  unrelated	  static	  pictures	  is	  possible	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  
may	  be	  reasonable.	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  an	  appreciation	  that	  does	  not	  take	  
account	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  what	  a	  garden	  is	  in	  one	  moment	  and	  what	  is	  
has	  been	  in	  past	  and	  will	  be	  in	  the	  future	  misses	  out	  on	  the	  particular	  aesthetic	  
experience	  which	  gardens	  can	  provide.	  	  
	  
Changes	   are	   also	   essential	   to	   performances	   because	   performances	   are	  
sequences	  of	  events.	  	  The	  events	  that	  combine	  to	  constitute	  a	  performance	  are	  
carried	  out	  by	  agents	  we	  know	  as	  actors,	  dancers	  and	  musicians.	  These	  agents	  
carry	   out	   actions	   in	   accordance	   with	   sets	   of	   instructions	   called	   scripts,	  
choreographies	  and	  scores,	  and	  the	  actions	  and	  their	  products	  are	  the	  things	  to	  
which	  we	  rightly	  pay	  attention	  and	  in	  which	  pleasure	  is	  taken.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
dramatic	  arts	  these	  are	  the	  actions	  the	  actors	  carry	  out,	  the	  story	  they	  tell	  and	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the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   tell	   it.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   dance	   these	   are	   the	   dancers’	  
movements	  and	  the	  story	  they	  tell	  or	  the	  abstract	  patterns	  they	  create.	   In	  the	  
case	  of	  music	  these	  are	  the	  sequences	  of	  sounds	  that	  the	  performers	  make	  by	  
manipulating	  an	  instrument	  or	  using	  their	  own	  voice.	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   changes	   that	   occur	   in	   performance	   are	   unlike	   the	   changes	   that	  
occur	   in	   gardens	   because	   plants	   are	   not	   performers.	   This	   means	   that	   the	  
changes	  plants	  exhibit	  are	  not	  intentional	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  plants,	  they	  cannot	  
generally	  be	  stopped	  and	  started	  at	  will	  and	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  influenced	  to	  any	  
significant	  degree	  by	  the	  gardener.	  	  For	  example,	  crocuses	  sprout	  in	  the	  winter	  
or	  early	  spring,	  produce	  flowers	  and	  die	  down	  during	  the	  summer.	  These	  events	  
are	  what	  crocuses	  do.	  However,	  crocuses	  are	  not	  performing	  and	  they	  are	  not	  
carrying	  out	   instructions,	  even	  when	   in	   sprouting	  and	   flowering	   they	   realize	  a	  
gardener’s	  intentions.	  	  
	  
The	   changes	   in	   gardens	   vary	   in	   significance	   and	   interest.	   For	   example,	   the	  
ageing	   of	   a	   kauri	   tree	   over	   centuries	   is	   a	   very	   slow	   change	   and	   is	   usually	   of	  
minimal	   interest	   to	  a	   garden	  visitor	  because	   it	   is	   imperceptible.	  However,	   the	  
imperceptible	  change	  may	  be	  required	  as	  a	  background	  to	  perceptible	  changes	  
or	  as	  a	  slow	  movement	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  faster	  movements.	  Moreover,	  the	  annual	  
production	  of	  cones	  is	  a	  regular	  part	  of	  the	  life	  of	  a	  kauri	  and	  this	  is	  of	  interest	  
because	  it	  is	  visible	  and	  aesthetically	  pleasing.	  The	  life	  of	  a	  petunia	  is	  of	  interest	  
because	  during	  the	  space	  of	  a	  few	  months	   it	  will	  change	  sufficiently	  to	  exhibit	  
growth,	  flowering,	  senescence	  and	  death.	  Not	  only	  the	  products	  of	  ageing,	  such	  
as	   flowers	   and	   seeds,	   are	   of	   importance:	   the	   whole	   process	   occurs	   quickly	  
enough	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  an	  observer.	  	  
Change	  and	  Time	  
Events	   are	   changes	   in	   objects	   and	   changes	   involve	   time.	   An	   object	   changes	  
when	  the	  properties	  it	  has	  or	  the	  relations	  in	  which	  it	  stands	  at	  one	  time	  differ	  
from	   the	  properties	   it	  has	  or	   the	   relations	   in	  which	   it	   stands	  at	  another	   time.	  
This	  means	  that	  changes	  cannot	  occur	  without	  time	  passing.	  Time	  and	  change	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are,	   therefore,	   inextricably	   linked.	   	   Change	   and	   time	   are	   essential	   to	   gardens	  
because	   they	   are	   essential	   to	   	   objects	   in	   them,	   and	   therefore	  Hunt	   is	   correct	  
when	  he	  says	  that	  time	  makes	  a	  “fundamental	  contribution”	  to	  “the	  being	  of	  a	  
garden”	  and	  that	  a	  garden	  “not	  only	  exists	  in	  but	  also	  takes	  its	  special	  character	  
from	  four	  dimensions.”	  1	  	  	  
	  
Time	  and	  its	  passage	  exist	  and	  can	  be	  experienced	  in	  different	  modes.	  	  	  The	  first	  
of	  these	  modes	  is	  measurable,	  predictable	  time,	  the	  time	  of	  science	  and	  clocks.	  	  
I	  will	  call	  this	  chronological	  time.	  The	  second	  mode	  is	  experiential	  time.	  This	   is	  
time	   as	   individual	   humans	   experience	   its	   passing.	   It	   is	   not	   objectively	  
measurable:	   it	   slows	   down	   and	   speeds	   up	   according	   to	   our	   individual	  
experience	   of	   it	   in	   the	   context	   of	   some	   external	   or	   internal	   event	   or	   object.	  
‘Time	   flies	   when	   you’re	   having	   fun,’	   is	   a	   cliché	   that	   succinctly	   expresses	   an	  
opinion	   about	   the	   passage	   of	   experiential	   time.	   The	   third	   mode	   of	   time	   is	  
musical	  time.	  	  This	   is	  the	  time	  created	  in	  a	  musical	  work.	  It	   is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  
complex	  interplay	  between	  pulse,	  metre	  and	  the	  composed	  temporal	  units	  in	  a	  
work.	   This	   time	   is	   different	   from	   the	   time	   taken	   for	   a	   musical	   performance,	  
which	   can	   be	   declared	   accurately	   in	   terms	   of	   chronological	   time,	   and	   it	   is	  
different	  from	  how	  long	  the	  musical	  composition	  seems	  to	  a	  listener.	   
Time	  and	  the	  Arts	  	  
 
It	   is	  possible	  to	  divide	  works	  of	  art	   into	  three	  groups	  depending	  on	  the	  way	  in	  
which	   they	   involve	   time.	   The	   first	   group	   comprises	   paintings	   and	   non-­‐kinetic	  
sculpture	   and	   I	   have	   discussed	   above	   how	   changes	   in	   these	   objects	   are	   not	  
properly	   the	   subject	   of	   aesthetic	   attention	   and	   appreciation.	   Our	   aesthetic	  
attention	  to	  paintings	  and	  sculpture	  is	  not	  attention	  to	  their	  temporal	  aspects,	  
events	  and	  processes,	  but	  to	  static	  configurations.	  	  
	  
Some	  paintings	  and	  sculpture	  do,	  however,	  possess	  a	  temporal	  aspect	  because	  
they	   are	   like	   novels	   inasmuch	   as	   they	   represent	   single	   events	   or	   narratives.	  	  	  
                                                
1 Hunt (2000) p. 15 
          
          
76 
Events	  and	  narratives	  take	  chronological	  time	  and	  so	  does	  looking	  at	  or	  reading	  
them.	  However,	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  look	  at	  or	  read	  the	  work	  is	  largely	  unrelated	  
to	   the	   time	   taken	   by	   the	   events	   portrayed.	   Thus,	   a	   very	   long	   novel	   may	  
represent	  events	  taking	  place	  during	  a	  half-­‐hour	  long	  lunch.	  A	  slow	  reader	  with	  
not	  much	  time	  for	  reading	  may	  take	  six	  months	  to	  read	  that	  very	  long	  account	  
and	   a	   quick	   reader	   may	   take	   six	   hours.	   Similarly,	   in	   one	   painting	   several	  
significant	  events	   in	  the	   life	  of	  a	  saint	  may	  be	  portrayed	  and	  these	  might	  take	  
two	  minutes	  or	  two	  hours	  to	  look	  at.	  
	  
In	   the	   cases	   of	   paintings	   and	   sculpture	   which	   represent	   events	   or	   narratives	  
aesthetic	   attention	   cannot	   be	   directed	   to,	   nor	   aesthetic	   pleasure	   taken	   in,	  
temporal	  aspects	  of	  those	  representations	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  any.	  	  
	  
The	   second	   group	   includes	   opera,	   theatre,	   spoken	   poetry	   and	   dance	   that	  
represents	  events	  or	  narratives.	  They	  have	  a	  temporal	  dimension	  because	  they	  
are	   performances	   and	   performances	   are	   temporally	   ordered	   sequences	   of	  
events.	   	   They	   take	   place	   in	   chronological	   time	   and	   so	   does	   the	   experience	   of	  
them.	  	  The	  time	  taken	  to	  experience	  a	  performance	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  time	  
the	  performance	   takes.	  Watching	  a	  play	  or	   listening	   to	  an	  opera	  begins	  when	  
the	  performance	  begins	  and	  ends	  when	  the	  performance	  ends.	  	  	  
	  
Most	   works	   in	   this	   group	   represent	   sequences	   of	   events	   that	   take	   place	   in	  
chronological	  time.	  They	  tell	  stories.	  Usually,	  the	  time	  taken	  by	  the	  performance	  
differs	   from	   the	   time	   taken	  by	   the	   events	   it	   represents.	   A	   play	   that	   lasts	   two	  
hours	  might	  represent	  events	  that	  occur	  over	  twenty	  years.	  A	  dance	  that	   lasts	  
five	   minutes	   might	   represent	   the	   week	   long	   life	   of	   a	   butterfly.	   Because	   the	  
passage	  of	  time	  is	  a	  constitutive	  component	  of	  these	  arts,	  aesthetic	  attention	  to	  
them	   is	   attention	   to	   time’s	   passage.	   	   Aesthetic	   pleasure	   can	   be	   taken	   in	  
temporal	  aspects	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  represent	  their	  stories.	  	  
	  
The	  third	  group	  comprises	  performances	  of	  abstract	  music	  and	  abstract	  dance.	  
Like	  the	  members	  of	   the	  second	  group,	   these	  arts	  have	  a	  temporal	  dimension	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because	   they	   are	   performances	   and	   performances	   are	   temporally	   ordered	  
sequences	   of	   events.	   	   They	   take	   place	   in	   chronological	   time	   and	   so	   does	   the	  
experience	  of	   them.	  However,	  music	   and	  dance	  of	   this	   type	  do	  not	   represent	  
events	  or	  narratives	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  the	  time	  taken	  performing	  them	  is	  
not	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  time	  taken	  by	  the	  events	  they	  represent.	  	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  music	  the	  essential	  artistic	  activity	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  temporal	  patterns	  
that	  present	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  to	  the	  ear.	  	  
	  
I	   argue	   firstly	   that	   music	   does	   this	   by	   creating	   patterns	   in	   sounds	   through	  
rhythm.	  	  Aesthetic	  attention	  to	  musical	  performance	  includes	  attention	  not	  only	  
to	  the	  pitch,	  timbre	  and	  amplitude	  of	  the	  sounds.	  It	  must	  also	  include	  attention	  
to	  the	  temporal	  aspects	  of	  the	  performance’s	  sounds.	  	  	  I	  argue	  secondly	  that,	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   dance,	   changes	   in	   space	   as	   well	   as	   time	   are	   essential	   and	   an	  
adequate	  appreciation	  of	  dance	  must	  include	  attention	  to	  changes	  of	  this	  kind.	  
	  
When	   we	   experience	   gardens	   as	   paintings	   we	   experience	   them	   as	   we	  
experience	   members	   of	   the	   first	   group	   that	   do	   not	   represent	   events	   or	   tell	  
stories.	   	   	  We	  attend	  to	  them	  as	  static	  arrangements	  and	  ignore	  their	  temporal	  
aspect	   altogether.	   However,	   when	   we	   experience	   them	   as	   presenting	   the	  
passing	  of	  time	  we	  experience	  them	  as	  members	  of	  the	  third	  group,	  as	  objects	  
whose	   temporal	   qualities	   are	   as	   important	   as	   their	   pictorial	   qualities.	   Our	  
experience	   of	   them	   is,	   in	   this	   way,	   analogous	   to	   our	   experiences	   of	   musical	  
performances	  and	  dance.	  I	  now	  argue	  that	  gardens	  present	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  
to	  the	  eye	  by	  presenting	  visible	  patterns	  in	  changes	  occurring	  in,	  and	  to,	  organic	  
and	   inorganic	   objects.	   The	   patterns	   are	   perceived	   to	   be	   rhythmic,	   just	   like	  
patterns	   in	   sound.	   	   Like	  audible	   rhythms,	   they	  can	  be	   the	  objects	  of	  aesthetic	  
pleasure	  and	  supply	  reasons	  for	  aesthetic	  judgments.	  	  
Time	  and	  Change	  in	  Gardens	  
Gardens	  cannot	  literally	  make	  time	  visible;	  even	  sundials	  and	  floral	  clocks	  can’t	  
do	   that.	   But	   noticing	   changes	   that	   take	   place	   in	   gardens	  makes	   awareness	   of	  
time	   possible	   and	   noticing	   patterns	   in	   and	   between	   these	   changes	   makes	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aesthetic	   appreciation	   of	   it	   possible.	   Gardens	   present	   visual	   evidence	   of	   the	  
passage	  of	   time	  or	  evidence	  of	   a	   gardener’s	  or	   garden	  designer’s	   attempts	   to	  
resist	  the	  changes	  brought	  about	  by	  it.	  	  
	  
We	  are	  aware	  of	  change	  in	  gardens	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  Firstly,	  we	  are	  aware,	  
to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   degree,	   of	   the	   changes	   that	   occur	   continuously	   in	   all	  
natural	  objects	  and	  that	  are	  clearly	  exhibited	  in	  a	  garden	  since	  such	  objects	  are	  
the	   material	   of	   which	   it	   is	   made.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   individual	   plants	   in	   a	  
traditional	  herbaceous	  border	  look	  completely	  different	  in	  midwinter	  from	  the	  
way	   they	   look	   in	  midsummer.	   Secondly,	   insofar	   as	   gardens	   are	   designed,	   we	  
may	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   designer’s	   having	   composed,	   contrasted	   or	   otherwise	  
articulated	   types	   of	   change	   in	   gardens	   in	   order	   to	   highlight	   the	   passage(s)	   of	  
time(s)	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  be	  interesting	  and	  attractive.	  
	  
The	  passage	  of	  chronological	  time	  is	  evident	  in	  gardens	  in	  three	  ways.	  There	  is,	  
firstly,	   the	   time	   of	   geology	   and	   geomorphology,	   the	   time	   spans	   over	   which	  
rocks,	   landforms	   and	   soils	   are	  made,	   changed	   and	   eroded.	   There	   is	   secondly,	  
biological	  time,	  the	  time	  spans	  over	  which	  individual	  plants	  and	  parts	  of	  plants	  
live,	  die,	  and	  reproduce.	  Thirdly,	  there	  are	  diurnal	  and	  seasonal	  cycles.	  The	  time	  
the	   changes	   and	   the	   cycles	   take	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	   time	   experiencing	   them	  
takes,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  watch	  them	  for	  the	  whole	  time	  they	  take.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  in	  
which	  changes	  in	  gardens	  are	  like	  performances.	  However,	  we	  don’t	  usually	  sit	  
and	  watch	   the	  grass	  grow	  or	  oak	   trees	  mature.	  This	   is	  because	  we	  would	   feel	  
that	   the	   experience	   was	   taking	   even	   longer	   that	   the	   time	   it	   does	   take.	   We	  
would	  experience	   it	   as	   intolerably	   long	  because	   it	  would	  be	  boring.	   This	   is	   an	  
example	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  experiential	  and	  chronological	  time.	  	  
	  	  
I	   have	   already	   claimed	   that	   it	   is	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   gardens	   that	   they	   change	  
constantly,	   the	  most	   change	   occurring	   in	   the	   plants	   of	   the	   garden.	   Change	   is	  
essential	   to	  all	   living	  organisms	  and	  the	  changes	  that	  constitute	   their	   lives	  are	  
responsible	   for	   the	   richness	   and	   complexity	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   time	   that	  
gardens	  offer.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  the	  use	  of	  plants	  as	  materials	  that	  makes	  the	  art	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of	   gardening	   distinctive	   and	   that	   makes	   the	   aesthetic	   experience	   of	   gardens	  
different	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  paintings.	  
	  
Plants	  are	  always	  either	  growing	  or	  dying,	  and	  sometimes	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  
same	  plant	  can	  be	  growing	  and	  dying	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Plants	  grow,	  set	  seed,	  
senesce	  and	  die	  according	  to	  their	  internal	  biological	  clocks.	  You	  cannot	  usually	  
see	  a	  mature	  kauri	  in	  a	  newly	  established	  garden	  and	  nor	  can	  you	  see	  camellia	  
flowers	  in	  summer.	  You	  have	  to	  wait	  while	  the	  kauri	  takes	  its	  own	  time	  to	  grow	  
and	  you	  have	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  appropriate	  season	  to	  see	  the	  camellia	  in	  flower.	  
	  
The	   speed	   of	   change	   varies	   greatly	   between	   different	   plants.	   Petunias	   and	  
radishes	   have	   brief	   life	   spans.	   The	   flowers	   of	   daylilies	   and	   moonflowers	   are	  
particularly	   ephemeral	   although	   the	   plants	   are	   not.	   Some	   aloes	   mature	   over	  
several	  years	  and	  then	  die	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  flower.	  Oaks	  endure	  for	  centuries	  but	  
change	  quite	  markedly	  each	  year	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  seasons.	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  different	  plants,	  different	  parts	  of	  plants,	  and	  natural	  materials	  all	  
have	  different	  rates	  of	  change	  presents	  aesthetic	  opportunities	  to	  the	  gardener	  
in	  the	  way	  she	  chooses	  to	  combine	  plants	  and	  natural	  materials.	  	  For	  example,	  
an	  oak	  tree	  grows	  slowly,	  its	  leaves	  grow	  and	  decay	  relatively	  quickly,	  a	  drift	  of	  
crocuses	  underneath	  the	  oak	  appears	  and	  disappears	  at	  a	  different	  rate	  and	  a	  
surrounding	   lawn	   is	   managed	   so	   that	   it	   looks	   the	   same	   all	   the	   time.	   Such	   a	  
combination	  of	  plants	  affords	  visual	   interest	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	   it	  creates	  a	  
complex	  rhythm	  of	  lifecycles,	  growth	  and	  decay	  that	  may	  interest,	  excite,	  calm,	  
disturb	  or	  reassure	  an	  attentive	  visitor.	  Similarly,	  rhythms	  of	  change	  and	  decay	  
are	  also	  present	  to	  be	  noticed	  by	  the	  observant	  and	  informed	  where	  the	  passing	  
of	  geological	  and	  geomorphological	  time	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  ground	  
itself,	  and	  in	  the	  shape,	  colour	  and	  composition	  of	  rocks,	  gravel,	  sand	  and	  soil.	  	  	  
	  
All	   of	   this	  means	   that	   the	   passage	  of	   time	   is	   inescapable	   in	   gardens.	   There	   is	  
always	  evidence	  of	  it:	  	  flowers	  opening,	  worms	  working	  the	  soil,	  leaves	  changing	  
colour	  and	  falling	  from	  the	  trees,	  fern	  fronds	  unfurling,	  leaves	  and	  petals	  folding	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for	  the	  night,	  water	  cascading,	  and	  even	  whole	  gardens	  maturing	  or	  senescing.	  
Gardens	  do	  not	  merely	  happen	  to	  exhibit	  time’s	  passing:	  they	  must	  do	  so.	  Any	  
garden	   is	   living.	   It	  must	  change,	  and	  with	  that	  time	  must	  pass,	  no	  matter	  how	  
subtly.	  	  
	  
The	  patterns	   in	   these	  changes	  are	   there	   to	  be	  seen.	  They	  are	  visible	  and	   they	  
are	   the	   fundamental	   artistic	   material	   of	   gardens	   as	   a	   distinctive	   art	   from	  
paintings.	  I	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  like	  patterns	  in	  sound	  in	  that	  they	  are	  
rhythms.	   They	   are	   visual	   rhythms	  produced	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   analogous	   to	   the	  
way	  in	  which	  audible	  rhythms	  are	  produced.	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6	   Music,	  Gardens	  and	  Dance	  
Music	  makes	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  audible	  
Susanne	   Langer	   developed	   a	   detailed	   philosophy	   of	   the	   arts	   in	   Feeling	   and	  
Form1	  and	  Philosophy	  in	  a	  New	  Key.2	  She	  was	  comprehensive	  in	  her	  treatment	  
of	   music	   but	   she	   did	   not	   discuss	   gardens.	   She	   described	   in	   detail	   how	   the	  
individual	  arts	   function	  as	   symbolic	   forms.	  Each	  art	   involves	  an	  “illusory	   field”	  
and	  music’s	  illusory	  field	  is	  time.3	  She	  claimed	  that	  music	  makes	  the	  passage	  of	  
time	  audible.	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  this	  claim,	  but	  my	  account	  of	  how	  music	  
does	  this,	  while	  it	  owes	  a	  debt	  to	  her,	  differs	  from	  hers.	  
	  
Music	  cannot	  literally	  make	  time	  audible	  but,	  by	  organizing	  sounds	  rhythmically,	  
it	   can	   draw	   listeners’	   attention	   to	   its	   passing.	   Musical	   time,	   which	   rhythm	  
articulates,	   is	  a	  complex	  product	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  pulse,	  metre	  and	  
what	  I	  call	  composed	  temporal	  units.	  (See	  Figure	  7,	  below.)	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Figure	  7	  Examples	  of	  pulse,	  metre	  and	  rhythm	  derived	  from	  the	  opening	  bars	  of	  Beethoven’s	  
Symphony	  No.	  5.	  
In	  a	  composition	  a	  composer	  divides	  objectively	  measurable	  chronological	  time	  
into	   a	   regularly	   recurring	   pattern	   called	   pulse.	   A	   composer	   then	   organizes	  
pulses	   into	  a	  metre,	  which	   is	  also	  usually	   regular	  and	   recurring.	  When	  we	   tap	  
                                                
1 Langer (1953) 
2 Langer (1957) 
3 Langer (1953) pp. 104-132 
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our	   feet	   or	   clap	   our	   hands	   in	   time	   to	   music	   it	   is	   often	   in	   accordance	   with	  
elements	   of	   a	   composition’s	   metre.	   Pulse	   and	   metre	   are	   indicated	   by	   a	  
composition’s	  tempo	  indication	  (e.g.	  allegro	  or	  andante)	  and	  its	  time	  signature	  
(e.g.	  2/4	  or	  3/4)	  respectively.	  
	  
Rhythm	   is	   created	   in	   a	   composition	   when	   a	   composer	   invents	   composed	  
temporal	   units,	   or	   rhythmic	   motifs,	   that	   are	   articulated	   and	   experienced	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  metre.	  The	  temporal	  events	  that	  constitute	  rhythms	  are	  usually	  
linked	  to	  melodic	  units,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Melody	  is	  not	  necessary.	  
Music	  requires	  only	  rhythm	  to	  exist.	  	  
	  
Musical	   time,	   which	   rhythm	   articulates,	   is	   not	   objectively	   measurable	  
chronological	   time	   and	   nor	   is	   it	   experiential	   time,	   as	   defined	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter.	  It	  is,	  however,	  like	  experiential	  time	  in	  that	  it	  can	  appear	  to	  slow	  down,	  
speed	  up,	   fragment	   or	   even	   stop.	   	   Just	   as	   excitement,	   boredom	  or	   shock	   can	  
make	  human	  experiential	  time	  appear	  to	  pass	  quickly,	  drag	  or	  stop,	  so	  too	  can	  a	  
composer	  manipulate	   her	  materials	   to	   create	   a	   range	   of	   temporal	   effects	   for	  
our	  direct	  experience.	  (See	  Figure	  8	  below	  and	  Figure	  9,	  p.	  83)	  Music	  uses	  the	  
passage	  of	  this	  musical	  time	  as	  its	  fundamental	  artistic	  material.	  Music	  creates	  
its	   own	  experiential,	   audible	   time	  world	   and	  offers	   us	   the	  opportunity	   to	   pay	  
attention	  to	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8	  Musical	  time	  starts	  regularly	  and	  predictably	  in	  this	  example	  but	  gradually	  it	  becomes	  
fragmented,	  erratic	  and	  unpredictable.	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Figure	  9	  Although	  the	  pulse	  and	  metre	  remain	  constant	  musical	  time	  appears	  to	  speed	  up	  in	  
this	  example.	  
 
Although	  we	  experience	  musical	  time	  as	  different	  from	  objectively	  measurable,	  
chronological	  time	  we	   inevitably	  experience	  the	  former	  time	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  
latter	   because	   that	   is	   the	   only	   way	   we	   can	   experience	   rhythm	   and	   thus	  
experience	   sound	   as	  music	   at	   all.	   Perhaps	   just	   as	   a	   cantus	   firmus	   provides	   a	  
melodic	   structural	  element	  around	  which	  a	  polyphonic	  musical	   composition	   is	  
heard	   so	   too	   chronological	   time	   can	   be	   said	   to	   provide	   a	   temporal	   structural	  
element,	  a	   ‘rhythmus	   firmus’,	   against,	  or	  more	  accurately,	  parallel	   to	  which,	  a	  
piece	  of	  music	  is	  heard.	  	  
Gardens	  make	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  visible	  
The	   relevant	   patterns	   in	   and	   between	   the	   changes	   that	   occur	   in	   gardens	   are	  
visual.	  These	  visual	  patterns	  are	  rhythms	  produced	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   rhythms	   are	   produced	   in	   sound.	   They	   are	   patterns	   in	   the	  
movements	  essential	  to	  gardens.	  All	  growth	  is	  movement.	  Sprouting,	  unfurling,	  
flowing,	   fruiting	   are	   movements,	   and	   so	   are	   dwindling,	   drooping,	   falling	   and	  
decaying.	  	  	  
	  
In	   gardens,	   as	   in	   music,	   chronological	   time	   provides	   what	   I	   have	   called	   a	  	  	  
‘rhythmus	   firmus’.	   	   	   In	   a	   garden	   the	   continuum	   of	   chronological	   time	   divides	  
itself	  into	  regular,	  recurring	  patterns	  experienced	  as	  diurnal	  and	  seasonal	  cycles.	  
These	   cycles	   set	   up	   what	   we	   described	   in	   music	   as	   pulse	   and	   metre.	   It	   is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  gardens	  this	  pulse	  and	  metre	  are	  not	  selected	  by	  the	  
designer	  but	  are	  provided	  by	  nature	  itself.	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Rhythm	   is	   created	   in	  a	  garden	  when	  a	  designer	  organizes	  natural	  objects	   into	  
perceptual	  units.	   If	   they	  are	  plants	   then	   they	  bring	  with	   them	   the	  patterns	  of	  
the	  events	  that	  constitute	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  kinds.	  	  For	  instance,	  oak	  trees	  grow	  
from	  acorns,	  each	  year	  they	  lose	  all	  of	  their	  leaves,	  grow	  new	  leaves,	  flower	  and	  
produce	  more	  acorns.	  Crocuses	  grow	  leaves	  and	  flowers	  in	  spring	  and	  then	  die	  
down	   and	   hibernate	   until	   the	   next	   spring.	   The	   patterns	   in	   these	   events	   are	  
given,	  not	   created,	  and	   there	   is	  a	   limit	   to	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  a	  gardener	   can	  
alter	   or	   influence	   them.	   These	   patterns	   are	   experienced	   in	   relation	   to	   each	  
other	  and	   to	   the	  background	  provided	  by	   the	  pulse	  and	  metre	  of	  diurnal	   and	  
seasonal	  time,	  which	  are	  themselves	  stretches	  of	  chronological	  time.	  When	  we	  
experience	  these	  patterns	  in	  this	  way	  we	  experience	  them	  as	  rhythm.	  
	  
Just	   as	   in	   music,	   time	   in	   gardens	   is	   a	   complex	   product	   of	   the	   interactions	  
between	  pulse,	  metre	  and	  selected	  perceptual	  units.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  important	  
difference:	   all	   the	   elements	   of	   garden	   time	   are	   chronological	   time	   elements.	  
Unlike	  musical	  time,	  chronological	  time	  cannot	  be	  slowed	  down	  or	  speeded	  up,	  
reversed,	   fragmented	   or	   stopped.	   	   Gardens	   use	   the	   passage	   of	   chronological	  
time	   as	   a	   fundamental	   artistic	  material	   but	   in	   so	   doing	   they	   create	   their	   own	  
complex	  arrangement	  of	  temporal	  patterns	  and	  thereby	  offer	  us	  opportunities	  
to	  think	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  time	  and	  its	  passage.	  
	  
In	   music	   and	   gardens	   our	   experience	   of	   rhythms	   depends	   not	   only	   on	   our	  
memory	  of	  what	  has	  preceded	  what	  we	  hear	  and	  see	  but	  also	  our	  expectation	  
of	  what	  may	  follow	  what	  we	  hear	  and	  see.	  For	  instance,	  when	  deciduous	  trees	  
are	  bare	  in	  gardens	  in	  winter	  we	  know	  that	  at	  a	  certain	  distance	  in	  time	  in	  the	  
past	  the	  trees	  were	  covered	  in	  leaves	  and	  we	  know	  that	  at	  a	  certain	  distance	  in	  
time	  in	  the	  future	  they	  will	  again	  have	  leaves.	  	  Similarly,	  in	  music	  our	  experience	  
of	   the	  silence	   in	  bar	  3	  of	   the	  Beethoven	  example	  above	   is	   influenced	  by	  what	  
we	  know	  we	  heard	  in	  bars	  one	  and	  two,	  and	  this	  knowledge	  in	  turn	  influences	  
what	  we	  may	  expect	  to	  hear	  later	  in	  that	  bar	  and	  in	  the	  following	  bars.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  
both	  music	  and	  gardens	  these	  experiences	  are	  based	  on	  knowledge.	  But	  there	  is	  
a	   difference.	   In	  music	   our	   sphere	   of	   knowledge	   is	   generally	   restricted	   to	   the	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composition	  in	  progress	  and	  to	  the	  composer’s	  compositional	  style.	  	  	  However,	  
in	  gardens	  our	  knowledge	  may	  be	  of	  that	  particular	  garden,	  or	  one	  of	  its	  plants,	  
a	  few	  minutes	  or	  a	  year	  ago,	  or	  it	  may	  be	  a	  much	  broader	  knowledge	  of	  living	  
materials	  and	  natural	  processes	  in	  gardens	  or	  nature	  generally.	  	  
Experiencing	  Time	  in	  Gardens	  
Because	  people	  are	   living	  organisms,	  human	   responses	   to	  a	   garden’s	   rhythms	  
may	  be	  especially	  interesting,	  evocative	  and	  resonant.	  In	  gardens	  we	  are	  faced	  
with	   patterns	   in	   real	   chronological	   time,	   rather	   than	   the	   ‘play’	   time	  of	  music.	  
These	   patterns	   may	   lead	   to	   reflections	   on	   time	   and	   its	   effects.	   By	   providing	  
designed	   real-­‐time	   worlds,	   gardens	   can	   offer	   us	   opportunities	   to	   observe	  
painlessly,	  and	  to	  meditate	  on	  and	  experience	  time’s	  passing.	  In	  gardens	  we	  see	  
birth,	  senescence	  and	  death,	  we	  see	  slow	  and	  fast	  cyclical	  changes,	  and	  we	  see	  
‘offspring’	   and	   ‘parents’.	   	   These	   experiences	   enable	   reflections	  on	   the	  human	  
condition,	   its	  permanence	  or	  transience,	  stability	  or	   instability,	  on	  mortality	  or	  
regeneration,	  growth	  or	  decay,	  health	  or	   sickness.	  They	  allow	  us	   to	   reflect	  on	  
the	  vagaries	  of	  human,	  as	  well	  as	  plant,	  life.	  	  
	  
Our	   experiences	   of	   gardens	   may	   direct	   our	   attention	   to	   time	   itself,	   to	   its	  
irreversibility,	   its	   unidirectionality,	   its	   cyclical	   nature,	   its	   inevitability	   and	   its	  
inexorability.	  They	  may	  direct	  our	  attention	  to	  our	  comfort	  when	  we	  embrace	  
time’s	  passage	  or	  to	  our	  discomfort	  when	  we	  struggle	  against	  it.	  Some	  gardens,	  
such	  as	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘timeless’	  Zen-­‐style	  raked	  sand	  gardens,	  and	  other	  gardens	  
that	  highlight	  geological	  or	  very	  slow	  moving	   time,	  may	   invite	  us	   to	   reflect	  on	  
eternity.	  They	  may	  offer	  us	  the	  opportunity	  to	  step	  out	  of	  our	  own	  time,	  to	  lose	  
ourselves,	  to	  release	  ourselves	  from	  our	  human	  time	  and	  escape	  temporarily	  to	  
a	  realm	  where	  time	  appears	  to	  stand	  still.	  
	  
It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  in	  gardens	  we	  are	  both	  spectators	  and	  participants,	  that	  we	  
both	  observe	  and	  dance	  in	  a	  garden	  of	  time.	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Gardens	  and	  Dance	  
I	  have	  argued	  that,	  of	  all	  art	  forms,	  gardens	  are	  most	  like	  performances	  because	  
they	   are	   essentially	   dynamic,	   and	   I	   have	   explored	   their	   temporal	   dimension	  
through	  an	  analogy	  with	  music.	  However,	  in	  some	  ways,	  gardens	  are	  even	  more	  
like	  dance,	  than	  music,	  because	  they	   involve	  changes	   in	  space	  as	  well	  as	  time.	  
Moreover,	  dances	  are	  like	  gardens	  in	  that	  although	  rhythm	  is	  essential,	  audible	  
sound	  is	  not.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   also	   interesting	   to	   see	   how	   dance	   presents	   problems	   about	   its	  
categorization	   as	   an	   art	   form	   that	   are	   similar	   to	   those	   presented	   by	   gardens.	  
Dance	  is	  sometimes	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  expressive	  art	  in	  which	  the	  movements	  
of	   the	   dancer	   give	   physical	   expression	   to	   the	   accompanying	   music	   and	   its	  
emotions.	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  plastic	  art	  that	  represents	  objects	  by	  means	  
of	   changing	   images	   or	   moving	   sculptural	   objects,	   or	   as	   a	   dramatic	   art	   that	  
represents	  events	  in	  a	  narrative.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  thought	  of	  as	  partaking	  of	  
the	  qualities	  of	  music,	  painting,	  sculpture	  and	  the	  dramatic	  arts.	  
	  
For	  Langer,	  dance	  was	  different	  from	  all	  these	  other	  arts.	  She	  proposed	  that	  the	  
art	  of	  dance	  had	  as	  its	  primary	  illusion	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  virtual	  realm	  of	  power.	  
The	  power	  exhibited	  was,	  she	  wrote,	   	  “…	  not	  actual,	  physically	  exerted	  power,	  
but	  appearances	  of	  influence	  and	  agency	  created	  by	  virtual	  gesture.”	  1	  From	  this	  
flowed	  her	   insights	  as	  to	  how	  and	  why	  dance	  arose	  and	  why	  it	   is	  of	  value	  and	  
interest	   to	  us.	  While	  disagreeing	  with	  many	  of	  her	  conclusions,	  her	  claim	  that	  
dance’s	  primary	  illusory	  field	  is	  gesture	  is	  appealing.	  She	  was	  not	  a	  proponent	  of	  
the	  aesthetic	  attitude:	  rather	  she	  believed	  a	  successful	  work	  of	  art	  expressed	  an	  
aesthetic	   quality	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   which	   something	   akin	   to	   the	   aesthetic	  
attitude	  was	  awakened	  in	  a	  viewer.	  In	  a	  successful	  dance	  then,	  ordinary	  physical	  
movements	   need	   to	   be	   transformed	   into	   something	   else	   so	   that	   art	   can	   be	  
made	  of	  it.	  This	  something	  else	  is	  gesture.	  	  A	  dancer’s	  movement	  may	  itself	  be	  
                                                
1 Langer (1953) p. 175 
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appealing	   to	   the	   eye	   but	   Langer	   argues	   that	   the	   aesthetic	   quality	   of	   a	   dance	  
allows	   that	   dancer’s	   movement	   to	   be	   transmuted	   from	   an	   ordinary,	   actual	  
movement	  into	  a	  virtual	  gesture.	  There	  is	  an	  analogy	  here	  with	  gardens	  because	  
both	  gardens	  and	  dance	  use	  a	  preponderance	  of	  ordinary	  living	  objects	  as	  their	  
raw	  material.	  So,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  a	  growing	  plant	  is	  an	  ordinary,	  everyday	  
object	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  differently	  as	  part	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  so	  too,	  
argues	   Langer,	   the	   dancer’s	   ordinary	   movement	   of	   his	   ordinary	   body	   is	  
experienced	  as	  something	  else,	  virtual	  gesture,	  when	  it	  is	  experienced	  within	  a	  
dance.	  I	  suggest	  that	  changes	  in	  gardens	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  
	  
I	   have	   explained	   how	  dance	   and	   gardens	   are	   alike	   because	   they	   both	   involve	  
changes	   in	   space	   and	   time.	   Changes	   in	   both	   dance	   and	   gardens	  may	   be	   big,	  
small,	  fast	  or	  slow,	  or	  any	  combination	  of	  these	  qualities.	  Sometimes	  they	  are	  so	  
slow	   or	   small	   that	   they	   are	   virtually	   imperceptible.	   However,	   the	   changes	   in	  
dance	  are	  different	  from	  changes	  in	  gardens	  in	  three	  important	  ways.	  Firstly,	  in	  
dance,	   the	   changes	   (movements)	   are	   intentional.	   They	   are	   executed	   by	  
performers	  using	  parts	  of	   their	  bodies	   and	  other	  objects	   such	  as	   costumes	  or	  
props.	  In	  dance,	  a	  dancer	  winks	  intentionally	  or	  performs	  a	  jeté	  intentionally	  or	  
collapses	  intentionally.	  Involuntary	  movements	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  dancers,	  such	  
as	  the	  aging	  of	  their	  bodies	  during	  a	  performance,	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  dance.	  	  
	  
In	   gardens	  all	   the	   relevant	   changes	  are	   involuntary.	  Plants	   grow.	  They	   sprout,	  
flourish,	  wither	  and	  die.	  These	  changes	  in	  plants	  are	  the	  movements	  in	  gardens	  
analogous	  to	  the	  intentional	  actions	  of	  dancers	  in	  dances,	  but	  the	  plants	  are	  not	  
acting	   intentionally.	   These	   changes	   are	   initiated	  by	   the	   plants	   themselves	   but	  
plants	  must	  change	  in	  these	  ways.	  They	  have	  no	  option	  in	  the	  matter.	  They	  are	  
just	  doing	  what	  plants	  must	  do	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  not	  performers.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  in	  dance,	  because	  the	  movements	  are	  performed	  intentionally	  by	  the	  
dancers,	  usually	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  choreography,	   they	   can	  
be	   varied	   intentionally	   and	   they	   can	   be	   started	   and	   stopped.	   A	   dance	   has	   a	  
beginning	   and	   an	   ending.	   Plants	   cannot	   usually	   be	   made	   to	   stop	   and	   start	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functioning	   as	   dancers	   do,	   although	   this	   happens	   to	   a	   degree	   in	   preparing	  
gardens	   and	   plants	   for	   display	   and	   competition.	   Gardens	   can	   be	   installed	   or	  
destroyed,	  but	  the	  changes	  in	  gardens	  continue	  indefinitely.	  	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   some	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   gardens	   can	   be	   directed	   and	   controlled	   by	   a	  
garden	  designer	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  choreographer.	  
Such	   changes	   occur	   as	   a	   result	   of	   instructions.	   Lights	   can	   be	   programmed	   to	  
perform	  according	  to	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  plan.	  And,	  more	  importantly,	  water	  can	  
be	   programmed	   to	   perform	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways,	   either	   by	   the	   provision	   of	  
containers,	  jets	  or	  channels	  of	  particular	  shapes	  that	  influence	  its	  behaviour,	  or	  
by	  more	   advanced	  mechanical	   (hydrological)	  means.	   Examples	   of	   this	   can	   be	  
seen	  in	  the	  gardens	  at	  the	  Villa	  d’Este	  near	  Rome,	   in	  the	  ‘joke’	  outdoor	  dining	  
rooms	  of	  other	  Italian	  gardens	  of	  the	  Renaissance	  and	  in	  contemporary	  gardens	  
such	   as	   Parc	   Andre	   Citroën	   in	   Paris.	   The	   changes	   in	  water,	  whether	   naturally	  
occurring	   or	   mechanically	   induced,	   are	   important	   in	   gardens,	   and	   water’s	  
mutability	   has	   long	   been	   celebrated	   as	   a	   contributor	   to	   gardens	   in	   all	   four	  
dimensions.	  	  
	  
However,	   many	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   gardens	   that	   are	   produced	   by	   an	   external	  
agency	  are	  not	  like	  the	  changes	  produced	  by	  a	  choreographer.	  Plants	  in	  gardens	  
can	  be	  affected	  by	  wind	  and	  sun	  and	  this	   results	   in	  movements.	  For	  example,	  
sunflowers	   turn	   to	   face	   the	   sun	   and	   leaves	   flutter	   in	   the	   breeze.	  Often	   these	  
changes	  are	  easily	  observable	  and	  have	  aesthetic	  importance	  to	  the	  gardens	  as	  
works	  of	  art.	  These	  movements	  have	  no	  equivalent	  in	  dance,	  where	  movements	  
are	   determined	   by	   the	   performers	   or	   the	   choreographer.	   Any	   analogous	  
changes	  that	  do	  occur	  in	  dance	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  it	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  	  	  
	  
In	   summary,	   gardens	  and	  dance	  are	  both	   visual	   arts	   in	  which	  our	   attention	   is	  
properly	   directed	   to	   movements	   of	   objects	   in	   both	   time	   and	   space.	   Our	  
understanding	  of	  gardens	  may	  be	  enriched	   to	   the	  degree	   that	  we	  can	  design,	  
experience	  and	  evaluate	  them	  not	  only	  as	  a	  sub-­‐category	  of	  painting	  but	  also	  as	  
a	  category	  of	  art	  very	  similar	  to	  dance.	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7	   Gardens	  and	  Some	  Other	  arts	  
Gardens	  and	  Kinetic	  Sculpture	  
Kant’s	   view	   of	   gardens	   as	   being	   like	   two-­‐dimensional	   paintings	   has	   been	  
discussed	  already,	  and	  it	  is	  reinforced	  by	  his	  separation	  of	  them	  from	  sculpture.1	  
He	   linked	  sculpture	  with	  architecture	  and	   together	   they	  comprised	   the	  plastic	  
division	   of	   the	   formative	   arts.	   He	   linked	   gardens	   with	   ”painting	   proper”	   and	  
they	  comprised	   the	  painting	  division	  of	   the	   formative	  arts.	  However,	   I	  believe	  
that	   it	   will	   be	   useful	   to	   investigate	   potential	   analogies	   between	   gardens	   and	  
sculpture,	   and	   in	   particular	   kinetic	   sculpture,	   to	   see	   if	   our	   understanding	   and	  
appreciation	   of	   the	   latter	   may	   inform	   a	   clearer	   understanding	   of	   gardens’	  
uniqueness.	  
	  
Gardens	   are	  made	  up	  of	   three-­‐dimensional	   objects	   in	   space.	   Like	   a	   sculpture,	  
elements	   of	   a	   garden	   can	   be	   walked	   around,	   inspected	   from	   different	  
viewpoints	   and	   touched.	   	   There	   are	   even	   small	   contained	   gardens,	   such	   as	  
Schwartz’s	  Splice	  Garden,	   	   (see	  Figure	  10,	  p.	  90)	  where	  the	  whole	  garden	  may	  
be	  experienced	  as	  if	  it	  is	  a	  sculpture.	  
	  
It	   has	   been	   noted	   already	   that	   sculptures	   are	   not	   expected	   to	   change	   and,	   if	  
they	  do,	  our	  aesthetic	  attention	  is	  not	  properly	  directed	  either	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
change	   nor	   to	   its	   results.	   However,	   in	   the	   genre	   of	   kinetic	   sculpture	   our	  
attention	  is	  properly	  directed	  to	  objects	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  change	  in	  
time	   and	   space.	   As	   a	   genre,	   kinetic	   sculpture	   shares	   this	   with	   dance	   and	  
gardens.	  	  
	  
Changes	   in	   objects	   in	   kinetic	   sculpture	   may	   be	   instrumentally	   achieved	   in	  
accordance	  with	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  ‘score’	  or	  they	  may	  be	  random.	  Examples	  of	  
instruments	   of	   change	   are	   natural	   processes,	   including	   tide,	   wind	   and	   sun,	  
                                                
1 Kant (2007) section 51: 151 
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actions	   on	   the	   part	   of	   viewers,	   and	  mechanical	   systems,	   a	   simple	   example	   of	  
which	  is	  a	  cuckoo	  clock.	  	  When	  parts	  of	  a	  kinetic	  sculpture	  move	  or	  are	  moved	  
in	   accordance	  with	   a	   predetermined	   ‘score’	   they	   are	   functioning	   in	   a	  manner	  
analogous	  to	  limbs	  and	  other	  moving	  parts	  of	  dancers,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  those	  
moving	  objects	  can	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  dancer	  moving	  them.	  An	  element	  in	  
a	  kinetic	   sculpture	  can	  be	  moved	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  choreography	  or	  other	  
set	  of	  instructions	  just	  as	  a	  dancer’s	  leg	  can	  be	  moved.	  There	  are	  differences	  in	  
the	  source	  of	  the	  motion,	  the	   ‘score’	  and	  the	  objects	  moving	  or	  being	  moved,	  
but	   both	   sets	   of	   elements	   are	   objects	   undergoing	   change	   in	   time	   and	   space	  




Figure	   10	   Photograph	   of	   Martha	   Schwartz's	   Splice	   Garden	   for	   the	   Whitehead	   Institute,	  
Cambridge	  MA.,	  USA.1	  
Plants	  are	  objects	  that	  change	  in	  time	  and	  space	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  
biological	   programmes	   and	   in	   this	   way	   they	   are	   unlike	   objects	   in	   kinetic	  
sculpture	   and	   dance.	   	   However,	   plants	   in	   gardens	   may	   also	   change	   or	   be	  
                                                
1 [Online] Available from: http://www.marthaschwartz.com/projects/bagelgarden.html [Accessed 
1 October 2011] 
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changed	  randomly	  by	  wind,	  rain	  and	  so	  on.	  	  When	  this	  occurs,	  garden	  plants	  are	  
behaving	  like	  elements	  of	  randomly	  moving	  kinetic	  sculptures.	  A	  tree	  moving	  in	  
response	   to	   wind	   is	   aesthetically	   interesting	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   a	   single	  
element	   or	   all	   of	   a	   Calder	   mobile	   sculpture	   is	   and,	   in	   this	   way,	   gardens	   and	  
kinetic	  sculpture	  are	  analogous.	  	  
Gardens,	  Installations	  and	  Environmental	  Sculpture	  
The	  objects	  and	  activities	  of	  art	  have	  often	  been	  characterized	  as	  different	  from	  
objects	  and	  activities	  in	  the	  ‘real’	  world.	  Not	  all	  philosophers	  and	  aestheticians	  
agree	  on	  this	  and	  two	  exceptions	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  However,	   for	   those	  
who	   do	   agree,	   terms	   such	   as	   disinterest,	   aesthetic	   attitude	   and	   aesthetic	  
experience	  are	   frequently	  used.	  These	   terms	  name	  ways	   in	  which	  art	  and	  our	  
experiences	   of	   it	   are,	   or	   in	   some	   instances	   should	   be,	   in	   a	   separate	  
compartment	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  everyday	  objects	  and	  ways	  of	  behaving.	  This	  
separation	  occurs	  more	  easily	  in	  some	  genres	  than	  others.	  
	  
Music	  and	  dance	  are	  performance	  arts.	   They	  occur	   in	  and	  create	   	   timeframes	  
and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   dance,	   places	   separate	   from	   the	   ‘real’	   world.	   Kinetic	  
sculpture	  comprises	  objects	  specifically	  designed	  or	  designated	  to	  be	  art	  objects	  
and	  they	  are	  perceived	  differently	  from	  ‘real’	  world	  objects	  by	  the	  initiated.	  It	  is	  
comparatively	   straightforward	   to	   see	   that	   the	   products	   of	   music,	   dance	   and	  
kinetic	   sculpture	   are	   different	   from	   the	   ‘real’	   world,	   especially	   when	   they	  
appear	   in	  concert	  halls,	  theatres	  and	  galleries,	  and	  to	  regard	  them	  in	  a	  special	  
way,	   as	   works	   of	   art.	   	   By	   contrast,	   gardens	   and	   architecture	   are	   three-­‐
dimensional	  objects	  that	  are	  to	  varying	  degrees	  inhabitable	  and	  useful,	  and	  they	  
are	   our	   real	   world.	  We	   are	   able	   to	   move	   in	   and	   through	   them	   and,	   at	   least	  
theoretically,	   are	   able	   to	   sit,	   eat,	   sleep	   and	   so	   on	   in	   them.	   	   This	   can	   be	  
problematic	  when	  we	  invoke	  concepts	  like	  disinterest	  and	  aesthetic	  experience.	  
Considering	  gardens	  and	  buildings	  as	  art	  objects,	  when	  they	  are	  so	  patently	  of	  
the	   ‘real’	   world,	   is	   clearly	  more	   complicated	   than	   considering	   say	   poetry	   and	  
music	   as	   art.	   Gardens	   and	   architecture	   have	   commonly	   been	   considered	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borderline	   arts1	   and	   apart,	   from	   their	   utility,	   their	   realness	   has	   been	   a	  
significant	  reason	  for	  this	  status	  
	  
Since	   about	   1970,	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   art	   world	   has	   deliberately	   sought	   out	   this	  
quality	  of	  three-­‐dimensional,	   inhabitable	  realness	  and	  exhibited	   it	   through	  the	  
new	  genre	  of	   installation	  art.	  However,	   this	   genre	  has	  never	  been	   considered	  
borderline	   art:	   it	   has	   in	   fact	   been	   in	   the	   vanguard	   of	   contemporary	   art	   ever	  
since	   it	   first	   appeared.	   Unlike	   gardens	   and	   buildings,	   installations	   have	   never	  
been	  expected	  to	  be	  useful,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  partially	  informed	  their	  status	  as	  
bona-­‐fide	  art	  objects.	  However,	  they	  do	  share	  with	  gardens	  many	  features	  and	  
qualities	   which	   have	   been	   raised	   as	   difficulties	   for	   gardens’	   being	   considered	  
art,	   and	   an	   examination	   of	   those	   qualities	   and	   features	   may	   teach	   us	   more	  
about	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  gardens	  as	  bona-­‐fide	  examples	  of	  art.	  
	  
Installations	   are	   typically	   three-­‐dimensional	   works	   that	   surround	   and	   engage	  
the	  viewer	   in	  ways	   similar	   to	  gardens.	   It	  may	  be	   said	   that	   they	   separate	  off	  a	  
part	  of	   reality,	  modify	   it	   in	   some	  way	  and	  offer	   it	  back	   to	  us	  as	  an	  art	  object.	  
Installations	  may	  be	  inside	  a	  building	  or	  outdoors.	  If	  outdoors	  they	  are	  in	  effect,	  
as	  a	  genre,	   synonymous	  with	   land	  and	  environmental	  art.	   For	   the	   time	   that	  a	  
viewer	  is	  in	  the	  installation	  it	  is,	  particularly	  if	  it	  is	  outdoors,	  her	  real	  world	  and	  
not	   just	   some	   abstraction	   from	   it.	   She	   is	   in	   its	   three-­‐dimensional	   space,	   is	  
surrounded	  by	  it.	  She	  is	  able	  to	  move	  through	  it.	  	  She	  may	  visit	  all	  or	  part	  of	  it	  
and	  usually	  do	  so	  in	  whatever	  order	  and	  for	  as	  long	  as	  she	  likes.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  
ways	  installations	  are	  analogous	  with	  gardens.	  	  
	  
Installations	   often	   appeal	   to	   two	   or	   more	   of	   the	   senses.	   For	   example,	  
Parekowhai’s	  On	  Looking	  Into	  Chapman’s	  Homer	  (see	  Figure	  11,	  p.	  93)	  appeals	  
equally	  to	  the	  senses	  of	  sight,	  touch	  and	  hearing	  because	  it	  involves	  sculptures	  
and	  musical	  performances	   in	  distinctive	   indoor	  and	  outdoor	   settings.	  Gardens	  
appeal	   to	   all	   five	   senses	   and	   the	   vestibular	   sense,	   although	  all	   senses	   are	  not	  
                                                
1 Davies (1994) pp. 31-47 
          
          
93 
usually	  equally	  involved,	  or	  involved	  at	  all,	  at	  any	  given	  moment.	  	  Gardens	  have	  
therefore	   sometimes	   been	   labeled,	   by	   Chatterjee1	   and	   others,	   as	   the	   ideal	  
Gesamtkunstwerk	  but	  this	  description,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  true,	  could	  apply	  
equally	  to	  complex	  installations.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  11	  Photograph	  of	  part	  of	  Michael	  Parekowhai’s	  	  
On	  Looking	  Into	  Chapman’s	  Homer	  at	  the	  2011	  Venice	  Biennale.	  
(Photo:	  Michael	  Hall)2	  
 
The	   multi-­‐sensory	   nature	   of	   gardens	   and	   installations	   means	   that	   they	   are	  
difficult	   to	   notate,	   record,	   reproduce	   and	   conserve	   and	   this,	   in	   turn,	   makes	  
them	   difficult	   to	   discuss,	   analyze,	   study	   or	   exhibit	   adequately	   away	   from	   the	  
site.	  The	  way	  their	  boundaries	  are	  perceived	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  difficulties.	  
Both	  gardens	  and	  installations	  may	  have	  blurred	  boundaries.	  “Where	  does	  the	  
garden	   end	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   landscape	   begin?”	   is	   a	   common	   question.	   A	  
                                                
1 Chatterjee (1986) 
2 [Online] Available from: http://www.nzatvenice.com/michael-parekowhai [Accessed 9 
November 2011] 
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similar	  question	  can	  be	  asked	  of	  installations:	  “Is	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  gallery	  part	  of	  
this	  work?”,	  or,	  outdoors,	  “Is	  the	  sky	  part	  of	  this	  installation?”	  
	  
Installations	  are	  usually	  designed	  for	  and	  installed	  in	  a	  particular	  setting.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  true	  of	  installations	  designed	  for	  outdoor	  spaces	  or	  indoor-­‐outdoor	  
spaces.	   Such	   installations	   are	   often	   site	   specific	   just	   as	   gardens	   are	   and	   they	  
therefore	  share	  gardens’	  difficulty	   in	  being	  reproduced	  at	  other	   locations.	   It	   is	  
suggested	  that	  On	  Looking	  into	  Chapman’s	  Homer	  cannot	  be	  reproduced	  away	  
from	   its	   Venetian	   settings	   because	   those	   particular	   environs	   are	   an	   essential	  
part	   of	   the	   work.	   Similarly	   the	   allées	   of	   Versailles	   cannot	   be	   reproduced	   in	  
Dubai,	  at	  least	  not	  without	  more	  than	  a	  touch	  of	  Disneyland.	  
	  
The	   aspects	   of	   installations	   discussed	   above	   have	   highlighted	   similarities	  
between	  gardens	  and	  installations.	  There	  remains	  to	  be	  addressed	  an	  important	  
difference	   between	   them.	   The	   resources	   which	   gardens	   supply	   for	   pictorial	  
representation	  and	  narrative	  are	  slender.	  	  The	  principal	  materials	  of	  gardens	  are	  
natural	  and	  they	  may	  be	  beautiful.	  For	  these	  reasons	  garden	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  
associated	  with	  the	  experiences	  of	  beauty,	  pleasure	  and	  pleasantness,	  none	  of	  
which	   have	   typified	   installations,	   at	   least	   when	   they	   first	   appeared.	   Because	  
installations	   can	   exhibit	   qualities	   and	   emotions	   such	   as	   irony,	   discomfort	   and	  
ugliness	   and	   because	   they	   can	   be	   densely	   intellectual,	   they	   have	   been	  much	  
favoured	  by	  philosophers	  of	  contemporary	  art,	  who	  have	  chosen	  by	  and	  large	  to	  
ignore	  gardens,	  perhaps	  because	  gardens	  cannot	  be	  and	  do	  these	  things.	  	  
	  
Reference	   has	   already	   been	   made	   to	   Langer’s	   understanding	   of	   ‘aesthetic	  
quality’	   and	   it	   is	   now	   time	   to	   investigate	   it	   further	  because	   it	   provides	   a	   step	  
towards	  the	  theories	  of	  Arnold	  Berleant,	  which	  are	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  gardens	  and	  outdoor	  installations.	  	  
	  
Langer	   believed	   that	   art	  was	   a	   fundamentally	   important	   and	   valuable	   human	  
and	   personal	   activity.	   	   But	   that	   did	   not	   imply	   for	   her	   that	   it	   was	   special	   and	  
beyond	   the	   realm	   of	   ordinary	   experience	   or	   that	   its	   objects	  were	   necessarily	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different	  from	  ordinary	  objects.	  What	  designated	  something	  an	  art	  object	  was	  
that	  it	  possessed	  what	  she	  termed	  ‘aesthetic	  quality’,	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  was	  
able	  to	  function	  as	  a	  non-­‐discursive	  symbol	  of	  our	  inner	  lives,	  and	  this	  function	  
could	   theoretically	   be	   performed	   equally	   well	   by	   an	   artwork	   or	   some	   other	  
object	  like	  a	  piece	  of	  craft.	  She	  wrote	  that	  art	  is	  the	  “creation	  of	  forms	  symbolic	  
of	   human	   feeling,”1	   and	   these	   symbols	   exist	   to	   articulate	   the	  world	  of	   feeling	  
that	  is	  otherwise	  ineffable.	  But	  they	  are	  incomplete	  symbols	  of	  that	  world	  and	  
require	  the	  conscious	  participation	  of	  each	  individual	  for	  their	  completion.	  
	  
Langer	   knew	   from	   personal	   experience	   that	   art	   was	   not	   about	   aesthetic	  
distance	  and	  disinterest	  and	  her	  theories	  supported	  her	   in	  that.	  She	  took	  us	  a	  
step	   further	   towards	  understanding	   that	   something	   like	   a	   garden	   can	  be	   real,	  
even	  useful,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  art.	  It	  was	  art	  because	  it	  was	  a	  special	  sort	  
of	   symbol	   and	   because	  we	   consciously	   interacted	  with	   it	   to	   a	   particular	   end.	  
Berleant	  took	  conscious	  interaction	  a	  step	  further	  and	  argued	  for	  what	  he	  called	  
active	  engagement.	  Berleant	  too	  knew	  from	  personal	  experience	  that	  art	  is	  not	  
about	  aesthetic	  distance	  and	  disinterest	  and	  he	  continues	  to	  be	  active	  equally	  
as	   a	   philosopher	   and	   a	   musician.	   In	   Art	   and	   Engagement2	   he	   outlines	   a	  
framework	   for	   appreciating	   the	   arts	   based	   on	   active	   engagement	  with	   them.	  
This	   approach	   has	  much	   in	   common	  with	   contemporary	   aesthetic	   theories	   of	  
nature,	   in	   which	   field	   Berleant	   is	   also	   active.	   	   In	   fact	   he	   writes:	   ”A	   single	  
aesthetic	  applies	  to	  nature	  and	  art	  because,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  they	  are	  both	  
cultural	  constructs,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  not	  talking	  about	  two	  things	  but	  about	  one.”	  3	  
What	  he	  terms	  the	  “aesthetics	  of	  engagement”4	  allows	  that	  we	  experience	  art,	  
and	  nature,	  perceptually	  and	  appreciate	  it	  aesthetically	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
enjoying	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  it.	  	  
	  
                                                
1 Langer (1953) p 40 
2 Berleant (1991) 
3 Berleant (2004) p. 86 
4 Ibid. p. 85 
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Berleant’s	  views	  provide	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  way	  gardens	  have	  
traditionally	  been	  experienced	  and	  discussed.	  They	   take	  us	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  
environmental	   aesthetics	   wherein	   gardens’	   realness,	   changeability,	   multi-­‐
sensory	  nature,	   lack	  of	  authorial	   control,	   indistinct	  boundaries,	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  
no	  longer	  problematic	  but	  are	  in	  fact	  taken	  for	  granted.	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8	   Conclusion	  	  
 
I	   have	   shown	   that	   gardens	   are	   like	   paradigmatic	   types	   of	   art	   in	   many	   ways:	  
gardens	  can	  represent,	  express	  emotion,	  exhibit	  meaningful	  form,	  be	  novel	  and	  
original,	  be	  aesthetic	  objects,	  and	  be	  of	   interest	  to	  The	  Artworld.	  However,	  no	  
historical	   conception	  of	   art	   is	   adequate	  because	   they	   all	   fail	   to	   accommodate	  
some	   undoubted	  works	   of	   art.	   Except	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   institutional	   theory,	  
each	  conception	  has	  highlighted	  a	  feature	  of	  paradigmatic	  art	  forms	  that	  is	  also	  
to	  be	   found	   in	  gardens.	   I	  have	  shown	  that	   the	  cluster	  concept	   is	   the	  only	  one	  
that	  can	  accommodate	  all	  art	  forms.	  It	  also	  accommodates	  gardens.	  	  	  
	  
In	   addition,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   some	   gardens	   possess	   qualities	   that	   are	   our	  
reasons	   for	   treating	   objects	   as	   works	   of	   art	   and	   for	   valuing	   them	   as	   such.	  
However,	   they	   offer	   a	   unique	   combination	   of	   those	   qualities.	   Gardens	   are	  
distinctive	   because	   the	   combination	   of	   artistic	   and	   aesthetically	   relevant	  
features	   to	  be	   found	   in	   them	   is	  distinctive.	  The	  distinctiveness	  of	  gardens	   is	  a	  
result	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   their	   principal	  materials,	   living	   organisms,	   change	  
over	  time	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  those	  changes	  are	  experienced.	  	  
	  
I	   have	   emphasized	   similarities	   between	   gardens	   and	   the	   performance	   arts	   of	  
music	   and	   dance.	   I	   have	   explained	   how	   gardens	   function	   rhythmically	   in	   a	  
manner	  analogous	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	  music	   functions	   rhythmically	   and	  how	  
movement	  of	   objects	   in	   time	  and	   space	   is	   an	   important	   artistic	   and	   aesthetic	  
feature	   of	   gardens	   and	   dance.	   Both	   music	   and	   dance	   are	   paradigmatic	   art	  
forms.	  They	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  list	  of	  paradigmatic	  arts	  since	  the	  time	  of	  
Plato	   and	   Aristotle.	   However,	   there	   are	   ways	   in	   which	   gardens	   are	   not	   like	  
music	  and	  dance	  and	  I	  have	  identified	  some	  significant	  dissimilarities.	  	  	  
	  
I	  have	  shown	  that	  gardens	  are	  also	  importantly	  similar	  to	  the	  new	  art	  forms	  of	  
kinetic	  sculpture,	  installations	  and	  environmental	  sculpture.	  	  When	  we	  look	  at	  a	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piece	   of	   kinetic	   sculpture	   we	   direct	   our	   attention	   to	   objects	   and	   how	   they	  
change	   in	   time	  and	   space	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	  we	  do	   in	   gardens	  and	  dance.	  	  
When	  we	  experience	  an	  installation	  or	  environmental	  sculpture	  we	  experience	  
it	  as	  ‘real’,	  three-­‐dimensional	  and	  inhabitable	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  gardens	  are.	  	  	  
	  
For	  all	  these	  reasons	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  gardens	  deserve	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  unique	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